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FALSE LIGHT PRIVACY: A REQUIEM
J. Clark Kelso*
I. INTRODUCTION
Citing some 50 cases in the space of three-and-one half
pages, Dean Prosser created and gave lasting momentum to a
new tort, which he dubbed "False Light in the Public Eye."'
Prior to Prosser's article, the words "false light" and "privacy"
are not joined together in any reported American decisions.
It is a testament to Prosser's influence (and to the influence of
the American Law Institute) that the same search for decisions
after Prosser's article was published uncovers some 378 state
and 285 federal opinions containing both the phrase "false
light" and the word "privacy." Judging by the numbers alone,
false light privacy seems to be a juridically recognized cause of
action.
The numbers do not tell the whole story, however. The
privacy torts of intrusion, public disclosure of private facts, and
appropriation of name or likeness, which Prosser also identi-
fied in his leading article, appear to have taken firm root. False
light privacy, by contrast, continues to be the subject of sub-
stantial judicial and scholarly criticism. A few jurisdictions have
rejected the tort outright.' There is also a recent scholarly call
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I
would like to acknowledge my research assistant, Scott E. Jenny, for his assistance
in completing this article.
1. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L REV. 383, 398-401 (1960) [hereinaf-
ter Prosser, Privacy].
2. The cases for this Article were found by conducting a search on Wesdaw
for "'false light' and 'privacy'" in the following databases: ALLSTATES,
ALLSTATES-OLD, ALLFEDS, and ALLFEDS-OLD. The pre-Prosser search uncov-
ered only one opinion in which both "false light" and "privacy" appear, but the
appearance of the phrase "false light" is many pages removed from the appear-
ance of the word "privacy," and the case, a death-penalty appeal, has nothing to
do with torts. People v. Lisenba, 89 P.2d 39 (Cal. 1939), affd, 94 P.2d 569 (Cal.
1939), affid, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
3. State cases: Brockman v. Frank, 565 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1991);
Renwick v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 312 S.E.2d 405 (N.C. 1984), celt.
denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984); Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broadcasting Co., 709 S.W.2d 475
783
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for reconsideration of the tort, citing primarily First Amend-
ment concerns.' These calls have, in turn, prompted a
lukewarm defense of the tort by Professor Gary Schwartz.-
(Mo. 1986); Yeager v. Local Union 20, 453 N.E.2d 666 (Ohio 1983); Haynik v.
Zimlich, 498 N.E.2d 1095 (Ohio 1986).
Wisconsin's privacy statute includes only intrusion, misappropriation and
public disclosure, and it is a good guess that false light therefore does not exist
in Wisconsin, although the court retains power to create false light despite its
absence from the statute. Jaqueline Hanson Dee, The Absence of False Light from the
Wisconsin Privacy Statute, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 99, 101-02 (1982).
New York's Civil Rights Law also omits false light, and, in contrast to the
situation in Wisconsin, the New York Civil Rights Law has been interpreted as
occupying the field, thereby precluding judicial development of a privacy cause of
action apart from the statute. Stephano v. News Group Publications, 474 N.E.2d
580 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Beverly v. Choices Women's Med. Ctr., 532 N.Y.S.2d
400 (App. Div. 1988); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (App. Div. 1982).
But see Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978) (applying New
York law).
Two jurisdictions, Nebraska and Rhode Island, have included false light in
their privacy statutes. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-201 to 211 (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
9-1-28.1 (1985).
As noted below, text accompanying note 165, since false light is purely a
creature of state law, state cases are the only authoritative source for finding the
law of false light. Federal cases will be cited separately in the notes in the remain-
der of this article. In the following federal cases, courts have stated that the appli-
cable law of the state does not recognize false light privacy: Mitchell v. Random
House, Inc., 865 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989) (Mississippi law); Deupree v. Iliff, 860
F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1988) (Missouri law); Angelotta v. American Broadcasting Corp.,
820 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1987) (Ohio law); Brown v. American Broadcasting Co.,
704 F.2d 1296 (4th Cir. 1983) (Virginia law); Foretich v. Glamour, 741 F. Supp.
247 (D.D.C. 1990) (Virginia law); Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos., 737 F.
Supp. 431 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (Ohio law); Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, 733
F. Supp. 1289 (D. Minn. 1990) (Minnesota law); Dunn v. Town of Emerald Isle,
722 F. Supp. 1309 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (North Carolina law); Price v. Viking Press,
Inc., 625 F. Supp. 641 (D. Minn. 1985) (Minnesota law), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom, Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989) (reversed only
as to ruling on defamation claim); Herink v. Harper & Row Publishers, 607 F.
Supp. 657 (D.C.N.Y. 1985) (New York law); Falwell v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 521 F.
Supp. 1204 (W.D. Va. 1981) (Virginia law); Ward v. Connor, 495 F. Supp. 434
(E.D. Va. 1980) (Virginia law); Evans v. Sturgill, 430 F. Supp. 1209 (W.D. Va.
1977) (Virginia law); Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). No
attempt has been made to verify whether federal decisions have accurately predict-
ed or stated state law.
4. See Diane L. Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light that
Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364 (1989); Harvey L. Zuckman, Invasion of Privacy -
Some Communicative Torts Whose Time Has Gone, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 253
(1990).
5. Professor Gary Schwartz advocates "a limited doctrine of false light" for
"nondisparaging false statements" that are "highly offensive." Gary Schwartz, Ex-
plaining and Justifying a Limited Tort of False Light Invasion of Privacy, 41 CASE W.
RES L. REV. 885, 887, 919 (1991). This definition would exclude from false light
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With over six hundred cases mentioning false light privacy
by name, one would expect to find at least one or two opin-
ions in which false light was actually necessary to a proper
decision. There should be at least one opinion about which
everyone could agree, "Yes, this is the essence of false light."
This article will demonstrate that there is not even a single
good case in which false light can be clearly identified as add-
ing anything distinctive to the law. In the overwhelming major-
ity of cases, false light is simply added on at the end of the
complaint to give the complaint the appearance of greater
weight and importance. False light is- on the periphery, and the
core of the case lies elsewhere, in defamation," in misappropri-
ation,7 or in intentional infliction of emotional distress.'
That the cases easily fall into these categories is no shock.
Scholars recognized early on that false light overlapped signifi-
cantly with other torts.' The most obvious overlaps are be-
tween false light and defamation, on the one hand, and false
coverage cases which more property are treated as involving defamation. Id. at
900. As Professor Schwartz recognizes, when you exclude the defamation cases,
there is not much left for false light, and all of the examples which he gives of
limited false light involve the publication for profit of nondisparaging false state-
ments (such as unauthorized biographies or stories which contain substantial false
hoods). Id. at 893-97. As noted below, all these cases can be handled through the
doctrine of misappropriation (which is a much more settled and stable tort than
false light).
Putting the cases to one side, there remains in defense of false light only a
vaguely defined interest in a person being able to define "his sense of self within
society." Id. at 897. Professor Schwartz explains that "fi]n a false light action, the
defendant's falsehood brings about a mismatch or conflict between the plaintiff's
actual identity and his identity in the minds of others, a conflict that itself can be
offensive or disorienting." Id. at 898. Yet in the absence of harm to reputation
(which may involve ultimately an injury to the plaintiff's pecuniary interests),
should there be a cause of action for invading an interest as vaguely defined as a
person's selfhood? This may be grist for the academic mill, but it does not seem
to be the sort of concrete interest or harm that would be (or should be) of inter-
est to our judicial system.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 230-80.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 281-318.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 319-37.
9. Dee, supra note 3, at 119-23; Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privay Under the
Fint Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1205, 1270- 75 (1976); Debra Ann Bacharach,
The Privacy Action in Texas: Its Characterization, and a Determination of Applicable
Statutes of Limitations, 29 Sw. L.J. 928, 931 (1975); Harry Kalven, Jr. Privacy in Tort
Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 340
(1966); John W. Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privay, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093
(1962).
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light and intentional infliction of emotional distress, on the
other hand. Few of these scholars thought that false light (or,
more broadly, invasion of privacy) should simply be excised
from the law, however. After emphasizing the overlap, schol-
ars either claimed there were significant differences between
false light and the other torts (usually emphasizing that false
light protects a different interest), or simply approved of cre-
ating a modern and simpler cause of action to replace defama-
tion and the other overlapping torts.
With over six hundred cases now on the books, the dust
created by the scholars has settled somewhat, and the merits of
false light may be tested by a complete examination of those
cases. What becomes clear upon this examination is that there
is no practical need for the false light cause of action.
The traditionally recognized torts, such as defamation,
misrepresentation, assault, battery, and so forth, were created
by courts or legislatures. Although these two institutions obvi-
ously operate in vastly different ways, both institutions general-
ly change the law only when there is a relatively widely- shared
belief that some action is necessary. In the legislatures,
widely-shared beliefs are necessary to secure majority approval.
In the courts, there has traditionally been a reluctance to cre-
ate causes of action unless there is a showing of genuine need.
This reluctance stems in part from separation of powers con-
10. Professor Kalven is one significant exception. He argued in his 1966 arti-
cle that false light privacy was unnecessary and that if the law of defamation
needed to be updated, the appropriate judicial process was to alter the rules of
defamation. Kalven, supra note 9, at 341. See also Frederick Davis, What Do We
Mean by 'Right to Privacy"?, 4 S.D. L. REV. 1 (1959); Don R. Pember & Dwight L.
Teeter, Jr., Privacy and the Press Since Time, Inc. v. Hill, 50 WASH. L. REV. 57,
90-91 (1974). A student commentator suggests that false light privacy either be
reformulated to reflect the privacy interest (rather than the reputational interest)
or that the tort be abandoned. Bruce A. McKenna, False Light: Invasion of Privacy?,
15 TULSA LJ. 113, 137-39 (1979).
Quite a few scholars complained that Prosser's categories were wrong not
because they did not accurately summarize the cases, but because his definition of
privacy was ultimately under-inclusive. See, e.g., Tom Gerety, Redefining Ptivacy, 12
HARV. C.R.-C.L L REV. 233 (1977); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of
Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962 (1964). So far,
however, the effort by scholars to create a unitary interest in privacy that could
form the basis for a single cause of action-invasion of privacy-has been largely
ignored by the courts as a matter of tort law and rejected by the Supreme Court
as a matter of constitutional principle. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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cerns and in part from an intellectual tradition among judges
of restraint and caution.
False light was not created by the courts or the legisla-
tures, however. It was created by Dean Prosser and sanctioned
by the American Law Institute. As will be shown below, none
of the cases Prosser cited in support of false light privacy come
close to recognizing such a tort. False light existed only in
Prosser's mind.
That false light's parentage lies not in the courts or legisla-
tures but in the halls of academia suggests an explanation for
false light's failure. Scholars do not live with the restrictions of
action placed upon judges or legislators. Scholars need not act
with restraint and caution, and the constitutional separation of
powers does not act as a check upon what scholars propose. As
a result, scholars can propose changes to the law to satisfy
their own personal standards ofjustice, fairness, consistency or
simplicity.
In the case of false light, the theory was that we could mix
falsity from defamation together with unreasonable publicity
and emotional distress, and that the result of this mixture
would be a new and different tort. The reality is that the
courts prior to Prosser did not perceive a need for this tort,
and in the over six hundred decisions subsequent to Prosser,
courts still have not found a reason for this tort." Worse yet,
the supposed existence of false light has confused courts and
practitioners who remain uncertain as to the scope of the tort
and the type of defenses which may be asserted. It is time that
courts declared the experiment at an end. False light and Re-
statement (Second) of Torts section 652E should be rejected.
Since false light has been mentioned in over 600 deci-
sions, how can it plausibly be maintained that false light does
not actually exist? It depends, of course, upon what we mean
by a cause of action "existing" in the cases. If a cause of action
can be said to exist simply because a court says somewhere
that it recognizes the existence of the cause of action, then
false light unquestionably exists. This sort of purely formal
11. Professor Davis, in a pre-Prosser article, nicely summed up this point as
follows: "Indeed, one can logically argue that the concept of a right to privacy
was never required in the first place, and that its whole history is an illustration
of how well meaning but impatient academicians can upset the normal develop-
ment of the law by pushing it too hard." Davis, supra note 10, at 23.
1992]
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recognition of a cause of action by a court is not the proper
test, however, as can easily be proven. Suppose that the Su-
preme Court of X formally recognized a cause of action called
"interference with reputation," but then equated "interference
with reputation" in all aspects with the law of defamation. In
one sense-a not very interesting sense-interference with repu-
tation would be an existing tort in the State of X.
Since formal recognition of a tort does not constitute
"independent existence," what does? This article proposes that
a cause of action "exists" in the cases only if one or more cases
properly decided can be found in which the plaintiff either did
recover or could have recovered solely on the basis of the sup-
posed cause, of action. Although this may seem like an overly
rigorous test, after more than 600 reported decisions mention-
ing false light, there should be one or more cases that satisfy
this test.
Part II of this article examines in detail the same set of
cases Dean Prosser relied upon in his 1960 article and shows
that Prosser incorrectly extracted from these cases a principle
nowhere to be found in the cases themselves. Part III then
reviews all of the cases decided in the years subsequent to
Prosser's article and shows that nearly all of these cases could
be decided the same way without resort to a false light cause
of action. The only cases where false light clearly changes the
result are a few statute of limitations decisions, the results of
which are explainable by judicial hostility to limitation periods.
When the smoke has cleared, there exist only two decisions in
which state appellate courts have affirmed pro- plaintiff judg-
ments solely on the basis of false light privacy." Both cases
could have been decided on defamation grounds. Significantly,
in one of the cases, the supposed existence of false light priva-
cy confused both defense counsel and the trial court, leading
to a judgment probably inconsistent with constitutional re-
quirements. It is time to end the confusion and declare that
false light privacy forms no part of the common law.
II. PROSSER'S FOLLY
As everyone knows, Prosser had a talent for finding trends
in the law of torts and for reinterpreting cases-sometimes
12. See infra text accompanying notes 437-72.
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large numbers of cases-to fit within a new and potentially
more useful classification. Prosser's articles on intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, nuisance, 4 contributory negli-
gence, and strict products liability" permanently changed
the face of the law of torts.
Prosser's article on the law of privacy, published in 1960,
was equally influential. The influence of the article is only part-
ly attributable to the article itself. By 1960, Prosser was widely
recognized as one of the leading torts scholars in the country,
and held the influential position of Reporter for the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts. Many believed that if Prosser said the
cases stood for a particular proposition, then it must be true.
Prosser's discussion of false light privacy is a perfect exam-
ple of the influence which Prosser wielded by virtue of his own
reputation. Citing some 50 cases in the course of a seven para-
graph discussion, Prosser proclaimed that one type of tortious
invasion of privacy "consists of publicity that places the plain-
tiff in a false light in the public eye." 7 The case citations are
sprinkled liberally in the footnotes. None of the cases are dis-
cussed in full in the text, and the reader must therefore be
satisfied with Prosser's spin.
In the following sections, which track Prosser's para-
graphs, the cases will receive a more complete treatment, and
it will be seen that Prosser's spin does not represent the only
spin which can be imparted. Each of the cases which Prosser
cites is readily explainable on another basis that does not in-
volve what Prosser ultimately calls false light privacy. None of
the cases Prosser relies upon supports his ultimate conclusion
that false light was an existing cause of action.
If Prosser had simply indicated that he was reinterpreting
opinions in a way probably never intended by the authors of
13. William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering-A New Tort, 37
MICH. L REv. 874 (1939).
14. William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEx. L. REV. 399 (1942).
15. William L Prosser, Contributory Negligence as a Defense to Violation of Stat-
ute, 32 MINN. L. REv. 105 (1948); William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1953); William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L
REV. 465 (1953).
16. William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L REv. 791 (1966).
17. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 1, at 398.
7891992]
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the opinions, Prosser's discussion would not be so misleading
(and probably would not have been quite as influential). In-
stead, Prosser characterized the cases as already supporting his
new creation. As will be seen, for Prosser to claim, as he did,
that false light privacy "has made a rather nebulous appear-
ance in a line of decisions" and that "in late years ... it has
begun to receive.., independent recognition" was wishful
thinking.' The first appearance of false light privacy and its
first independent recognition took place in the pages of
Prosser's own article, not in the cases themselves.
A. The Supposed First Appearance of False Light Privacy
Prosser claims that false light privacy "seems to have made
its first appearance in 1816, when Lord Byron succeeded in
enjoining the circulation of a spurious and inferior poem at-
tributed to his pen." 9 Prosser cites in the margin the case of
Lord Byron v. Johnston, ° the report of which is so short that it
may be fully included in the footnotes here.' According to
18. Prosser, Priva, supra note 1, at 398.
19. Prosser, Pri1uac supra note 1, at 398.
20. 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (1816).
21. The report is as follows:
Injunction, until answer or further order, to restrain the publi-
cation of a work as the Plaintiff's, upon affidavit by the Plaintiff's
agents (the Plaintiff himself being abroad), of circumstances making it
highly probable that it was not the Plaintiff's work; and the Defen-
dant refusing to swear as to his belief that it was so.
The Defendant, a publisher, advertised for sale certain poems,
which he represented by the advertisment to be the work of Lord
Byron, on whose behalf a Bill was filed (His Lordship being himself
abroad), for an Injunction to restrain the publication under the title
described in the advertisement; and, on affidavits made by His
Lordship's agents, both as to their belief and also as to circumstances
rendering it highly probable that the work was not his Lordship's, an
application was made to the Vice-Chancellor accordingly; when His
Honour, upon the ground that the affidavits were not sufficiently
positive, and might be contradicted, ordered that notice of the mo-
tion should be given to the Defendant.
Notice have been given pursuant to this Order, the application
was now renewed before the Lord Chancellor, who approved of the
course which had been taken by the Vice- Chancellor; and, upon the
Defendant declining to swear as to his belief that the poem in ques-
tion was actually the work of Lord Byron, granted the motion.
An Injunction was issued accordingly, to restrain the Defendant
from publishing, in the Plaintiff's name, or as his work, the several
poems mentioned in the advertisement, or any parts thereof, till an-
1992] FALSE LIGHT PRIVACY
Prosser, one general principle consistent with the result in
Lord Byron's case was that "falsity or fiction has been held to
defeat the privilege of reporting news and other matters of
public interest, or of giving further publicity to already public
figures."" Alternatively, and somewhat more narrowly, Lord
Byron's case fell within a series of cases involving "publicity
falsely attributing to the plaintiff some opinion or utter-
ance."23
As can be seen in footnote 21, supra, the report in Lord
Byron is short and not very illuminating. 4 The Defendant was
a publisher attempting to sell a book of poems falsely attribut-
ed to Lord Byron, the most famous English poet of the time
(and one of the most famous of all times).' Lord Byron pub-
swer or further order.
Reg. Lib. B. 62 b. Id. (emphasis omitted)
22. Prosser, Privaty
, 
supra note 1, at 398.
23. Id. For discussion of other cases involving false attribution, see infra text
accompanying notes 30-107.
24. Lord Langdale, The Master of the Rolls, later complained that "I regret
that the report of the case in Merivale [Lord Byron] does not assist me by stating
the reasons for making the order." Clark v. Freeman, 50 Eng. Rep. 759, 762
(1848).
25. The following letter from Lord Byron to his publisher, Mr. Murray, sets
forth the underlying facts of the dispute:
Venice, Dec. 9, 1816.
In a letter from England, I am informed that a man named
Johnson has taken upon himself to publish some poems called a 'Pil-
grimage to Jerusalem, a Tempest, and an Address to my Daughter,' &
c., and to attribute them to me, adding that he had paid five hun-
dred guineas for them. The answer to this is short: I never wrote such
poems, never received the sum he mentions, nor any other in the same qua'
ter, nor (as far as moral or mortal certainty can be sure) ever had, di-
rectly or indirectly, the slightest communication with Johnson in my lfe; not
being aware that the person existed till this intelligence gave me to
understand that there were such people. Nothing surprises me, or this
perhaps would, and most things amuse me, or this probably would
not. With regard to myself, the man has merely lyed; that's natural; his
betters have set him the example. But with regard to you [.e.,
Byron's publisher], his assertion may perhaps injure you in your publi-
cations; and I desire that it may receive the most, public and unquali-
fied contradiction. I do not know that there is any punishment for a
thing of this kind, and if there were, I should not feel disposed to
pursue this ingenious mountebank farther than was necessary for his
confutation; but thus far it may be necessary to proceed.
You will make what use you please of this letter; and Mr.
Kinnaird, who has power to act for me in my absence, will, I am
sure, readily join you in any steps which it may be proper to take,
with regard to the absurd falsehood of this poor creature ....
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lished his own poems under his own name, the publication of
which generated a substantial income for himself and for his'
publisher." Although the report does not indicate the basis
for the action in Lord Byron, Lord Byron's agents undoubtedly
alleged that the Defendant was essentially engaged in "passing
off" the Defendant's product as though it were the Plaintiff's
product. Passing off-attempting to sell goods under the false
claim that the goods were manufactured by another-had been
recognized at common law (although not by that name), and
an injunction to prevent a competitor from passing off goods
as the plaintiff's was an appropriate remedy.27 Subsequent
cases treat Lord Byron v. Johnston as a passing-off case.2
THOMAS MOORE, THE LIFE OF LORD BYRON 581-82 (1855) (quoting letter of Lord
Byron to Mr. Murray, dated Dec. 9, 1816).
Other spurious attributions of literary works to Lord Byron are described
in SAMUEL C. CHEW, BYRON IN ENGLAND 169-93 (1924).
26. The economic relationship between Lord Byron and his publisher was
quite complex. Lord Byron typically refused to accept payment for his works. His
publisher nevertheless kept substantial sums on account for Lord Byron and, when
Byron needed the money, made payments to Lord Byron from that account. SAM-
UEL SMILES, A PUBLISHER AND His FRIENDS-MEMOIR AND CORRESPONDENCE OF
THE LATE JOHN MURRAY, 352-56 (1891).
27. See Southern v. How, 79 Eng. Rep. 1243 (decided during the reign of
Queen Elizabeth I). The court indicated that an action upon the case would lie by
a manufacturer of fine cloth against a competitor who used the other's mark up-
on his inferior cloth. Singleton v. Bolton, 99 Eng. Rep. 661, 661 (1783). Lord
Mansfield said "that if the defendant had sold a medicine of his own under the
plaintiff's name or mark, that would be a fraud for which an action would lie."
Id. Substitute the word "poem" for "medicine" in the quote from Singleton, and
the decision in Lord Byron is easily supported by then-existing authority. See also
Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trademarks, 9 MICH. L REV.
29, 40 (1910). "It is curious that most of the provisions of our modern trade
mark statutes and many of the common law rules on the subject are to be found
in surprisingly similar form in the mediaeval guild regulations, municipal ordinanc-
es and royal decrees." Id.
28. E.g., Clark v. Freeman, 50 Eng. Rep. 759 (1848) (refusing to enjoin the
distribution of advertisements and pamphlets announcing "Sir James Clarke's Con-
sumption Pills," advertisements which falsely suggested that Sir James Clark, a
prominent physician at the time, had some connection with the product). The
court applied the long-standing rule against enjoining libels, holding that the equi-
ty court did not have jurisdiction to decide in the first instance whether the
defendant's conduct constituted a libel. Id. at 761. Lord Langdale, The Master of
the Rolls, also explained that "I cannot liken this case to that of Croft v. Day,
where a man fraudulently attempted to make his own goods pass off as the goods
of another, to the prejudice of that other. This the Court would not allow." Id. at
762. Plaintiff's counsel then cited Lord Byron to the court to show that it had
jurisdiction to issue the injunction, but the court distinguished Lord Byron, making
clear that in its view, Lord Byron, like Croft v. Day, was simply a passing off case:
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Prosser apparently rejected this natural and obvious read-
ing of the case by ignoring what was probably, for the court,
the most important feature of the case-that is, Lord Byron's
participation in the market for literary products, a participa-
tion that gave rise to a type of competitive injury over which
the equity courts had jurisdiction." Prosser's analysis thus be-
gins by misreading Lord Byron v. Johnston, a misreading per-
I do not think the cases [including Lord Byron] apply. If Sir
James Clark [the plaintiff] had been in the habit of manufacturing
and selling pills it would be very like the other cases in which the
Court has interfered for the protection of property. I regret that the
report of [Lord Byron] in Merivale [Lord Byron] does not assist me by
stating the reasons for making the order.
Id. at 762.
In other words, since the defendant was not competing with Sir James
Clark in the manufacture and sale of drugs, Sir James Clark could not secure an
injunction against the defendant's unfair competition (an unremarkable holding
repeated by courts in both England and the United States). Lord Byron, by con-
trast, was a participant in the literary market, and he could secure an injunction
against the defendant's unfair competition (again, an unremarkable holding).
29. Prosser is not the only one to have misinterpreted Lord Byron. Professor
Wigmore found Lord Byron to be a case sui generis:
The grounds of the judgment are not reported; the sale might
of course interfere with the sale of genuine poems; and the false
poems might detract from the plaintiff's professional repute. But the
latter circumstance does not appear in the case; and the former as-
pect was not essential, and moreover would not be covered by any
copyright, for the plaintiff had no author's copyright in these poems.
The principle of this class of cases is quite independent of copyright,
or of the marketable quality of the utterance ascribed to the plaintiff.
It includes all cases where the defendant falsely attributes to the
plaintiff's composition any statement, whether it be in book, pam-
phlet, or interview; whether it be of personal opinion or of fact; and
whether the tenor of the statement be hateful or contemptible in the
minds of readers.
John H. Wigmore, The Right Against False Attribution of Belief or Utterance, 4 KY.
LJ., No. 8, 3, 5-6 (1916).
Professor Wigmore seems to have labored under the impression that copy-
right was the only established legal basis for securing an injunction in the circum-
stances, and that by granting an injunction, the court was defining some new
wrong. This is simply inaccurate. As indicated above, English courts had previously
recognized that a market-participant is injured when a competitor misappropriates
the other's trademark. See supra note 27. Accordingly, Wigmore's statement that
"[t]he principle of this class of cases is quite independent ...of the marketable
quality of the utterance," id., is probably incorrect. Indeed, the court in Clark v.
Freeman, 50 Eng. Rep. 759 (1848), specifically rejected Professor Wigmore's posi-
tion, refusing to grant an injunction specifically because the plaintiff was not a
participant in the marketplace. See supra note 28.
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haps designed to suggest to the reader that the new tort being
described has actually been around since 1816.
B. False Attribution of Opinion or Utterance
Prosser spends the next three paragraphs in his discussion
identifying three "form[s]" of false light privacy. The first para-
graph identifies "publicity falsely attributing to the plaintiff
some opinion or utterance."' Prosser's first example is a ref-
erence back to Lord Byron."' As just noted, Prosser's reading
of Lord Byron does not withstand scrutiny. As will be seen, each
of the other cases discussed in the third paragraph suffers
from a similar misreading.
1. Fictitious Testimonials in Advertising
Prosser gives a "cf cite to four cases"2 involving "fictitious
testimonial[s] used in advertising," which Prosser says "might
be ... [a] good illustration" of false attribution of opinion or
utterance." Prosser's hesitation ("might be") and use of a "of"
cite are well advised, because each case cited is more appropri-
ately described as involving either libel or improper commer-
cial exploitation of plaintiffs name or likeness (a
well-recognized tort quite distinct from false light)." In
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.,"3 the defendant's
advertisement contained two pictures, one of a happy man
(the plaintiff), and the other of a sickly looking man.' Above
30. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 1, at 398.
31. Prosser, PrivacA supra note 1, at 398.
32. Prosser, Pivacy supra note 1, at 398 n.130.
33. Prosser, Pivay, supra note 1, at 398.
34. Prosser himself recognized that these cases involved misappropriation of
name or likeness for commercial benefit, and he cited the same cases in his sec-
tion on appropriation. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 1, at 386, 402 nn.15 6 -57 .
35. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
36. Id. A case note heralding recognition of the "right of privacy" in Ken-
tucky indicates that both pictures in Pavesich were of the plaintiff and that below
the pictures "was the statement that his unhappy condition was changed to the
happy one by having taken out a policy in this company." L Meriwether Smith,
The Right of Privacy, 4 KY. L.J., No. 3, 22, 24 (1915). Although this misdescription
of the facts in Pavesich is not really material to decision of the case (since there
still would have been an unauthorized commercial exploitation), the author's ap-
parent carelessness in dealing with facts may suggest an equal careleisness in de-
scribing the holding of the case as involving the "right of privacy" pure and sim-
ple. Indeed, Professor Wignore criticized the author for not observing the distinc-
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the plaintiff's picture was the advertising pitch, "Do it now.
The man who did.""7 Above the other face was the warning,
"Do it while you can. The man who didn't."' Beneath the
plaintiffs picture was the following quote attributed to the
plaintiff: "In my healthy and productive period of life I bought
insurance in the New England Mutual Life Insurance Co., of
Boston, Mass., and to-day (sic) my family is protected and I am
drawing an annual dividend on my paid-up policies."'9
The court held that the complaint properly pled both libel
and invasion of privacy. In approving the cause of action for
invasion of privacy, the court quoted and adopted portions of
the dissenting opinion in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Co.,' a factually similar case where the majority denied the
existence of a cause of action. The dissenting opinion as quot-
ed in Pavesich clearly identified unauthorized commercial ap-
propriation as the key to the cause of action:
Instantaneous photography is a modern invention, and
affords the means of securing a portraiture of an
individual's face and form in invitum their owner. While,
so far forth as it merely does that, although a species of
aggression, I concede it to be an irremediable and irre-
pressible feature of the social evolution. But if it is to be
permitted that the portraiture may be put to commercial
or other uses for gain by the publication of prints there-
from, then an act of invasion of the individual's privacy
results, possibly more formidable and more painful in its
consequences than an actual bodily assault might be.4'
The cause of action for libel in Pavesich arose out of
additional allegations that the plaintiff's friends and acquain-
tances knew the plaintiff did not have a policy of insurance
with the defendant. Because of this knowledge, the testimonial
tion between a commercial misappropriation (which may occur even though the
plaintiff had made the statements attributed to him but simply had not authorized
their use in a publication) and a cause of action for defamation (which necessarily
involves falsehoods). John H. Wigmore, The Right Against False Attribution of Belief
or Utterance, 4 Ky. LJ., No. 8, 3 (1915).
37. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 68.
38. Id.
39. Id.; see also Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 69.
40. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
41. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 78 (quoting Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box, Co..
64 N.E. 442, 450 (N.Y. 1902) (Gray, J., dissenting)).
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attributed to the plaintiff would lead these friends and ac-
quaintances to believe that the plaintiff was "a self-confessed
liar" either gratuitously or for profit, and, in either case, would
"merit the contempt of all persons having a correct conception
of moral principles."42
It is only by conflating the two causes of action-one for
libel and the other for commercial misappropriation- that
Prosser is able to discover in Pavesich a new cause of action for
false light. Prosser extracts falsity from the libel cause of action
and public use of that falsity from the misappropriation cause
of action to create a new cause of action concerning publicity
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. The
new cause of action is of course a hybrid, and there is nothing
in Pavesich itself to indicate that the court would have sanc-
tioned this particular hybrid. To the contrary, the court in
Pavesich carefully discusses the two causes of action separately,
no doubt in order to maintain the purity of-each."
The three other cases in Prosser's footnote follow the
same pattern. In Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn,44 the defendant,
manufacturer of "Doan's Kidney Pills," circulated 8,000,000
pamphlets which contained a letter endorsing the pills falsely
attributed to the plaintiff, "a prominent figure in the Blue
Grass country of Kentucky," and containing a picture of the
plaintiff above the letter.4" As in Pavesich, the court found that
there was both a libel and an invasion of privacy. The court
was careful, however, to narrowly characterize the invasion of
privacy as involving "the publication of the picture of a person
without his consent, as a part of an advertisement for the pur-
pose of exploiting the publisher's business."4"
42. Id. at 81.
43. An example will demonstrate the fallacy which infects Prosser's reasoning.
Suppose we take falsity from defamation and misrepresentation and pecuniary loss
from interference with contractual relations to create a new tort called "falsely
breaching a contract" which would make it tortious to give false reasons in sup-
port of a breach of contract. Even the Supreme Court of California did not go
this far in Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 686 P.2d
1158, (Cal. 1984), and Seaman's is at the outer edge of tort law, if not entirely off
the map. OKI America, Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, 872 F.2d 312 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Kozinski, J., concurring).
44. 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. Ct. App. 1909).
45. Id. at 365-66.
46. Id. at 366.
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The court in Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equipment
Co., 7 explained that the suit was "an action for damages for
the unauthorized use by defendant of plaintiffs name in adver-
tising its product and for an injunction." 8 No more need be
said about this case to show that it falls squarely within
Pavesich. Finally, Manger v. Kree Institute of Electrolysis9 arose
under the New York Civil Rights Law that by its explicit terms
is limited to misappropriation of name or likeness for "adver-
tising purposes or for the purposes of trade."'"
Prosser next identifies an "Oregon case in which the name
of the plaintiff was signed to a telegram to the governor urging
political action which it would have been illegal for him, as a
state employee, to advocate."5' In the case cited, Hinish v.
Meier & Frank Co.,52 the defendant signed the plaintiffs name
(without the plaintiffs consent) to a telegram which opposed
proposed state legislation that would have substantially dam-
aged the defendant's business." In particular, the defendant
maintained an optical department within its stores, and the
proposed legislation "would have prevented the defendant...
from continuing to engage in the business of fitting and selling
optical glasses to the public." 4 The plaintiff was actually a
federal employee (rather than a state employee as Prosser
claimed), and as a Classified Civil Service Employee of the
United States Government, was prohibited by federal statute
47. 291 P.2d 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955).
48. Id. at 196.
49. 233 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1956).
50. Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law provides as follows:
Any person whose name, portrait .or picture is used within this
state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without
the written consent first obtained as above provided may maintain an
equitable action in the supreme court of this state against the person,
firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or picture, to prevent
and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages
for any injuries sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant
shall have knowingly used such person's name, portrait or picture in
such manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by the last
section, the jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary damages.
Manger, 233 F.2d at 7 n.1.
51. Prosser, Priva supra note 1, at 398.
52. 113 P.2d 438 (Or. 1941).
53. Id. at 439.40.
54. Id.
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from engaging in political activities. 5 The plaintiff alleged
that the defendant's unauthorized use of the plaintiffs name
jeopardized plaintiffs employment and pension rights.'
Although Prosser highlights the fact that "it would have
been illegal for him, as a state [sic] employee, to advocate" a
political position, 7 the court was singularly unimpressed with
the allegation that the defendants had jeopardized the
plaintiffs employment, holding that "it cannot be assumed that
he would have been penalized for misconduct of which he was
not guilty."58 Rather, the court held a cause of action was stat-
ed because the complaint alleged that "the defendants appro-
priated to themselves for their own purposes, without the
plaintiffs consent and against his will, his name, his personality
and whatever influence he may have possessed, and injected
them into a political controversy in which, as far as appears, he
had no interest."59 Hinish is nothing more than a simple mis-
appropriation case, quite similar to Lord Byron, Pavesich, and a
host of other decisions.'
Prosser gives an "accord" cite to Schwartz v. Edrington,6"
apparently to indicate that Schwartz is essentially on all fours
with Hinish, and describes Schwartz in a parenthetical as involv-
ing "continued circulation of petition after plaintiff had with-
drawn his signature."" Schwartz is, however, entirely different
from Hinish and involves more than a simple publication of a
petition after plaintiff had withdrawn his signature. The peti-
tion at issue in Schwartz was a legal petition, the purpose of
which was to transform a village into an incorporated munici-
pality.' Pursuant to the applicable Louisiana statutes, a peti-
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 1, at 398.
58. 113 P.2d at 448.
59. Id.
60. The court in Hinish did not emphasize that the defendants were using
plaintiff's name for purely commercial purposes, but the facts clearly would have
supported that conclusion, since the defendants were attempting to defeat legisla-
tion that would have hurt their commercial business. Moreover, lobbying is itself a
commercial enterprise, and endorsements from influential people are a commodity
within that market. Unauthorized use of endorsements by lobbyists thus falls well
within ordinary commercial misappropriation doctrine.
61. 62 So. 660 (La. 1913).
62. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 1, at 398 n.131.
63. 62 So. at 660.
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tion signed by two-thirds of the electors of a village was to be
presented to the governor for approval only after the petition
had been published in a local newspaper (or otherwise posted
for public inspection if there was no local paper) for three
weeks." The plaintiffs signed the petition under the mistaken
impression that the governing officials of the soon-to-be creat-
ed municipality would be chosen at an election.' After sign-
ing the petition, the plaintiffs learned that the first set of offi-
cials would simply be appointed by the governor, and the
plaintiffs asked to withdraw their signatures from the peti-
tion.' By this time, the proponents had already secured signa-
tures from more than two-thirds of the electors, and were
ready to publish the petition for the statutorily-required three
weeks. The trial court enjoined the publication of the
plaintiffs' names in support of the petition, citing the publica-
tion as "'an invasion of their right of privacy."'67
The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the injunction,
but said nothing in its opinion about the right of privacy. In-
stead, the sole issue on appeal was whether the injunction
violated constitutional and common law proscriptions against
enjoining speech.' In explaining why the injunction did not
violate these principles, the court characterized the defendant's
conduct as follows:
What they were enjoined from doing was the publication
of a petition purporting to be signed by, and which was, in
fact, signed by, the plaintiffs in injunction, and purporting
to be their petition, but which was not their petition, be-
cause, having signed it under a misapprehension, they
disowned and repudiated it, and no longer desired that to
be done which it was the purpose of the petition to accom-
plish. And, the publication, not being an exercise by
relators of the privilege of publishing their sentiments, but
being an unauthorized use by them of a composition pur-
porting to represent the sentiments of the signers was, as
to the use of their names, under the control of the
64. Id.
65. Id. at 660-61.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 661 (quoting trial court).
68. Both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions had been interpreted
generally as forbidding prior restraints. Id. Louisiana had adopted the common
law rule forbidding injunctions against libellous publications. Id.
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signers."
Although the court did not discuss any positive rea-
sons in support of the injunction and limited its discussion to
rejecting constitutional opposition to the injunction, several
plausible reasons commend themselves, none of which involves
false light. Most obviously, we may hypothesize a common law
rule that an elector who signs a petition favoring conversion of
a village to a municipality has an absolute right to withdraw
the signature at any time prior to the actual conversion." If
there is a right to withdraw from the petition, then refusing to
remove the elector's name and subsequent publication of the
petition with the elector's name would be wrongful conduct
warranting exercise of equity jurisdiction. This has nothing to
do with false light privacy, of course; it has everything to do
with public policy regarding the proper presentation of peti-
tions to government.
2. Spurious Books and Articles
Recognizing that the above cases do not strongly support
the existence of false light privacy, Prosser turns to "[m]ore
typical" cases involving "spurious books and articles, or ideas
expressed in them, which purport to emanate from the plain-
tiff."" Two cases are cited as falling into this alleged category,
but neither fit. In D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Co.,' the
plaintiff alleged causes of action for libel and violation of New
York's commercial misappropriation statute. The defendant
attributed to the plaintiff an article which recounted in first
person a wildly exaggerated adventure in Africa along the lines
of an Indiana Jones movie." The plaintiff was a world-famous
writer and authority on African culture. The intermediate ap-
pellate court held that the complaint sufficiently pled the ele-
ments of libel because, given the plaintiff's stature and reputa-
tion for honesty (as alleged in the complaint), the outrageously
69. Id. at 662-63.
70. Indeed, Louisiana Revised Statutes now specifically provides that "[a]ny
elector may withdraw his name from the petition by filing a signed statement of
withdrawal with the registrar of voters." LA. REV. STAT. § 33:1(B)(2) (West 1988).
71. Prosser, Priacy, supra note 1, at 398-99 (footnote omitted).
72. 139 N.Y.S. 200 (App. Div. 1913), modified, 102 N.E. 1101 (N.Y. 1913).
73. For example, the article told of how the author stopped a Congo canni-
bal feast, saving a young American in the process. D'Alamonte, 139 N.Y.S. at 202.
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exaggerated story was "calculated to hold him up to ridicule
and contempt."' The court also held that the complaint stat-
ed a cause of action under New York's commercial misappro-
priation statute."5
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the court's judg-
ment with respect to the libel cause of action, but reversed the
court's judgment on the commercial misappropriation statute,
holding that the complaint did not fall within the statute's
proscription.' The court did not explain in its short, per curi-
am order why the complaint did not satisfy the statute, but the
clear result in the case is that the complaint stated only a cause
of action for libel and did not state a claim for New York's
version of invasion of privacy by commercial misappropriation.
The ultimate decision in this case is thus exactly contrary to
Prosser's position.
The next case cited is Hogan v. A. S. Barnes & Co." This
is a most remarkable case for Prosser to rely upon, because the
court explicitly grounded liability in the law of unfair competi-
tion and just as explicitly denied that there had been any inva-
sion of privacy at all. The defendant's agent, one Camerer, was
employed to write a book titled "Golf With the Masters.""9
The book contained pictures of twelve famous golfers accom-
panied by textual analysis of various aspects of the golfers'
games. The chapter titles, format and advertising for the book
gave the impression that each of the golfers had some active
input into the book.
Camerer had taken photographs of Ben Hogan on the
putting green at Baltusrol warming up for the 1954 U.S. Open.
Camerer sent Hogan a consent and release form which would
have authorized Camerer to use the pictures in conjunction
with the planned book. Hogan flatly refused in a short letter
which read in its entirety, "'Are you kidding?"" Hogan, who
had previously authored a golf instruction book which had
been published by the defendant, sent a letter of protest to the
defendant's president, warning him not to publish pictures of
74. Id. at 202-03.
75. I& See supra note 49.
76. D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Co., 102 N.E. 1101 (N.Y. 1913).
77. 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314 (Pa. 1957).
78. Id
79. 1d. at 315.
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Hogan in the planned book.' Defendant published the book
with Hogan's picture notwithstanding Hogan's protests.
Hogan brought suit, alleging causes of action for invasion
of privacy, unfair competition, misappropriation, libel and
breach of fiduciary duty.8 The court rejected the privacy
claim in its entirety, reasoning that invasion of privacy related
to an invasion of "'the right to be let alone,"' and that Hogan,
who sought widespread public attention and acclaim, could not
assert an invasion of his right to be let alone. Hogan did not
really want to be let alone.'
The court embraced Hogan's unfair competition and mis-
appropriation claims, however, and awarded Hogan substantial
damages on those causes of action. The court's analysis was
straightforward in this regard. Citing a line of unfair competi-
tion cases which find their inspiration in International News
Service v. Associated Presi," the court found that Hogan's ef-
forts as a golfer and writer created an enforceable property
interest in the commercial value of Hogan's name and picture,
and that the defendant's unauthorized exploitation of Hogan's
name and picture constituted unfair competition." Prosser's
reliance upon this decision shows just how far Prosser was
willing to go to support his new creation."
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 315-16.
83. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
84. 114 U.S.P.Q at 316-20.
85. There were indeed only two things which were false about the book.
First, the book falsely suggested that Hogan had authorized its publication and
had actively participated in the analysis or writing. Second, the book purported to
give away Hogan's "secret," which was apparently a much talked about topic
among golf enthusiasts. It is clear from the court's analysis that the second false-
hood was entirely irrelevant. There still would have been a recovery for unfair
competition even if the author had correctly guessed Hogan's secret, which the
author had not done. The first falsehood was of course critical to the unfair com-
petition claim. If Hogan had authorized the book, there would have been no
claim for unfair competition. This is of course true of all unfair competition
claims. If the competitor had consented to the use, there would be no injury. But
if this falsity is all that is required for false light, then all we have done is to
rename certain unfair competition claims as false light claims.
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3. Unauthorized Use of Name
Prosser closes this paragraph with a reference to cases
involving "the unauthorized use of [the plaintiff's] name as a
candidate for office, or to advertise for witnesses of an acci-
dent, or the entry of an actor, without his consent, in a popu-
larity contest of an embarrassing kind."'
State ex rel. La Follette v. Hinkle7 is a misappropriation of
name case. Prosser describes the case as involving an unautho-
rized use of the plaintiff's name "as a candidate for office," but
that description is inaccurate. La Follette was running for Pres-
ident under the Progressive party's banner, and the Progres-
sive party had submitted to Washington's Secretary of State a
list of national electoral candidates to appear upon the ballot.
The defendants, desiring to run a progressive slate for state
offices, created a state political party called "the La Follette
State party."' The state party did not nominate any electoral
candidates who would have competed with the Progressive
party's candidates.' La Follette joined the Progressive party in
seeking to enjoin the Secretary of State from certifying the La
Follette State party's nominations, thus keeping those nomina-
tions from appearing on the ballot."
The court granted the injunction, but only in part. Citing
the rights of every citizen "to vote for whomsoever he pleases,"
the court permitted the names submitted by the La Follette
State party to appear on the ballot.9 Mr. La Follette claimed,
however, that the state party's use of his name was unautho-
rized, and the court granted relief on this basis, ordering that
the words "La Follette" be dropped from the state party's
name.' The court's rationale was simple:
Nothing so exclusively belongs to a man or is so personal
and valuable to him as his name. His reputation and the
character he has built up are inseparably connected with it.
Others can have no right to use it without his express
86. Prosser, Piiacy, supra note 1, at 399 (footnotes omitted).
87. 229 P. 317 (Wash. 1924).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 319.
90. Id. at 317.
91. Id. at 319.
92. Id.
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consent, and he has a right to go into any court at any
time to enjoin or prohibit any unauthorized use of it.93
This quote shows quite plainly that the court was applying
principles of misappropriation, and, indeed, Prosser also cites
the case in the section of his article dealing with misappropria-
tion.'
Hamilton v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.95 is another
misappropriation of name case, albeit in a somewhat peculiar
context. The plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident
and suffered serious injuries. A third person was killed in the
accident. The plaintiff's liability insurer, the defendant, was
unable to communicate with the plaintiff for several weeks
because of the plaintiffs injuries. Anticipating a possible law-
suit against its insured (a suit which it had an obligation to
defend), the insurance company ran an advertisement in a
local paper to solicit possible witnesses to the accident. Be-
lieving, probably correctly, that witnesses would be reluctant to
call an insurance company, the advertisement was drafted in
the first person and was purportedly signed by the insured."
In fact, however, the insured had not authorized the use of his
name in the advertisement, and the address and phone num-
ber which appeared in the advertisement were those of an
insurance company employee."
The decision could easily have been grounded in the law
of unauthorized commercial use of one's name (like Pavesich
93. Id.
94. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 1, at 405 n.180.
95. 82 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 1955).
96. Id. at 62. The advertisement provided as follows:
Auto Accident
May 12, 1952
If you witnessed the automobile accident in which I was in-
volved on the Belle Chasse Highway, just below Gretna, on the after-
noon of Monday, May 12, or if you know of anyone who witnessed
it, or if you have any information whatsoever concerning the accident,
I would appreciate it if you would either write me at the address
given below or telephone me collect. I am especially anxious to con-
tact the gentlemen who drove back to Gretna to summon the police
and ambulance.
Fred G. Hamilton
5110 Bienville Ave., New Orleans
24 La., Telephone Audubon 6122
Id
97. Id.
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and a host of other cases), and Prosser cited Hamilton in his
section on misappropriation.9" The court's discussion does
not proceed along such clear lines since the court preferred to
quote extensively from the plaintiff's brief for its legal analy-
sis." The plaintiffs brief was, unfortunately, an analytic mess
whose sole purpose apparently was to establish that there was
a cause of action for invasion of privacy (a proposition that
was not really at issue since there had already been several
opinions from the Louisiana Supreme Court Which recognized
various privacy causes of action)." The case is best consid-
ered on narrow grounds concerning unauthorized use of
plaintiff's name or portraiture in an advertisement, a cause of
action quite distinct from false light privacy.
Finally, we have Marks v. Jaffa0 ' to consider. The case
involves no falsehood whatsoever, and its inclusion in the false
light section of Prosser's article is curious. The plaintiff was a
famous actor who had recently entered law school, apparently
in an effort to change careers.'" The defendant, a newspaper
publisher, wished to publish the plaintiff's picture and name
next to the picture and name of another famous actor and
invite the readers to cast votes concerning the comparative
popularity of the two actors.' The defendant originally
sought the plaintiffs permission, but the plaintiff objected to
the contest. The defendant held the contest notwithstanding
the plaintiff's objections, and the plaintiff sought an injunc-
tion." If there was a falsehood, it was only the possibility
that readers might believe the plaintiff had consented to partic-
ipate in the contest. The plaintiff did not allege the creation of
this false impression, however, and the court's opinion may be
searched in vain for reference to such a falsehood. Instead, the
court held that a private person-which for this court included
a famous actor who had recently entered law school in antici-
pation of becoming a member of the bar-had the right to
object to being placed involuntarily in public contests which
98. Prosser, Pivazy, supra note 1, at 403 n.164.
99. Hamilton, 82 So. 2d at 63-65.
100. I& at 64 (citing Louisiana cases).
101. 26 N.Y.S. 908 (Super. Ct. 1893).
102. This of course may be less of a career change than most people think.
103. I at 909.
104. Id.
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purported to judge such matters as comparative popularity,
"honesty or morality, or any other virtue or vice he was sup-
posed to possess; and the victim selected would either have to
vindicate his character in regard to the virtue or vice selected,
or be declared inferior to his competitor-a comparison which
might prove most odious.""° The remainder of the opinion
emphasizes the intrusion upon the private life of the plaintiff
who, apparently in the court's eyes, had withdrawn from the
public spotlight in favor of "the privacy of [his] home[].""~
Even if the court's decision were to withstand a proper consti-
tutional analysis,"°7 the decision has nothing to do with false
light privacy. It is more properly treated as involving intrusion,
public disclosure of private facts, or commercial appropriation
of name or picture.
C. Unauthorized Use of Picture
In the next paragraph, Prosser identifies "[a]nother form"
of false light privacy involving "the use of the plaintiff's picture
to illustrate a book or an article with which he has no reason-
able connection.""~ Before looking at the cases in detail, it is
worth remarking that the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's
picture in a book or article would seem most naturally to in-
volve a misappropriation of name or portraiture which, as
already noted, is a well-recognized branch of the law of unfair
competition (or, alternatively, is a well-recognized invasion of
privacy).'" The fact that the author of the book or article
thought it would somehow improve the overall quality of the
final product to include photographs indicates that the photo-
graphs have a commercial value, and the unauthorized use
constitutes unfair competition or invasion of privacy by misap-
propriation.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Serious constitutional issues would be created by imposing liability upon a
newspaper for conducting a popularity poll concerning public figures. Cf. Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
108. Prosser, Privacy. supra note 1, at 399.
109. To the extent that the book or article contains defamatory material, the
case will also be grounded in libel. It is of course the coincidence of facts giving
rise to both libel and commercial misappropriation that Prosser exploits in cre-
ating a false light privacy tort.
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If the subject of a photograph is legitimately newsworthy,
the law of unfair competition and principles of free speech
ordinarily combine to make the publication not actionable. If
the subject of the photograph bears no reasonable connection
to the article, then even if the article is newsworthy, the subject
of the photograph is not, and the author or publisher may not
assert free speech principles against the claim of misappropria-
tion. Under this analysis, the lack of a reasonable connection
does not indicate that the plaintiff has been placed in a false
light; rather, the lack of reasonable connection takes away
from the publisher a recognized interest in reporting newswor-
thy events (reporting which includes publication of related
pictures). The core of the cause of action under this analysis is
not that the defendant has falsely created the impression that
the plaintiff is somehow connected to the subject matter of the
article, but the misappropriation of the plaintiff's picture for
commercial purposes. As will be seen, the cases which Prosser
cites are more consistent with this misappropriation analysis
than with Prosser's suggested false light tort. Prosser ignored
the appropriation aspect of these cases, however, choosing to
emphasize the false impression that might have been created.
He lumped all of these cases together in one sentence as fol-
lows:
But when the face of some quite innocent and unrelated
citizen is employed to ornament an article on the cheating
propensities of taxi drivers, the negligence of children,
profane love, "man hungry" women, juvenile delinquents,
or the peddling of narcotics, there is an obvious innuendo
that the article applies to him, which places him in a false
light before the public, and is actionable.'
In Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co.," the plaintiff, a
taxi-cab driver in Washington D.C., pled counts in libel and
invasion of privacy when the defendant published her photo-
graph in The Saturday Evening Post in conjunction with an
article describing Washington D.C. cab drivers as "ill- man-
nered, brazen,... contemptuous of their patrons ... [and]
dishonest.". 2 Although the text of the article constituted only
110. Prosser, Pivacy, supm note 1, at 399 (footnotes omitted).
111. 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948).
112. Fowler v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F. Supp. 303, 304 (D.D.C. 1948) (a
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a non-actionable group libel,"' the court held that the
plaintiff could state an individual cause of action for libel be-
cause her picture had been included in conjunction with the
article. Thus, the jury was presented with a factual question
concerning whether the ordinary reader would infer that the
text of the article actually applied to the plaintiff.",
The court also approved the plaintiff's second cause of
action for invasion of privacy. The court clearly viewed the
case as involving nothing more than an unauthorized appropri-
ation of the plaintiffs picture. It cited the early cases like
Pavesich which involved, in the court's words, "the unautho-
rized utilization of photographs or pictures of the plaintiff in
connection with advertising matter," and noted that "[s]everal
of the decisions ... apply the same principle to different un-
sanctioned uses of names or portraits of private individu-
als."" It also cited section 867 of the Restatement of Torts,
which identified having one's "likeness exhibited to the public"
without proper authorization as tortious conduct."6 Most im-
portant, the court nowhere indicates in its privacy discussion
that the truth or falsity of the impression created by the pic-
ture has anything to do with whether a cause of action for
invasion of privacy was properly pled. According to the court,
privacy is invaded when a person's picture is widely publicized
without their consent.
Next is Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co.," 7 which is one of
the strongest cases in support of false light privacy. When she
was ten years old, the plaintiff was struck by an automobile
driven by a careless driver. A newspaper photographer hap-
pened to be passing the scene of the accident and snapped a
picture of the plaintiff as she was being lifted from the pave-
ment by a bystander. The picture was published the following
day in conjunction with a newspaper account of the accident.
Some twenty months later, the picture was published again,
companion case to Peay).
113. Id.
114. Peay, 78 F. Supp. at 305.
115. 78 F. Supp. at 307.
116. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867, superseded by RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 652A-I (1976), provided in full as follows: "A person who unrea-
sonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs
known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other." Id.
117. 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951).
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this time in conjunction with a newspaper story titled, "They
Ask To Be Killed," an article which emphasized pedestrian
carelessness.
Plaintiff originally pled libel and invasion of privacy, but
dropped the libel cause of action during trial."8 The jury
awarded damages for invasion of privacy, and the defendant
appealed."9 The court began its analysis by noting that the
newspaper was privileged to publish the picture in conjunction
with the original story about the accident, a point conceded by
the plaintiff."n The plaintiff argued that the twenty-month
lapse of time had caused the defendant's privilege to vanish, a
proposition the court rejected.'2' The court nevertheless af-
firmed the judgment, finding that the defendants had abused
the privilege of reporting newsworthy events by publishing the
plaintiffs picture in conjunction with an article that "had noth-
ing at all to do with her accident."" According to the court,
the article related to "pedestrian carelessness," and there was
no evidence to show that the plaintiff had been careless. The
use of the picture was therefore not justified by the privilege
to report newsworthy events.
Properly analyzed, Leverton is another misappropriation of
likeness case, quite similar to Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., dis-
cussed above. In both cases, the pictures bore an insufficient
relation to the subject matter of the article to justify their in-
clusion. The court in Leverton explicitly denied that the case
involved an appropriation for a commercial use, and that ex-
plains why Leverton was one of Prosser's best cases.
A close examination of Leverton's discussion of appropria-
tion indicates clearly, however, that the court misapprehended
the doctrine. The court accepted the general proposition that
"[p]eople who run newspapers and magazines as commercial
enterprises, run them to make profit if they can, "12' but, cit-
ing Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.,1' the court held that "[t]he
118. Id. at 978.
119. ld. at 974.
120. Id. at 976.
121. Id. at 977.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
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publication in this case was not an appropriation for a com-
mercial use."'"
The Leverton court obviously did not understand Sidis. The
court in Sidis was faced with a claim under New York's appro-
priation statute, which required that the use of a picture be
"for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade.""
The picture in Sidis was of a former child prodigy who had
rejected fame and sought to live reclusively. The picture was
published along with an article titled, "Where Are They Now?"
The court interpreted New York's appropriation statute to
exclude "the publication of a newspaper, magazine, or book
which imparts truthful news or other factual information to the
public." The court emphasized that a news publisher is im-
mune from suit under New York's law "so long as he confines
himself to the unembroidered dissemination of facts."'
Fictionalization, by contrast, fell within the New York statute's
scope.", The story in Sidis was completely accurate, and so
the defendant could not be held liable for a misappropriation.
If the court in Leverton had properly understood Sidis, it
would have concluded that using the plaintiff's picture to il-
lustrate an unrelated news story was just the sort of
fictionalization recognized in Sidis as being actionable as a
commercial misappropriation of the plaintiff's likeness."
125. Leverton, 192 F.2d at 977.
126. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 810.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. Id. (citations omitted).
129. The court reemphasized this point as follows: "[the publisher] is immune
from the interdict of §§ 50-51 so long as he confines himself to the unembroidered dis-
semination of facts. Publishers and motion picture producers have occasionally been
held to transgress the statute in New York, but in each case the factual presen-
tation was embellished by some degree of fictionalization." Id. (emphasis added,
citations omitted).
130. The court in Leverion also purported to rely upon an article by Wilfred
Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 713, 720
(1948). Feinberg explains the analysis in Sidis in terms of a balancing between the
commercial use of the photograph and the informational content of the article
and photograph. According to Feinberg, when the informational content of an
article and picture is sufficiently important (e.g., is newsworthy), the courts have
denied the existence of a commercial use (or have, alternatively, held that the
commercial use is justified in light of the value of the communication).
This analysis, does not suggest, however, that all news stories printed in
newspapers are non-commercial. To the contrary, Feinberg recognizes both the
commercial nature of publishing and the public interest favoring certain types of
publication (e.g., news). There is little informational value in false or fictionalized
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Thus, although Leverton is one of Prosser's strongest cases, it
supports Prosser only because the court's analysis in Leverton
was seriously flawed. The Leverton court correctly held that the
defendant had done something wrong, but the court incorrect-
ly rejected misappropriation as the basis for its decision.
Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co.' is one of California's lead-
ing privacy cases. The defendant's employee secretly took a
picture of the plaintiffs, husband and wife, while they were
seated at stools in their own confectionery and ice cream con-
cession. The husband had his arm around his wife and his
cheek next to hers. This picture was published in the
defendant's magazine in conjunction with an article about love.
The caption for the picture read, "Publicized as glamorous,
desirable, 'love at first sight' is a bad risk."' Love at first
sight was described in the article as being based solely upon
sexual attraction and as being the "wrong" kind of love.'"
Gill, like Leverton, most naturally falls within misappropria-
tion of likeness, and the California court in its analysis empha-
sized the elements of the misappropriation doctrine, though
the court did not identify the doctrine by name."H Of particu-
lar interest is the following analysis:
Assuming [the article] to be within the range of public
interest in dissemination of news, information or educa-
tion, and in a medium that would not be classed as com-
mercial-for profit or advertising-there appears no necessi-
ty for the use in connection with the article without their
consent, of a photograph of plaintiffs. The article, to fulfill
its purpose and satisfy the public interest, if any, in the
subject matter discussed, could, possibly, stand alone with-
out any picture. In any event, the public interest did not
require the use of any particular person's likeness nor that
of plaintiffs without their consent. The likeness is only
illustrative of a part of the article, like a schematic diagram
in a scientific dissertation, except that there is far less nec-
reports, however, and when a newspaper uses someone's picture in a fictionalized
manner, the use is most definitely a form of commercial misappropriation.
131. 239 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1952).
132. Id. at 632.
133. Id.
134. The lower court opinion was clearer in this respect than the opinion
from the Supreme Court. See Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 231 P.2d 565 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1951).
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essary pertinency.'
Stated more simply, the point is that even if the story
were newsworthy and thus privileged, the picture of the plain-
tiffs was unrelated to the news or information contained in the
story. The picture did not share the elements of
newsworthiness that gave the article its privileged status. Ac-
cordingly, as in Leverton and Sidis, it was appropriate to hold
the defendant responsible for its misappropriation.
The next six cases cited by Prosser were from New York.
It is clear that the cases do not support the existence of false
light privacy because New York's law on invasion of privacy is
limited to misappropriation of name or likeness pursuant to
the New York Civil Rights Law.s Each case deals with a mis-
appropriation of name or likeness combined with an action for
libel. It would unnecessarily burden this already lengthy discus-
sion to treat these cases in the text. The cases are therefore
discussed in the margin.'5 '
135. 239 P.2d at 634.
136. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW, §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976).
137. The first case does not even live up to its billing as a New York privacy
case. Martin v. Johnson Publishing Co., 157 N.Y.S.2d 409 (Sup. Ct. 1956), was a
libel action pure and simple and did not involve New York's limited misappro-
priation doctrine. Having found the photograph libellous (because it was published
in -conjunction with a lurid story), the court in the final paragraph of its short
opinion explained its measure of damages as follows:
Invasion of her privacy and holding plaintiff up to possible
scorn and ridicule, particularly by a repetition of a publication of the
identical picture in another lurid setting, must be compensated for.
She is the mother of young children. Her husband is a member of
the police force of the community in which plaintiff lives.
Id. at 411-12.
Although the court mentions privacy in this paragraph, the court is using
the word to describe a measure of damages and not as an indication of a cause
of action based upon an invasion of privacy.
In Semler v. L/tem Publications, 9 N.Y.S.2d 319 (City Ct. 1938), the defen-
dant published a photograph of the plaintiff, a professional model, without secur-
ing the proper consent, a clear misappropriation. In Russell v. Marboro Books,
183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1959), Jane Russell recovered damages under New York's
misappropriation statute and for libel when the defendant modified pictures which
Russell had consented to have published. The original picture was of Russell read-
ing a book in one bed with a man reading a book in an adjoining bed. Among
other sins, the defendant modified the picture to put Russell in the same bed
with the male model. The court held that the consent did not extend to the mod-
ification. I&.
In Metzger v. Dell Publishing Co., 136 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1955), the
court affirmed a jury verdict (conditioned on plaintiffs' stipulation to reduce the
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D. Inclusion of Name or Picture in Rogues' Gallery
Prosser's final set of examples involve "the inclusion of the
plaintiff's name, photograph and fingerprints in a public
'rogues' gallery' of convicted criminals, when he has not in fact
been convicted of any crime.""s Falsely claiming that a per-
son has been convicted of a crime falls within that class of
statements which are defamatory per se, and if the defendants
in these cases had been private individuals (rather than the
state), a claim for defamation would clearly have been appro-
priate.' In all but one of the cases cited, the plaintiff sought
an injunction against a local or state police department to
prevent them from taking and disseminating mug shots. 4°
Relief was denied in most of the cases,' and the remaining
cases are explainable on the ground that government may not
systematically defame persons who have been arrested for
crime by publidy portraying them as having already been convicted."
verdict) in an action for libel and violation of the New York statute when the
defendant published a picture of the plaintiffs innocently standing outside of a
building discussing the World Series in conjunction with an article on street
gangs. The court in Callas v. Whisper, Inc., 198 Misc. 829 (1950), affd, 105
N.Y.S.2d 1001 (App. Div. 1951), held that no cause of action was stated under
New York's statute and dismissed plaintiff's suit. In Thompson v. Close-Up, Inc.,
98 N.Y.S.2d 300 (App. Div. 1950), the plaintiff's picture was published in conjunc-
tion with an article on dope-peddling, and the court held that the plaintiff had a
cause of action under the New York statute because the plaintiff had no connec-
tion with dope-peddling and, therefore, the use of the picture did not further any
interest in newsgathering or reporting and was, instead, 'merely to increase the
circulation of the magazine, which is to say, for purposes of advertising or trade."
Id.
138. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 1, at 399.
139. BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY, § 4.12.1, at 120 (2d ed. 1991).
140. The exception is Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 67 A. 97 (N.J. Ct. Err. & A pp.
1907), where the court granted amandatory injunction ordering the county clerk
to remove the plaintiff's name as father from a birth certificate. The mother had
falsely claimed the plaintiff was the father, and the appearance of his name on
the birth certificate was virtually unassailable proof of his status, a status which
carried with it significant legal and financial obligations.
141. Downs v. Swann, 73 A. 653 (Md. 1909); Norman v. City of Las Vegas,
177 P.2d 442 (Nev. 1947); Mabry v. Kettering, 117 S.W. 746 (Ark. 1909), second
appeal, 122 S.W. 115 (Ark. 1909); Bartletta v. McFeeley, 152 A. 17 (N.J. Ch. 1930),
aff'd, 156 A. 658 (N.J. 1931); McGovern v. Van Riper, 54 A.2d 469 (N.J. Ch.
1947). In these cases, the plaintiffs sought to prevent the police from sharing with
other law enforcement agencies information which would identify the plaintiff
(such as the plaintiffs picture, fingerprints, etc.).
142. Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 39 So. 490 (La. 1950); State ex rel. Mavity v.
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E. Prosser's Summary
The final three paragraphs in Prosser's discussion attempt
to put false light privacy in a broader context. For our purpos-
es, the most important claim Prosser makes is that "[t]he false
light need not necessarily be a defamatory one" and that "[t]he
privacy cases do go considerably beyond the narrow limits of
defamation, and no doubt have succeeded in affording a need-
ed remedy in a good many instances not covered by the other
tort."' Prosser cites no cases in support of these proposi-
tions, however, and as can be seen from the cases discussed
above, none of the cases Prosser cites in the false light section
of his article provides meaningful support.
It is true that recovery can be had for publishing a photo-
graph in the absence of an action for defamation. Thus, the
cases cited in Prosser's article do go beyond defamation, but
they do not go in the direction of false light. Instead, the cases
which go beyond defamation go in the direction of commercial
misappropriation, a tort which, unlike false light, does not
require that a false impression be created.
None of the cases Prosser cited purported to create a new
tort with the characteristics of false light privacy. Prosser creat-
ed false light privacy only by treating the cases in the manner
of a smorgasbord in which Prosser could pick and choose vari-
ous elements from each cause of action to create a new dish
on the menu. Falsity comes from defamation, and widespread
publicity comes from misappropriation and another privacy
tort, public disclosure of private facts. Putting these together,
Prosser came up with publicity that places the plaintiff in a
false light in the public eye, a tort which no court had found a
need to create.
III. PROSSER'S PEDIGREE
A. The First Post-Prosser Article Cases
Prosser took his new tort to the American Law Institute
for inclusion in the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1967,
seven years following publication of his article. During those
Tyndall, 66 N.E.2d 755 (Ind. 1946).
143. Prosser, Privacy, supm note 1, at 400-01.
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seven years, Prosser's new classification was cited some eleven
times by the courts."' Although Prosser's classification was
cited, none of these cases held that a cause of action was either
stated or proved for false light privacy. No plaintiff recovered a
dime under false light privacy.
At the same time, however, the cases did not reject
Prosser's new creation outright. Instead, on the allegations or
proven facts of each case, the courts simply found one or
more reasons to deny recovery or avoid the question whether
false light existed. For example, in Werner v. Times-Mirror
Co.,' the first case to use Prosser's "false light" terminology,
the court held only that California's newspaper retraction stat-
ute, Civil Code section 48a, applied to a complaint alleging
false light privacy, and since there was no allegation of compli-
ance with the statute, the court affirmed a demurrer to the
complaint.' In Truxes v. Kenco Enterprises,'47 the court held
as a matter of law that the photograph of the plaintiff, a postal
employee, in conjunction with a story emphasizing that federal
employees have a later retirement age than state employees,
did not place the plaintiff in a false light (since his photograph
would be interpreted by an ordinary reader as simply an exam-
ple of the fact that federal employees can be older than state
employees). In Brink v. Griffith,' an appeal from a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff for defamation and false light, the
court held that it did not have to decide whether false light
144. Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 14 Cal. Rptr. 208 (Ct. App. 1961); Peterson
v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 367 P.2d 284 (Idaho 1961); Yoder v. Smith, 112 N.W.2d
862 (Iowa 1962); Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, 20 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App.
1962); Truxes v. Kenco Enters., 119 N.W.2d 914 (S.D. 1963); Spahn v. Julian
Messner, Inc., 250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1964); Brink v. Griffith, 396 P.2d 793 (Wash.
1964); Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964); Brauer v. Globe News-
paper Co., 217 N.E.2d 736 (Mass. 1966); Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496 (Ga.
App. 1966); Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329 (D.S.C. 1966).
145. 14 Cal. Rptr. 208 (Ct. App. 1961).
146. Although the court technically did not need to address the question
whether false light privacy existed independently of defamation, the court's reli-
ance on § 48a strongly suggests that false light did not have an independent exis-
tence. Section 48a, by its express terms, applies only in cases of "libel in a news-
paper, or of a slander by radio broadcast." CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(1). Thus, in
order for § 48a to apply, it must be true that a false light claim is an action for
"libel" or "slander," at least for purposes of § 48a. But see Kinsey v. Macur, 165
Cal. Rptr. 608 (Ct. App. 1980), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 453-72.
147. 119 N.W.2d 914 (S.D. 1963).
148. 396 P.2d 793 (Wash. 1964).
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existed, since even if it did exist, the plaintiff could have only
one recovery.
These cases do not establish the existence of false light
privacy. They establish only that courts were well aware of
what Prosser had proposed, but that they had, as yet, found no
reason to affirm a pro-plaintiff judgment on false light privacy
grounds.
B. The American Law Institute Falls in Line
Despite the absence of even a single case awarding a plain-
tiff damages for false light privacy, Prosser took his creation
with him to the American Law Institute in 1967. As could be
expected, Prosser used his article as the basis for what ulti-
mately became Chapter 28A in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts dealing with Invasions of Privacy. As originally proposed,
section 652E, titled "Publicity Placing Person in False Light,"
provided as follows:
One who gives to another publicity which places him be-
fore the public in a false light of a kind highly offensive to
a reasonable man, is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy. ""
Prosser modestly claimed in a special "Note to Institute"
that Professor Wigmore had "first distinguished" false light pri-
vacy in an article published in 1916."5 As will shortly be seen,
Wigmore did not propose in his article an independent cause
of action for false light (or anything remotely resembling false
light). Prosser may have hoped to convince the Institute with
his citation to Wigmore that false light was something more
than the creation of the Reporter himself. 5'
Professor Wigmore's article was titled "The Right Against
False Attribution of Belief or Utterance."'52 The article was
149. A.L.I., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 120, (Tentative Draft No. 13,
1967).
150. Id. A "Note to Institute" is published only in the Tentative Drafts and is
not published in the final draft.
151. Professor E. Allan Farnsworth, reporter for the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS, has observed that "it scarcely behooves the Reporter of a restatement
to proclaim too often that he is engaged in innovation." E. Allan Farnsworth, In-
gredients in the Redaction of The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L REV.
1, 6 (1981).
152. John H. Wigmore, The Right Against False Attribution of Belief or Utterance,
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prompted by a Kentucky decision, Foster-Milburn Co. v.
Chinn,' and a student note commenting on that deci-
sion. "  Wigmore correctly noted that the decision in
Foster-Milburn had two bases: (a) "the publication of the
plaintiffs picture for advertising purposes,""s and (b) "the
false attribution to the plaintiff of a testimonial for the
defendant's" product. Wigmore described the first base as
falling squarely within the right of privacy. 7 Wigmore just as
clearly described the second base, which Prosser claimed in his
comments constituted the first recognition of false light priva-
cy, as being "a distinct right, and belongs under the head of defa-
mation." "
Near the end of his article, Professor Wigmore does in-
deed speak of a right of privacy which protects against false at-
tributions of opinions. The first example Professor Wigmore
gives concerns an address which he made "before the Young
Men's Christian Association on 'The Legal Profession,'" and a
newspaper report made without his consent. The report falsely
attributed to the speaker the assertion that "'a man need not
4 KY. hJ., No. 8, 3 (May 1916).
153. 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. 1909). The case is discussed above at text accompany-
ing notes 44-46.
154. L Meriwether Smith, The Right of Privacy, 4 KY. LJ., No. 3, 22 (Dec.
1915).
155. Wigmore, supra note 152, at 3.
156. Wigmore, supra note 152, at 3.
157. "The right of privacy protects against the publication or exposure of
facts-of things which truly exist but ought [not] to be published, e.g., one's facial
features, family history, etc." Wigmore, supra note 152, at 3. Professor Wigmore
appears not to have recognized in his article the existence of a cause of action
for commercial misappropriation, and this explains his willingness to categorize
unauthorized use of pictures for advertising purposes as a species of privacy. Pro-
fessor Wigmore's confusion is especially apparent in his discussion of Lord Byron
v. Johnston, 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (1816). See supra note 152, at 5. Wigmore correctly
noted that "the [defendant's] sale might of course interfere with the sale of genu-
ine poems," supra note 152, at 5, which should have suggested a cause of action
for commercial misappropriation or unfair competition. According to Wigmore,
however, the possible interference was "not essential" to decision of the case.
Wigmore gives no support for this statement, and none can be given, because, as
can be seen above, the report for the case is so sparse that it is virtually impossi-
ble to determine what was essential for the decision and what was not. We do
know, however, that subsequent English decisions have read Lord Byron as requir-
ing potential competitive injury, contrary to Wigmore's suggestion. Clark v. Free-
man, 50 Eng. Rep. 759 (1848).
158. Wigmore, supra note 152, at 3 (emphasis added).
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be honest to be a successful lawyer."'' 5 9 Wigmore explains
why, in his view, this type of report should be actionable:
I am entitled to be judged in public by my actual opinions
and utterances. To have false ones ascribed to me is an
injury to my feelings of self respect. And that is the injury
against which I am entitled to be protected. The right of
privacy is really a right to be protected against a certain
kind of injury to feelings. And that is the feature common
to that right and the present one. The right to be protect-
ed against defamation, i.e., against loss of repute and pa-
tronage among other persons, does not here reach the
essence of the wrong.'6
Although Wigmore thought this type of false. attribution
should be actionable, he forthrightly conceded in his article
that such a liability could not be supported "by any deci-
sions." "
Prosser's claim that Wigmore recognized false light privacy
as existing in the case law was contrary to fact, and no case
had ever sanctioned an award of damages based upon false
light privacy when Prosser brought his new tort to the Insti-
tute. It might be supposed that given the extraordinary lack of
judicial or scholarly support for Prosser's creation, one or
more members of the American Law Institute would have
risen in protest, complaining that the Reporter was going far
beyond anything found in the cases." In the event, however,
Prosser did not have to answer even a single question about
false light privacy. He gave a brief explanation of what the
section was intended to do, and he moved on to the next top-
159. Wigmore, supra note 152, at 8.
160. Wigmore, supra note 152, at 8 (emphasis in original).
161. Wigmore, supra note 152, at 7. In terms of the law of defamation,
Wigmore may simply have been 75 years ahead of his time. In Masson v. New
York Magazine, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991), the Supreme Court held that falsely quot-
ing a speaker could, in some circumstances, give rise to liability for defamation
consistent with the First Amendment.
162. Probably the most famous such battle over cases at the Institute involved
§§ 45 & 90 of the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcTS. Promissory estoppel was initially
not going to be included in the Restatement. It was pointed out in a heated de-
bate at the Institute, however, that there were many cases the results of which
could be explained only by resort to promissory estoppel, and § 90 ultimately was
adopted. The story is compellingly told in GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CON-
TRACT 57-66 (1974).
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ic." The section came back before the Institute two more
times with only drafting revisions to reflect the changing con-
stitutional landscape, and there was again no discussion direct-
ed at the existence of the tort."
C. Post-Restatement (Second) Cases from State Courts
There are now over 600 cases which mention false light
privacy by name. There are just over 350 reported decisions
from the state courts and over 250 reported decisions from
federal courts. Because the common law of false light privacy,
if it exists at all, can properly be found only in decisions from
state courts," the discussion in the text will focus primarily
on the state decisions. Citations to federal decisions may be
found principally in the footnotes.
We are looking for a decision in which false light privacy
was the sole basis and could have been the only basis for a pro-
plaintiff judgment. Decisions in which false light privacy was
only one of many theories in support of a judgment do not
prove the independent existence.of the tort. With this simple
test in mind, the state decisions fall into the following catego-
ries, as will be shown: (1) cases mentioning false light privacy
in the opinion even though the plaintiff did not allege false
light privacy; (2) cases in which false light overlaps with libel;
(3) cases in which false light overlaps with misappropriation of
name or picture; (4) cases in which false light overlaps with
emotional distress claims; (5) statute of limitations decisions in
false light cases; (6) federal decisions where false light is the
sole basis for recovery; and (7) state decisions in which false
light is the sole, non-overlapping cause of action.
163. 44 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS, 274-77 (1968).
164. Tentative Draft No. 21 was discussed at 52 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 99-198
(1975); Tentative Draft No. 22 was discussed at 53 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 64-156
(1976).
165. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). No one has ever argued
that there exists as a matter of federal common law a cause of action for false
light privacy. Federal courts dealing with false light claims are therefore deciding
cases under state law, and a federal court determination of state law is of course
of exceedingly little precedential value.
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1. Cases Not Involving False Light Privacy Claims
About one quarter of the 600 or so cases which mention
false light privacy by name do not even involve claims of false
light privacy by the plaintiff. These hundred and fifty or so
cases involve defamation claims,'" emotional distress
claims,67 wrongful termination," reverse freedom of infor-
166. State cases: Winters v. Greeley, 545 N.E.2d 422 (Ill. App. 1989); Zinda v.
Louisiana Pac. Corp., 440 N.W.2d 548 (Wis. 1989); Hall v. Citizens Ins. Co. of
Am., 368 N.W.2d 250 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Schupmann by Schupmann v. Em-
pire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 589 S.W.2d 101 (Mo. App. 1985); Little Rock News-
papers v. Dodrill, 660 S.W.2d 933 (Ark. 1983); Boyles v. Mid-Florida Television
Corp., 431 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Mark v. Seattle Times, 635 P.2d
1081 (Wash. 1981), affirring, Mark v. King Broadcasting Co., 618 P.2d 512 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1980); Baker v. Burlington N., Inc., 587 P.2d 829 (Idaho 1978); Green
Valley School v. Cowles Florida Broadcasting, 327 So. 2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976); Sindorf v. Jacron Sales Co., 341 A.2d 856 (Md. Ct. App. 1975), aff'd, 350
A.2d 688 (Md. Ct. App. 1976); A.S. Abell Co. v. Barnes, 265 A.2d 207 (Md. Ct.
App. 1970).
Federal cases: General Elec. Co. v. Sargent & Lundy, 916 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir.
1990); Reuber v. Food Chem. News, 899 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1990); Kassel v.
Gannett Co., 875 F.2d 935 (1st Cir. 1989); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, 867 F.2d
1188 (9th Cir. 1989); Paul v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 831 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir.
1988), affid without published opinion; Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir.
1986), rev'd sub nom., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Marcone v.
Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1985); Bichler v. Union
Bank & Trust Co., 745 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Lerman v. Flynt
Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984); Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, 720 F.2d 631
(11th Cir. 1983); Ryan v. Brooks, 634 F.2d 726 (4th Cir. 1980); Tureen v. Equifax,
Inc., 571 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1978); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir.
1977); Baggs v. Eagle-Picher Indus., 750 F. Supp. 264 (W.D. Mich. 1990); White v.
Fraternal Order of Police, 707 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1989); Garcia v. Williams, 704
F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Grimsley v. Guccione, 703 F. Supp. 903 (M.D. Ala.
1988); Zerman v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 677 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Ness, 677 F. Supp. 866 (D.S.C. 1988); Price v. Viking
Penguin, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1501 (D. Minn. 1988); McGinniss v. Employers Rein-
surance Corp., 648 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Dowd v. Calabrese, 589 F.
Supp. 1206 (D.D.C. 1984); Shermco Indus. v. Secretary of the Air Force, 584 F.
Supp. 76 (N.D. Tex. 1984); Apostle v. Booth Newspapers, 572 F. Supp. 897 (W.D.
Mich. 1983); Carey v. Hume, 390 F. Supp. 1026 (D.D.C. 1975); American Credit
Corp. v. United States Casualty Co., 49 F.R.D. 314 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
167. State cases: Doe v. Dyer-Goode, 566 A.2d 889 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Fig.
ured v. Paralegal Technical Servs., 555 A.2d 663 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1989); Ballaron v.
Equitable Shipyards, 521 So. 2d 481 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Anderson v. Fisher
Broadcasting Cos., 712 P.2d 803 (Or. 1986); Killilea v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 499
N.E.2d 1291 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985); Hall v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 368 N.W.2d
250 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Craft v. Rice, 671 S.W.2d 247 (Ky. 1984); Boyles v.
Mid-Florida Television Corp., 431 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Duhammel v. Star, 653 P.2d 15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d
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mation act claims,"6  false imprisonment, 7 ' copyright in-
fringement,' civil rights violations,'" or other privacy
619 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Fry v. Ionia Sentinel-Standard, 300 N.W.2d 687
(Mich. CL App. 1980); Davis v. First Nat. Bank of Ariz., 605 P.2d 37 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1979); Kelly v. Franco, 391 N.E.2d 54 (II. App. Ct. 1979); Jeffers v. City of
Seattle, 597 P.2d 899 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979); Fletcher v. Florida Pub. Co., 319 So.
2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Cluff v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 460 P.2d 666
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1969).
Federal cases: Reuber v. Food Chem. News, 899 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1990);
Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, 867 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1989); Falwell v. Flynt, 797
F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nor., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46
(1988); Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1501 (D. Minn. 1988);
Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 656 F. Supp. 471 (D. Me. 1987); Wood v. Nation-
al Computer Sys., 643 F. Supp. 1093 (W.D. Ark. 1986); Houghton v. New Jersey
Mfrs. Ins. Co., 615 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co.,
561 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ga. 1983); Apostle v. Booth Newspapers, 572 F. Supp. 897
(W.D. Mich. 1983); Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Pa.
1978).
168. State cases: Roe v. Cradduck, 555 N.E.2d 1155 (I1. App. Ct. 1990);
Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989); Ballaron v. Equi-
table Shipyards, 521 So. 2d 481 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Haith v. Model Cities Health
Corp. of Kansas City, 704 S.W.2d 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Todd v. South Caroli-
na Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 278 S.E.2d 607 (S.C. 1981).
Federal cases: Garcia v. Williams, 704 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Hudson v.
S.D. Warren Co., 608 F. Supp. 477 (D.C. Me. 1985); Wells v. Thomas, 569 F.
Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Rogers v. International Business Mach. Corp., 500 F.
Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
169. State cases: Detroit Free Press v. Oakland County Sheriff, 418 N.W.2d
124 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Napper v. Georgia Television Co., 356 S.E.2d 640 (Ga.
1987); Forsberg v. Hous. Auth. of City of Miami Beach, 455 So. 2d 373 (Fla.
1984); Hubert v. Harte-Hanks Tex. Newspapers, 652 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Ct. App.
1983); Tobin v. Mich. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 331 N.W.2d 184 (Mich. 1982); City of
Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Hearld, 307 N.W.2d 572 (N.D. 1981); Industrial
Found. of the S. v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976).
Federal cases: Kneeland v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 650 F. Supp. 1076
(W.D. Tex. 1986); Marzen v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Seres., 632
F. Supp. 785 (N.D. 11. 1985); Providence J. Co. v. FBI, 460 F. Supp. 778 (D.C.R.I.
1978).
170. State cases: Walls v. City of Columbus, 461 N.E.2d 13 (Ohio Ct. App.
1983).
Federal cases: Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
171. Federal cases: Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,
805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977);
Rosenfeld v. W.B. Saunders, 728 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Nash v. CBS, Inc.,
704 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. III. 1989); National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp.,
503 F. Supp. 533 (D.C. Tex. 1980).
172. Federal cases: Small v. Inhabitants of City of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544 (1st
Cir. 1986); McNally v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1976);
Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872 (D.C. Ga. 1983); Spencer v.
Gen. Tel. Co. of Pa., 551 F. Supp. 896 (D.C. Pa. 1982); Garrity v. Thomson, 81
F.R.D. 633 (D.C.N.H. 1979); Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652 (D.C.
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claims, such as intrusion, 7 misappropriation of name or
Pa. 1978); Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (D.C. Ill. 1978); Vanasco v. Schwartz,
401 F. Supp. 87 (D.C.N.Y. 1975).
173. State cases: Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900 (Ill. App. 1990); Doe
v. Dyer-Goode, 566 A.2d 889 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Figured v. Paralegal Technical
Servs., 555 A.2d 663 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1989); Hudson v. Montcalm Pub. Corp., 379
S.E.2d 572 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); Wolf v. Regardie, 553 A.2d 1213 (D.C. Ct. App.
1989); Stessman v. American Black Hawk Broadcasting Co., 416 N.W.2d 685 (Iowa
1987); Hall v. Post, 355 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), rv'd, 372 S.E.2d 711
(N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Batts v. City of Baton Rouge, 501 So. 2d 302 (La. Ct. App.
1986); DeAngelo v. Fortney, 515 A.2d 594 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Candebat v.
Flanagan, 487 So. 2d 207 (Miss. 1986); Melvin v. Burling, 490 N.E.2d 1011 (Ill.
App. 1986); Texas Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Texas State
Employees Union, 708 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. App. 1986), evod, 746 S.W.2d 203 (Tex.
Sup. Ct. 1987); Trout v. Umatilla County Sch. Dist., 712 P.2d 814 (Or. App.
1985); Werner v. Kliewer, 710 P.2d 1250 (Kan. 1985); Donnel v. Lara, 703 S.W.2d
257 (Tex. App. 1985); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 696 P.2d 527
(Or. 1985); Schupmann by Schupmann v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 689
S.W.2d 101 (Mo. App. 1985); Harris by Harris v. Easton Pub. Co., 483 A.2d 1377
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Dunlap v. McCarty, 678 S.W.2d 361 (Ark. 1984); House v.
Sports Films & Talents, 351 N.W.2d 684 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); N.O.C., Inc. v.
Schaefer, 484 A.2d 729 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1984); Sofka v. Thai, 662 S.W.2d 502
(Mo. 1983); Lewis v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 339 N.W.2d 857 (Mich. Ct. App.
1983); Gerard v. Parish of Jefferson, 424 So. 2d 440 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Jones v.
Hudgins, 295 S.E.2d 119 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); MacKerron v. Madura, 445 A.2d
680 (Me. 1982); Sustin v. Fee, 431 N.E.2d 992 (Ohio Op. 1982), Tobin v. Michi-
gan Civil Serv. Comm'n, 331 N.W.2d 184 (Mich. 1982); Mark v. Seattle Times, 635
P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1981); Mark v. King Broadcasting Co., 618 P.2d 512 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1980); Cape Publications v. Bridges, 387 So. 2d 436 (Fla. Ct. App. 1980);
Montgomery Ward v. Shope, 286 N.W.2d 806 (S.D. 1979); Davis v. First Nat'l
Bank of Ariz., 605 P.2d 37 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal,
375 So. 2d 1386 (La. 1979); Geisberger v. Willuhn, 390 N.E.2d 945 (I1. Ct. App.
1979); Kelly v. Franco, 391 N.E.2d 54 (I1. Ct. App. 1979); Jeffers v. City of Seat-
ie, 597 P.2d 899 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979); Corcoran v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
572 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Cassidy v. American Broadcasting Cos., 377
N.E.2d 126 (11. Ct. App. 1978); Norris v. King, 355 So. 2d 21 (La. Ct. App.
1978); Gonzales v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 555 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Ct. App.
1977); Bank of Indiana v. Tremunde, 365 N.E.2d 295 (11. Ct. App. 1977); Nelson
v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221 (Me. 1977); Berthiaume's Estate v. Pratt, 365 A.2d
792 (Me. 1976); Vespa v. Safety Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 549 P.2d 878 ( Kan.
1976); Froelich v. Werbin, 548 P.2d 482 (Kan. 1976); Hollander v. Lubow, 351
A.2d 421 (Md. 1976); Hines .v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 223 S.E.2d 468 (Ga.
CL App. 1976); Fletcher v. Florida Pub. Co., 319 So. 2d 100 (Fla. Ct. App. 1975);
McNutt v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 538 P.2d 804 (N.M. 1975); Dotson v.
McLaughlin, 531 P.2d I (Kan. 1975); Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993 (Kan. 1973);
Bradshaw v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 197 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); Cluff v.
Farmers Ins. Exchange, 460 P.2d 666 (Ariz. App. 1969); Household Finance Corp.
v. Bridge, 250 A.2d 878 (Md. 1969); Lambert v. Dow Chem. Co., 215 So. 2d 673
(La. Ct. App. 1968).
Federal cases: McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Birnbaum v.
United States, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978); Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411
(8th Cir. 1978); Fowler v. S. Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 343 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1965);
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likeness,74 or public disclosure of private facts. 7  Virtually
Baggs v. Eagle-Picher Indus., 750 F. Supp. 264 (W.D. Mich. 1990); Grimsley v.
Guccione, 703 F. Supp. 903 (M.D. Ala. 1988); Bussen v. Southern Cent. Bell Tel.
Co., 682 F. Supp. 319 (S.D. Miss. 1987); Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 656 F.
Supp. 471 (D. Me. 1987); Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 642 F.
Supp. 1357 (D.C.N.Y. 1986); Huskey v. National Broadcasting Co., 632 F. Supp.
1282 (N.D. I1. 1986); Shermco Indus. v. Secretary of the Air Force, 584 F. Supp.
76 (D.C. Tex. 1984); Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, (D.C. Ga.
1983); Bi-Rite Enters. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188 (D.C.N.Y. 1983);
Spencer v. General Tel. Co. of Pennsylvania, 551 F. Supp. 896 (D.C. Pa. 1982);
Barr v. ARCO Chem. Corp., 529 F. Supp. 1277 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Beard v.
Akzona, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 128 (D.C. Tenn. 1981); Rogers v. IBM, 500 F. Supp.
867 (D.C. Pa. 1980); Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967 (D.C.N.Y.
1977); Morris v. Danna, 411 F. Supp. 1300 (D.C. Minn. 1976); American Credit
Corp. v. United States Casualty Co., 49 F.R.D. 314 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Shorter v. Re-
tail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329 (D.C.S.C. 1966).
174. State cases: Staruski v. Continental Tel. Co. of Vt., 581 A.2d 266 (Vt.
1990); Slocum v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 542 So. 2d 777 (La. Ct. App. 1989); Hud-
son v. Montcalm Publishing Corp., 379 S.E.2d 572 (Ga. 1989); Candebat v.
Flanagan, 487 So. 2d 207 (Miss. 1986); Haith v. Model Cities Health Corp. of
Kansas City, 704 S.W.2d 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Anderson v. Fisher Broadcast-
ing Cos., 712 P.2d 803 (Or. 1986); LeFlore v. Reflections of Tulsa, 708 P.2d 1068
(Ok. 1985); Faber v. Condecor, Inc., 477 A.2d 1289 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1984); Law-
rence v. A.S. Abell Co., 475 A.2d 448 (Md. 1984); Venturi v. Savitt, Inc., 468
A.2d 933 (Conn. 1983); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change v. Ameri-
can Heritage Prods., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982); Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619
(Fla. Ct. App. 1981); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979);
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979); Norris v. King, 355 So. 2d
21 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Nelson v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221 (Me. 1977);
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 351 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio 1976), rev'd,
433 U.S. 562 (1977); Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 235 A.2d 62 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1967).
Federal cases: Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, 867 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1989); Falwell
v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Carson v.
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983); Martin Luther King.,
Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, 694 F.2d 674
(lth Cir. 1983); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978);
Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977); Carson v. National Bank of
Commerce Trust & Say., 501 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1974); Motschenbacher v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974); Rosenfeld v. W.B. Saunders,
728 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Nash v. CBS, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ill.
1989); Mendonsa v. Time, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 967 (D.R.I. 1988); Zerman v. Sullivan
& Cromwell, 677 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Benally v. Hundred Arrows Press,
614 F. Supp. 969 (D.N.M. 1985); Friends of Phil Gramm v. Americans for Phil
Gramm in '84, 587 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. Va. 1984); Bi-Rite Enter. v. Button Master,
555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp.,
503 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Tex. 1980); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp.
426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Uhlaender
v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
Varnish v. Best Medium Publishing Co., 405 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied
394 U.S. 987 (1969), involved a sensationalized and fictionalized story based partly
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upon an actual newsworthy event. The court does not clearly indicate whether the
invasion of privacy theory being used is misappropriation or false light. The
court's citation to Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 154 A.2d 422 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959), as
.a case quite similar to this one," 405 F.2d at 612, suggests that misappropriation
is the proper characterization since Aquino emphasized, citing New York author-
ities, that a sensationalized and fictionalized news report was more for purposes of
trade than for reporting the news.
175. State cases: Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1990); Miller v.
Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900 (11. Ct. App. 1990); Roe v. Cradduck, 555 N.E.2d
1155 (Il. Ct. App. 1990); Zinda v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 440 N.W.2d 548 (Wis.
1989); Hudson v. Montclam Publishing Corp., 379 S.E.2d 572 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989);
Wolf v. Regardie, 553 A.2d 1213 (D.C. Ct. App. 1989); Hall v. Post, 355 S.E.2d
819 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988); Ballaron v. Equitable
Shipyards, 521 So. 2d 481 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Maheu v. CBS, Inc., 247 Cal.
Rptr. 304 (Ct. App. 1988); Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Cos., 712 P.2d 803
(Or. 1986); Trout v. Umatilla County Sch. Dist., 712 P.2d 814 (Or. Ct. App.
1985); Werner v. Kliewer, 710 P.2d 1250 (Kan. 1985); Killilea v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 499 N.E.2d 1291 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985); Harris by Harris v. Easton Publishing
Co., 483 A.2d 1377 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Boyles v. Mid-Florida Television Corp.,
431 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Ramsey v. Georgia Gazette Publishing
Co., 297 S.E.2d 94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); Jones v. Hudgins, 295 S.E.2d 119 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1982); Roshto v. Hebert, 413 So. 2d 927 (La. Ct. App. 1982), revd, 439
So. 2d 428 (La. 1983); Tobin v. Michigan Civil Serv. Comm'n, 331 N.W.2d 184
(Mich. 1982); Fry v. Ionia Sentinel-Standard, 300 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. Ct. App.
1980); Cape Publications v. Bridges, 387 So. 2d 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983); Baker v. Burlington N., Inc., 587 P.2d 829 (Ida-
ho 1978); Corcoran v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 572 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978); Rush v. Maine Say. Bank, 387 A.2d 1127 (Me. 1978); Norris v. King, 355
So. 2d 21 (La. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 995 (1987); Beaumont v.
Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522 (Mich. 1977) (Coleman, J., dissenting); Nelson v. Maine
Times, 373 A.2d 1221 (Me. 1977); Hollander v. Lubow, 351 A.2d 421 (Md. Ct.
App. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976); Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publishing
Co., 543 P.2d 988 (Kan. 1975); Midwest Glass Co. v. Stanford Dev. Co., 339
N.E.2d 274 (11. Ct. App. 1975); Fletcher v. Florida Publishing Co., 319 So. 2d 100
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (McCord, J., dissenting), rev'd, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977); McNutt v. New Mexico State Tribune Co.,
538 P.2d 804 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 540 P.2d 248 (N.M. 1975);
Hendry v. Conner, 226 N.W.2d 921 (Minn. 1975); Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 327
A.2d 133 (Pa. 1974); Taylor v. K.T.V.B., Inc., 525 P.2d 984 (Idaho 1974); House-
hold Finance Corp. v. Bridge, 250 A.2d 878 (Md. Ct. App. 1969); Earp v. City of
Detroit, 167 N.W.2d 841 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969); Lambert v. Dow Chem. Co., 215
So. 2d 673 (La. Ct. App. 1968).
Federal cases: McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1005 (1985); Reuber v. Food Chem. News, 899 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1990),
vacated, 922 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1990); Ross v. Midwest Communications, 870 F.2d
271 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989); Gilbert v. Medical Economics
Co., 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981); Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411 (8th
Cir. 1978); McNally v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1975), cel.
denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976); Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976); Doe v. McMillan, 459 F.2d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(Wright, J., dissenting), modified, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Baggs v. Eagle-Picher Indus.,
750 F. Supp. 264 (W.D. Mich. 1990); Heath v. Playboy Enters., 732 F. Supp. 1145
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all of these cases cite or quote either the Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 652A,"6 Prosser's privacy article, " or one
of the editions of Prosser & Keeton on Torts. The reference to
"false light" has nothing to do with resolution of the cases, but
in the course of discussing or quoting something that is rele-
vant to the case, "false light" is incidentally included.
Unfortunately, the mere act of repeatedly quoting the
Restatement or Prosser tends to bring an aura of reality to
false light privacy. In this way, false light privacy is introduced
into the law of a state in cases involving other, more well- es-
tablished torts. The development of false light privacy in the
State of Texas is a perfect example of how a cause of action
can slip into the law of a state without careful consideration.
There are now fourteen published decisions from Texas
courts which mention false light privacy. False light first ap-
peared in Industrial Foundation of the South v. Texas Industrial
Accident Board,' a reverse Freedom of Information Act case.
The case arose under Texas' Open Records Act, and the issue
was whether certain records held by the Texas Industrial Acci-
dent Board concerning workmen's compensation claims were
(S.D. Fla. 1990); White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 707 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C.
1989), modified, 909 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Wood v. National Computer Sys.,
643 F. Supp. 1093 (W.D. Ark. 1986), afifd, 814 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1990); Huskey
v. National Broadcasting Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Il. 1986); Davis v.
Monsanto Co., 627 F. Supp. 418 (S.D. W.Va. 1986); Houghton v. New Jersey Mfrs.
Ins. Co., 615 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Pa. 1985), nvod, 795 F.2d 1134 (3rd Cir. 1986);
Wells v. Thomas, 569 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Cummings v. Walsh Constr.
Co., 561 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ga. 1983); Garrity v. Thomson, 81 F.R.D. 633
(D.C.N.H. 1979); Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
176. Section 652A provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by (a) unreasonable intrusion upon
the seclusion of another, as stated in 652B; or (b) appropriation of
the other's name or likeness, as stated in 652C; or (c) unreasonable
publicity given to the other's private life, as stated in 652D; or (d)
publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the
public, as stated in 652E.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 625A (1976).
Courts often quote § 652A in full in order to establish that there is a cause of
action for invasion of privacy generally or for intrusion, appropriation or unrea-
sonable publicity. It is of course unnecessary to quote § 652A(2)(d), dealing with
false light, in these cases, but human nature being what it is, courts take the path
of least resistance and quote the entire section.
177. Prosser, Privacy, supra note 1.
178. 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976), cem. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).
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"public" and therefore subject to disclosure." The defendant
claimed, among other things, that disclosure would violate the
common law privacy rights of the workmen's compensation
claimants."s The court noted that it had previously recog-
nized a common law right of privacy which encompassed "the
right to be free from the unwarranted appropriation or exploi-
tation of one's personality, the publicizing of one's private
affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern, or the
wrongful intrusion into one's private activities in such manner
as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation
to a person of ordinary sensibilities."' The court then dis-
,cussed whether disclosure of Industrial Accident Board records
would constitute the wrongful publicizing of one's private af-
fairs, holding that a fact question was presented on this issue
for determination by the trial court.'
Since unwarranted publicity of private matters had been
previously recognized in Texas jurisprudence, it was entirely
unnecessary for the court to rely upon either the Restatement
(Second) of Torts or Prosser. The court obviously felt, howev-
er, that citing both of these respected sources would strength-
en its opinion, and the court listed Prosser's four categories of
privacy, including false light privacy.' False light privacy was
not relevant to the court's decision, and apart from the cita-
tion to Prosser's article, false light privacy was not discussed in
the case.
The next reference to false light is in Woife v. Arroyo," a
failed attempt to create in Texas a meaningful cause of action
for wrongful prosecution of a civil action. The plaintiff, a med-
ical doctor, had been previously sued by the defendant for
malpractice." The malpractice action ended with a take-
nothing summary judgment in favor of the doctor." The
doctor then filed what in most other jurisdictions would have
been an action for abuse of process or malicious prosecu-
179. 540 S.W.2d at 672.
180. Id. at 682.
181. Id. (quoting Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Tex. 1973)).
182. Id. at 682-86.
183. Id. at 682.
184. 543 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976).
185. Id.
186. Id.
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tion."7 Texas does not recognize an ordinary action for mali-
cious prosecution, however. Recognizing the importance of
open access to its courts, the Supreme Court of Texas had
previously held that a suit for malicious prosecution could be
brought only if there had been a seizure of the person or of
property. Attempting to avoid this rule, the plaintiff cre-
atively pled his case as one involving "constructive contempt"
of court and invasion of privacy."'
The court of appeals rejected the pleading. According to
the court, constructive contempt simply does not exist. Con-
tempt involves violation of a court order, and there was no
allegation that the defendant had violated any court order by
filing the action for malpractice. In discussing the privacy
claim, the court cited Texas' leading privacy case, Billings v.
Atkinson, 9" and Prosser's four categories.9 Correctly de-
scribing the state of Texas case law on privacy, the court noted
that Texas cases had recognized intrusion and appropriation of
name or picture, but that no Texas cases had considered pub-
lic disclosure of private facts or false light.9 The court did
not attempt to put the plaintiffs suit into any of the four cate-
gories, holding that an absolute privilege attached to communi-
cations in a judicial proceeding, including the allegations con-
tained in the defendant's prior complaint for malpractice.95
187. 1&
188. Pye v. Cardwell, 222 S.W. 153 (Tex. 1920). A recent decision summarizes
Texas law on this point as follows: "Texas law requires special injury for malicious
prosecution, that is, actual interference with the defendant's person (such as an
arrest or detention) or property (such as an attachment, an appointment of a
receiver, a writ of replevin or an injunction)." Sharif-Munir Davidson Dev. Corp. v.
Bell, 788 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
189. 543 S.W.2d at 12.
190. 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973).
191. 543 S.W.2d at 13.
192. Id. Publicity of private facts had also been discussed in Industrial Founda-
tion of the South v. Texas Industrial Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976),
ceit. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977), but the court in Industrial Foundation did not ac-
tually have before it a civil tort suit. Unwarranted publicity of private facts was
being raised solely as a bar to disclosure of documents by the Texas, Industrial
Accident Board. Id. at 682. Moreover, although the decision in Industrial Founda-
tion was first issued on July 21, 1976, a petition for rehearing was not denied
until October 6, 1976. The decision in Wolfe was rendered on October 13, 1976.
The court in Wofe may be excused for not citing Industrial Foundation in its dis-
cussion of Texas privacy law.
193. 543 S.W.2d at 13-14.
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The next case, Gonzales v. Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co.," involved unauthorized intrusion by a telephone com-
pany employee into the plaintiff's residence for the purpose of
disconnecting service while the plaintiff was absent. 5 Relying
upon intrusion cases from other jurisdictions, since no Texas
case on point existed, the court held that a cause of action for
intrusion had been proven." False light already begins to
take on an independent existence in Texas in this case, howev-
er, because the court cites Industrial Foundation'97 as recogniz-
ing Prosser's four categories of privacy.'
The next step in the process of creation was Moore v.
Charles B. Pierce Film Enterprises,'" which involved a claim
against a movie producer.' The movie dramatized a series
of unsolved murders in Texas in the 1940's, and the complaint
alleged that one of the victims portrayed in the movie was the
plaintiffs deceased sister.2' The complaint alleged intrusion
and false light privacy.' Citing Prosser and the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the court claimed that it was "generally rec-
ognized" that the right of privacy encompassed Prosser's four
categories.2° Ultimately, it was unnecessary for the court to
have recognized any right to privacy in the case, since the
court held that an action for invasion of privacy, even if it
existed, could be alleged by the deceased sister's brother (who
was not mentioned in the movie at all).' As will shortly be
seen, however, the court's inclusion of false light in the list of
"generally recognized" torts would prove to be significant.
H.C. Gill v. H.D. Snow" arose out of a land dispute be-
tween two neighbors. Snow filled an old gravel pit on his prop-
erty and when a nearby creek flooded, Gill's property was
damaged.' Gill and Snow were unable to resolve their dif-
194. 555 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
195. Id. at 220.
196. Id. at 221-22.
197. 540 S.W.2d 668.
198. 555 S.W.2d at 221.
199. 589 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979).
200. Id. at 490.
201. Id. at 489.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 490.
204. Id. at 491.
205. 644 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
206. Id. at 223.
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ferences privately, and Gill took out a one-page advertisement
in the local paper which included, among other things, a re-
print of a letter sent to Snow by the Texas Water Development
Board expressing concern about Snow's landfill. 7 Snow sued
for invasion of privacy, alleging intrusion, false light, and pub-
lic disclosure of private facts.' The court cited Billings, Moore
and the Restatement (Second) of Torts in support of its con-
clusion that there existed four types of privacy torts.' The
court reversed the plaintiffs judgment and rendered judgment
in favor of the defendant as a matter of law, finding that the
evidence did not support an intrusion (because there was no
physical or similar invasion), false light (because there was no
evidence that anything in the advertisement was false), or pub-
lic disclosure (because the advertisement was based for the
most part on information contained in public records)."'
It is fair to characterize Texas law at this point as not rec-
ognizing false light privacy. The court in Billings did not list
false light as part of privacy. The Industrial Foundation court
mentioned Prosser's four categories, but did not indicate ap-
proval or disapproval. The court in Wolfe v. Arroyo correctly
noted that false light had not yet been approved or discussed
by any Texas case. Gonzales began the process of incorporation
by citing Industrial Foundation as though the court had recog-
nized false light privacy. Moore and Snow gave added impetus
by. treating false light privacy as though it had achieved the
status of a recognized tort.
We now come to National Bonding Agency v. Demeson,"1
the first case in Texas arguably to recognize false light privacy
by affirming a jury verdict involving false light. It appears that
the defendant had caused to be published a wanted poster
with the plaintiffs name and picture, describing plaintiff as "a
bond jumper and referring to her sexual habits."212 The com-
plaint also alleged that the defendant's agent had "forced their
way into her residence, holding her and her children hostage,
207. I.
208. Id. at 224.
209. Id. at 223-24.
210. Id. at 224.
211. 648 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
212. Id. at 749 n.1.
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threatening them, and not allowing them to leave,""'5 and
that the agents "had set fire to her car."" 4
The plaintiff pled causes of action for libel and slander,
invasion of privacy (including intrusion, false light and public
disclosure of private facts), assault and false imprisonment,
intentional infliction of mental distress and intentional trespass
to chattel."' The jury apparently found in favor of the plain-
tiff on "several of these torts" (unfortunately, we don't know
from the court's opinion which torts the jury accepted and
which were rejected), but awarded damages only for the inva-
sion of privacy (although we don't know for which branch of
invasion of privacy).""
The defendant appealed primarily on the ground that
Texas did not recognize a cause of action for invasion of priva-
cy.2"7 This was of course a preposterous claim in light of Bill-
ings and other cases, which the court cited in its opinion reject-
ing the defendant's argument."8 The court did not, however,
take the time to distinguish the various privacy claims which
had been recognized or to discuss any of the evidence in the
case with an eye to identifying which type of privacy claim was
presented. Instead, the court simply cited Prosser's four cate-
gories, and then held that "[o]n the authority of Billings, su-
pra, . . . [plaintiff] has stated a tort actionable in Texas, to wit:
the intentional invasion of the right of privacy.""1 The reader
is left wondering if the case really involved false light at all.
The court does not indicate that the poster was false, and Bill-
ings did not indicate that false light privacy was a cause of
action.
Skipping over several unexceptional cases,2 we come to
213. Id. n.3.
214. Id. n.4.
215. Id. at 749.
216. Id.
217. Id. The court of appeals was hampered in its decision (as was the
appellant's counsel) by the failure of the appellant to file a statement of facts
which would have contained excerpts from the trial transcript, among other impor-
tant pieces of the record. Because of the absence of a statement of facts, the ap-
pellant was limited to arguing that the special issues given to the jury did not
correctly state Texas law. Id.
218. Id. at 749-50.
219. Id. at 750.
220. Hubert v. Harte-Hanks Texas Newspapers, 652 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Ct. App.
1983) (open records act case); Floyd v. Park Cities People, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 96
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Covington v. The Houston Post,22l which clearly recognized false
light privacy as an independent tort in Texas. Plaintiff's photo-
graph was published in conjunction with an article about an-
other person of the same name. The article indicated that civil
and criminal proceedings were pending against "Margaret
Covington;" unfortunately, the Margaret Covington against
who the proceedings were pending was not the Margaret
Covington whose picture was printed. She brought an action
against The Houston Post for libel and false light privacy.
The libel action was dismissed on summary judgment
because the suit was filed more than one year after the publica-
tion, and Texas has a one-year statute of limitations for li-
bel.' The plaintiff obviously pled false light in an attempt to
avoid the statute of limitations. The first question which the
court in Covington should have asked is whether false light had
previously been recognized by Texas cases. It did not ask that
question, however. Instead, it simply stated as an accepted fact
that "[i]nvasion of privacy consists of four distinct torts," in-
cluding false light." In support of this premise, the court cit-
ed Snow, Moore, Prosser's treatise, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, and Wood v. Hustler Magazine," a federal decision
which relied upon Industrial Foundation and Snow in support of
the proposition that "Texas courts recognize [all] four forms of
privacy invasion." 5 Having found that false light privacy ex-
isted, the court next held that a two-year statute of limitations
applied to false light privacy in light of the supposedly differ-
ent interest being protected and a Texas rule of strictly con-
struing statutes of limitation."'
(Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (no cause of action for publication in newspaper of accurate
picture of plaintiff's front yard); Donnel v. Lara, 703 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Ct. App.
1985) (intrusion case involving telephone harassment); Texas Dept. of Mental
Health & Mental Retardation v. Texas State Employees Union, 708 S.W.2d 498
(Tex. Ct. App. 1986), rev'd on appeal, 746 S.W. 203 (Tex. 1988) (intrusion case
involving mandatory polygraph).
221. 743 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
222. Id at 346.
223. Id
224. 736 F.2d 1084, reh'g denied, 744 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1107 (1985).
225. Id. at 1088.
226. 743 S.W.2d at 34748. Accord Clarke v. Denton Publishing Co., 793
S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (limitations period for libel does not apply to
false light cause of action). These decisions were contrary to the result suggested
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The experience in Texas with false light has been repeated
in other jurisdictions and with respect to other torts. A court
mentions a rule or an interest in passing-pure dicta. The next
court treats the passing remark as more than dicta, and new
rules and new causes of action are created, sometimes incor-
rectly.' One way to avoid this sort of error is for the second
court to read prior opinions very carefully to separate the
wheat from the chafe. This may be expecting too much of the
second court, however, especially when the dicta appears in an
opinion from a higher court or the highest court in the juris-
diction.
The better way to reduce this type of error is for the first
court to be more careful in drafting its initial opinion. Say only
what is truly necessary for the holding, and say no more. Omit
those troublesome footnotes which may largely be drafted by
clerks in any event. Don't try to make every decision a treatise
on the law. Decide the case before the court and no more.
In Texas' case, the court's false light dicta in Industrial
Foundation of the South v. Texas Industrial Accident Board"' has
been transformed into a holding in Covington v. The Houston
Post' that a litigant may avoid the libel statute of limitations
simply by repleading the same facts and calling it false light.
in a 1975 article analyzing limitations periods for privacy actions under Texas law.
Bacharach, supra note 9, at 949.
It is contended by this author that the torts of public disclosure and
false light are so similar to the defamation action that, if considered
afresh by the legislature, the same considerations should govern and
these three actions should all have the same [one-year] statute of
limitations.
Bacharach, supra note 9, at 849.
For a discussion of other statute of limitations cases, see infra text accompanying
notes 335-50.
227. Cf. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 254 (1988) (retreating
from dicta in prior California Supreme Court decisions which had been widely in-
terpreted by the lower courts as approving the existence of a cause of action for
wrongful termination). See generally Lawrence C. Levine, Judicial Backpedaling: Putt-
ing the Brakes on California's Law of Wrongful Termination, 20 PAC. LJ. 993, 1021
n.108 (1989).
228. 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976).
229. 743 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
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2. The Defamation Cases
False light privacy appears most closely related to the ac-
tion for defamation. An action for defamation lies to redress
unprivileged, false statements of fact communicated to third
persons which harms one's reputation.' The action for false
light privacy lies, in theory, when the defendant has given pub-
licity about another which "places the other before the public
in a false light.""3' Simply inspecting these two sentences, one
can see that a possible difference between defamation and
false light is that defamation requires harm to reputation while
false light apparently does not require harm to reputation.
Other harm, and more particularly, emotional distress standing
alone, is apparently sufficient for false light.' 2
Comment b to Section 652E confirms that this is the in-
tended effect of the black-letter:
It is not, however, necessary to the action for invasion of
privacy that the plaintiff be defamed. It is enough that he
is given unreasonable and highly objectionable publicity
that attributes to him characteristics, conduct or beliefs
that are false, and so is placed before the public in a false
position."
Courts attempting to distinguish libel from false light pri-
vacy have most often seized upon this supposed distinction.
Although Section 652E appears to assert that false light
privacy protects an interest independent from libel, the com-
ments to Section 652H, concerning damages, clearly state that
"[o]ne who is publicly placed in a false light, under 652E, may
recover damages for the harm to his reputation from the posi-
tion in which he is placed.""3 ' So for false light, the plaintiff
may recover both harm to reputation and emotional harm.
230. RE TATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558.
231. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E.
232. Not all jurisdictions follow this rule, however. In Fellows v. National En-
quirer, 721 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1986), the court held that an action for false light could
be maintained only if the communication was (1) defamatory on its face, or (2) if
not defamatory on its face, if the plaintiff could prove "special damages." See
Jeanne Ellen Courtney, Fellows v. National Enquire. Limiting the False Light Invasion
of Privay Ton, 19 PAC. LJ. 355 (1988).
233. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E, cmt. b.
234. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H, cmt. a.
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In most defamation 'cases, the measure of damages will
likewise include both harm to reputation and emotional harm.
According to the traditional common law rules, where there
has been either a libel, slander per se, or slander not per se
where special damages are proven, damages will be measured
by the harm to reputation plus any proven emotional distress,
which is recoverable as a form of parasitic damages."' Sec-
tion 623 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts so provides:
"One who is liable to another for a libel or slander is liable
also for emotional distress and bodily harm that is proved to
have been caused by the defamatory publication." Thus, harm
to reputation and emotional distress are recoverable in both
defamation and false light. There is a complete overlap in the
measure of damages.
The similarities between defamation and false light are so
marked that some courts have concluded that if a cause of
action for defamation is pled, a cause of action for false light
privacy is duplicative and may be dismissed from the case.
That, for example, was the holding in Kapellas v. Kofinan,M
the California Supreme Court's first exposure to false light pri-
vacy. Kapellas arose out of an editorial published by the defen-
dant critical of the plaintiff, who was then seeking a position
on the city council. The editorial, entitled "Children's Welfare
Must Come First," criticized the plaintiff's decision to seek
office notwithstanding her status as mother of six."37 Plaintiff
filed suit in three counts, the first for libel on her own behalf,
the second for libel on behalf of her children, and the third
for invasion of privacy on behalf of her children.' The trial
court granted a demurrer to all three counts, 39 and the plain-
tiff appealed.
The Supreme Court of California held that the first two
causes of action were properly stated, and it reversed the trial
court's judgment granting a demurrer."' As to the third
count for invasion of the children's privacy, the court distin-
guished between false light and unreasonable publicity. Con-
235. BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 9.6.3, 367-68 (1987).
236. 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1969).
237. Id. at 914-15 n.2.
238. Id. at 914-15.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 916-21.
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cerning unreasonable publicity of private facts, the court held
that a cause of action was stated and that this was distinct from
the cause of action for libel.24" ' The cause of action for false
light did not fare so well, however. Relegating its discussion of
false light to a footnote, the court found "the [false light] ac-
tion is in substance equivalent to the children's libel claim,"
and the court held that "[s]ince the complaint contains a spe-
cific cause of action for libel, the privacy count, if intended in
this light, is superfluous and should be dismissed."4 ' Other
courts have come to a similar conclusion. 43
Courts also have almost uniformly held that the same
substantive defenses-both common law and constitution-
al-which apply to defamation actions also apply to false light
claims.44 As will be seen below, some courts have seized up-
on the theoretical difference between false light and defama-
tion to give the plaintiff a way around a statute of limitations
defense, but the results in these cases have little to do with the
substance of false light privacy and much to do with judicial
hostility to limitations defenses. 45
Because the overlap between defamation and false light is
so pronounced even in theory, it is no surprise that false light
and defamation almost always go hand in hand, and the cases
involving allegations of both defamation and false light are the
single largest class of false light cases.2 46 The great majority of
241. Id. at 921.
242. Id. at 921 n.16.
243. State cases: Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. App. 1987); Selleck v.
Globe Int'l, 212 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Ct. App. 1985) (following Kapehas). See also Pearce
v. Courier-Journal, 683 S.W.2d 633 (Ky. App. 1985) (noting that because of the
complete overlap in damages recoverable, there could be only one recovery).
Federal cases: Renner v. Donsbach, 749 F. Supp. 987 (W.D. Mo. 1990);
Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490 (D.D.C. 1987).
244. See cases cited in Fellows v. National Enquirer, 721 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1986).
See also Thomas I. Emerson, The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14
HARv. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 329, 334 (1979); Alfred Hill, Defamation and Psivaty Under
the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L REv. 1205, 1274-75 (1976).
245. See infra text accompanying notes 335-50.
246. State cases: Near East Side Community Org. v. Hair, 555 N.E.2d 1324
(Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Aisenson v. American Broadcasting Co., 269 Cal. Rptr. 379
(C. App. 1990); Murray v. Schlosser, 574 A.2d 1339 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1990);
Schaffer v. Zekman, 554 N.E.2d 988 (III. App. Ct. 1990); S & W Seafoods Co. v.
Jacor Broadcasting, 390 S.E.2d 228 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); Yancey v. Hamilton, 786
S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1989); Henry v. Taft Television & Radio Co., 774 S.W.2d 889
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Yovino v. Fish, 539 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. Ct. App. 1989); Jones
v. Palmer Communications, 440 N.W.2d 884 (Iowa 1989); Hoppe v. Hearst Corp.,
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770 P.2d 203 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Thomason v. Times Journal, 379 S.E.2d 551
(Ga. Ct. App. 1989); Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank of Princeton, 534 N.E.2d
987 (IIl. App. Ct. 1989); Elm Medical Lab. v. RKO Gen., 532 N.E.2d 675 (Mass.
1989); Yakowicz v. McDermott, 548 A.2d 1330 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988); Easter Seal
Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 530 So. 2d 643 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Van Duyn v. Smith,
527 N.E.2d 1005 (11. App. Ct. 1988); Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988);
Walko v. Kean College, 561 A.2d 680 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1988); Celebrezze v. Dayton
Newspapers, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 755 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Larsen v. Philadelphia
Newspapers, 543 A.2d 1181 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Blake v. Gannett Co., 529 So.
2d 595 (Miss. 1988); Ganassi v. Buchanan Ingersoll, P.C., 540 A.2d 272 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1988); Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284 (N.J. 1988); Rowland v. Union
Hills Country Club, 757 P.2d 105 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Ohio Say. Ass'n v. Busi-
ness First of Columbus, 540 N.E.2d 320 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Spears v.
McCormick & Co., 520 So. 2d 805 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Jones v. Taibbi, 512
N.E.2d 260 (Mass. 1987); Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, 746 P.2d 1319 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1987), vacated, 783 P.2d 781 (Ariz. 1989); Berkos v. National Broadcast-
ing Co., 515 N.E.2d 668 (III. App. Ct. 1987); Morganroth v. Whitall, 411 N.W.2d
859 (Mich. Ct. App.1987); Burton v. NCNB Nat'l Bank of N. Carolina, 355 S.E.2d
800 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987); Deitz v. Wometco West Michigan TV, 407 N.W.2d 649
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Muslow v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 509 So. 2d 1012 (La. Ct.
App. 1987); Lakian v. Globe Newspaper Co., 504 N.E.2d 1046 (Mass. 1987); Fisher
v. Detroit Free Press, 404 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Hudak v. Fox, 521
A.2d 889 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987); Early Detection Ctr., P.C. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 403 N.W.2d 830
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Hirsch v. Cooper, 737 P.2d 1092 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986);
Haynik v. Zimlich, 498 N.E.2d 1095 (Ohio C.P. 1986), verepoiled, 508 N.E.2d 195
(Ohio Misc. 2d 1986); LaMon v. City of Westport, 723 P.2d 470 (Wash. Ct. App.
1986); Hall v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 809 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Wecht v.
PG Pub. Co., 510 A.2d 769 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Fasching v. Kallinger, 510 A.2d
694 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1986); McCammon & Assocs. v. McGraw- Hill Broadcasting
Co., 716 P.2d 490 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986); Hagler v. Democrat-News, Inc., 699
S.W.2d 96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Madsen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985);
Sawabini v. Desenberg, 372 N.W.2d 559 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Selleck v. Globe
Int'l, 212 Cal. Rptr. 838 (CL App. 1985); Pearce v. Courier-Journal, 683 S.W.2d
633 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); Buller v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 684 S.W.2d 473 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1984); Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 610 (Cal. 1984);
Zartman v. Lehigh County Humane Soc'y, 482 A.2d 266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984);
McNabb v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 685 P.2d 458 (Or. Ct. App. 1984); Arent v.
Hatch, 349 N.W.2d 536 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Ledl v. Quik Pik Food Stores, 349
N.W.2d 529 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, 320 S.E.2d 70
(W. Va. 1984); Yeager v. Local Union 20, 453 N.E.2d 666 (Ohio 1983); Renwick
v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 304 S.E.2d 593 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd,
312 S.E.2d 405 (N.C. 1984); Walls v. City of Columbus, 461 N.E.2d 13 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1983); Byrd v. Hustler Magazine, 433 So. 2d 593 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983);
Weatherall v. Dep't of Health & Human Resources, 432 So. 2d 988 (La. Ct. App.
1983); National Bonding Agency v. Demeson, 648 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Ct. App.
1983); Jones v. Calder, 187 Cal. Rptr. 825 (Ct. App. 1982), affd, 465 U.S. 783
(1984); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-America, 448 A.2d 1317 (Conn. 1982);
Thorpe v. Danby, 448 A.2d 676 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982); McCall v. Courier-Journal
& Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981); Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. Rptr. 160 (Ct. App. 1981); Ander-
son v. Low Rent Housing Comm'n, 304 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1981); Williams v.
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Church's Fried Chicken, 279 S.E.2d 465 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); Forsher v. Bugliosi,
608 P.2d 716 (Cal. 1980); Hodsdon v. Whitworth, 266 S.E.2d 561 (Ga. Ct. App.
1980); Adreani v. Hansen, 400 N.E.2d 679 (I1. App. Ct. 1980); Dodrill v. Arkansas
Democrat Co., 590 S.W.2d 840 (Ark. 1979); Brown v. B6ney, 255 S.E.2d 784
(N.C. Ct. App. 1979); Harrison v. Washington Post Co., 391 A.2d 781 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Lester v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 241 S.E.2d 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978);
Winegard v. Larsen, 260 N.W.2d 816 (Iowa 1977); Devlin v. Greiner, 371 A.2d
380 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977); Bitsie v. Walston, 515 P.2d 659 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973);
Burke v. Triangle Publications, 302 A.2d 408 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973); Harnish v.
Herald-Mail Co., 286 A.2d 146 (Md. 1972); Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912,
(Cal. 1969); Reed v. Ponton, 166 N.W.2d 629 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968); Patton v.
Royal Indus., 70 Cal. Rptr. 44 (Ct. App. 1968).
Federal cases: White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir.
1990); Aids Counseling & Testing Ctrs. v. Group W Television, Inc., 903 F.2d 100
(4th Cir. 1990); Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262 (10th Cir. 1989);
Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1526 (8th Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Grimaldi,
875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989); Leidholdt v. L.F.P., Inc., 860 F.2d 890 (9th Cir.
1988); Ault v. Hustler Magazine, 860 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1988); Fudge v. Penthouse
Int'l, Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012 (Ist Cir. 1988); Rouly v. Enserch Corp., 835 F.2d 1127
(5th Cir. 1988); Moore v. Big Picture Co., 828 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1987); Ashby v.
Hustler Magazine, 802 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1986); Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46
(2d Cir. 1986); Zolezzi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 789 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir.
1986); O'Donnell v. CBS, Inc., 782 F.2d 1414 (7th Cir. 1986); Coughlin v. West-
inghouse Broadcasting & Cable, 780 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1985); Bichler v. Union
Bank & Trust Co. of Grand Rapids, 745 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1984); Lerman v.
Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984); Coudert v. Paine Webber, Inc.,
705 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1983); Gashgai v. Leibowitz, 703 F.2d 10 (Ist Cir. 1983);
Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 691 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1982); Street v. National
Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981); Tappen v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376
(10th Cir. 1979); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1977); Renner
v. Donsbach, 749 F. Supp. 987 (W.D. Mo. 1990); Jacobs v. Dujmovic, 752 F. Supp.
1516 (D. Colo. 1990); Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1359 (N.D. Ill.
1990); Hardge-Harris v. Pleban, 741 F. Supp. 764 (E.D. Mo. 1990); Rickman v.
Cone Mills Corp., 129 F.R.D. 181 (D. Kan. 1989); Handley v. Phillips, 715 F.
Supp. 657 (M.D. Pa. 1989); Mize v. Harvey Shapiro Enters., 714 F. Supp. 220
(N.D. Miss. 1989); Stewart v. Pantry, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1361 (W.D. Ky. 1988);
Seaphus v. Lilly, 691 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. II. 1988); Mitchell v. Random House,
Inc., 703 F. Supp. 1250 (S.D. Miss. 1988); Rohda v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 689 F.
Supp. 1034 (D. Colo. 1988); Brueggemeyer v. American Broadcasting Cos., 684 F.
Supp. 452 (N.D. Tex. 1988); Brueggemeyer v. Krut, 684 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Tex.
1988); Southern Air Transp. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 670 F. Supp. 38
(D.D.C. 1987); Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490 (D.D.C.
1987); Rickman v. Cone Mills Corp., 659 F. Supp. 412 (D. Kan. 1987); Jensen v.
Times Mirror Co., 634 F. Supp. 304 (D. Conn. 1986), on motion for reconsideration,
647 F. Supp. 1525 (1986); Hartman v. Meredith Corp., 638 F. Supp. 1015 (D.
Kan. 1986); L Cohen & Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1425 (D.
Conn. 1986); Robinson v. Vitra Corp., 620 F. Supp. 1066 (D.C. Md. 1985); Bosco
v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 611 F. Supp. 449 (D.C. Tex. 1985);
Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broadcasting & Cable, 603 F. Supp. 377 (D.C. Pa.
1985); Mays v. Laurant Publishing, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Holt v.
Cox Enters., 590 F. Supp. 408 (D.C. Ga. 1984); Bolduc v. Bailey, 586 F. Supp.
896 (D. Colo. 1984); Parnell v. Booth Newspapers, 572 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Mich.
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these cases resulted in a judgment for the defendant on one or
another ground, such as the truth of the communications, 47
that the communications were not capable of bearing a defam-
atory meaning and were not highly offensive to a reasonable
person, 48 or that the communications were privileged, either
under common law or under the Constitution.249
There are, of course, a handful of cases in which a judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed or in which the
appellate court permitted an action to proceed to trial for a
possible judgment in favor of the plaintiff. In the following
1983); McCabe v. Village Voice, 550 F. Supp. 525 (D.C. Pa. 1982); Cantrell v.
American Broadcasting Cos., 529 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Iii. 1981); Fitzgerald v. Pent-
house Int'l, Ltd., 525 F. Supp. 585 (D.C. Md. 1981); Roberts v. Dover, 525 F.
Supp. 987 (D.C. Tenn. 1981); Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285
(D.C. 1981); Martin v. Municipal Publications, 510 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
Cibenko v. Worth Publishers, 510 F. Supp. 761 (D.C. N.J. 1981); Gonzalez v.
Leonard, 497 F. Supp. 1058 (D.C. Conn. 1980); Smith v. Esquire, Inc., 494 F.
Supp. 967 (D.C. Md. 1980); Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081 (D.C. Pa.
1980); Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, 485 F. Supp. 893 (D.C.
Mich. 1980); Bromhall v. Rorvik, 478 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Justice v. Belo
Broadcasting Corp., 472 F. Supp. 145 (D.C. Tex. 1979); Lorentz v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 946 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F. Supp.
850 (Kan. 1977); Wilson v. Retail Credit Co., 325 F. Supp. 460 (D.C. Miss. 1971);
Holmes v. Curties Publishing Co., 303 F. Supp. 522 (D.S.C. 1969); Peacock v.
Retail Credit Co., 302 F. Supp. 418 (D.C. Ga. 1969).
247. See, e.g., Near East Side Community Org. v. Hair, 555 N.E.2d 1324 (Ind.
Ct App. 1990) (no allegation that statements were false); Aisenson v. American
Broadcasting Co., 269 Cal. Rptr. 379 (Ct. App. 1990) (allegation that judge had
lowest rating in survey was true); Ohio Say. Ass'n v. Business First of Columbus,
540 N.E.2d 320 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Jones v. Taibbi, 512 N.E.2d 260 (Mass.
1987); Morganroth v. Whitall, 411 N.W.2d 859 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Fisher v.
Detroit Free Press, 404 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Byrd v. Hustler Mag-
azine, 433 So. 2d 593 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983); Goodrich v. Waterbury
Republican-America, 448 A.2d 1317 (Conn. 1982).
248. See, e.g., Neish v. Beaver Newspapers, 581 A.2d 619 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
(statements in series of articles about new city attorney neither capable of defama-
tory meaning nor highly offensive); Muslow v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 509 So. 2d
1012 (La.Ct. App. 1987); Madsen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985);
Andreani v. Hansen, 400 N.E.2d 679 (III. App. Ct. 1980).
249. See, e.g., Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, 783 P.2d 781 (Ariz. 1989)
(statements criticizing job performance of public official); Van Duyn v. Smith, 527
N.E.2d 1005 (11. App. Ct. 1988) (statements made in context of abortion dispute
with posters and pickets); Walko v. Kean College, 561 A.2d 680 (NJ. Super. Ct.
1988) (spoof of holine concept with a "whoreline"); Brown v. Boney, 255 S.E.2d
784 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979). In Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 590 S.W.2d 840
(Ark. 1979), a newspaper article falsely reported that the plaintiff had failed to
pass the state bar exam. The court held that an action for libel could proceed
under the Gem standard, but that the false light claim had to be dismissed be-
cause there was no evidence of actual malice.
FALSE LIGHT PRIVACY
paragraphs, all of those cases will be discussed, and it will be
seen that the false light claim in each case added absolutely
nothing to the plaintiffs recovery.' The cases stand for the
narrow proposition that there can be a false light recovery
when there is also a defamation recovery. In light of the over-
lap between the two torts, this proposition is a far cry from
saying that false light has an independent existence.
We begin with one of those odd cases the entertainment
value of which makes it a likely candidate for inclusion in a
torts casebook. The plaintiff in Murray v. Schlosser," a Con-
necticut case, submitted her picture for publication in a local
newspaper as a newlywed. The picture was apparently not very
flattering to her. The defendants were two radio talk-show
hosts and the radio station over which they broadcast. The
talk- show hosts had a weekly feature titled "Berate the Brides"
in which listeners were encouraged to call in to vote on the
"Dog of the Week" based upon photographs of brides appear-
ing in the local newspaper."2 One of the hosts said of the
plaintiff, based upon the picture in the newspaper, that she
was "'too ugly to even rate,'" and the other host, a woman,
said something like "she did not want even her worst enemy to
be with the plaintiff."252
Although the plaintiff was declared the "Dog of the
Week," it was the defendants who ultimately were found to be
barking up the wrong tree. Plaintiff sued, alleging causes of
action for defamation, false light invasion of privacy and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants respond-
ed with a motion to strike, asserting that the broadcasts were
privileged by the First Amendment. The court determined that
250. The statute of limitations cases are not included here, but are discussed
in detail infra at text accompanying notes 335- 50.
Also not included in the text are a few federal cases in which courts ren-
dered non-merits decisions. Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, 828 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (claim alleging both defamation and false light was subject to arbitration
clause); Gialde v. Time, Inc., 480 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1973) (dismissed for lack of
appellate jurisdiction an appeal from a discovery order requiring the defendant to
disclose the name of a source for a story); Mays v. Laurant Publishing, Ltd., 600
F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (personal jurisdiction ruling); Brown v. News Group
Publications, 563 F. Supp. 86 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (motion to change venue).
251. 574 A.2d 1339 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1990).
252. Winners apparently received as a prize "a case of Ken-L Ration and a
dog collar." Id. at 1340.
253. Id.
1992]
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the plaintiff was not a public person (that is, neither a public
official nor a public figure) and that the subject matter of the
communication was not of public interest.2' The court also
rejected the argument that the communications were privi-
leged statements of opinion, emphasizing that since "the defen-
dants were purportedly encouraging the listening audience to
vote, the words used by [the defendants] were not votes of an
opinion, but statements of conclusions." 5' The court tried to
bolster its determination that the communications were not
mere statements of opinion (such as, "This painting is ugly")
by drawing upon the "common knowledge that a woman gen-
erally reaches the zenith of her attractiveness and desirability
at or about the time of her marriage, and that wedding photo-
graphs capture her beauty."' According to the court, this
"common knowledge" suggested that the communications were
false, and since they were capable of being false, were more
likely to be unprivileged statements of fact instead of privi-
leged statements of opinion. " The court denied the motion
to strike, and as of the date of this writing, the case awaits trial. '
254. Id. at 1840.
255. Id. at 1341.
256. Id. at 1341.
257. This would appear to turn the fact/opinion dichotomy on its head. If a
communication is an opinion, then courts treat the communication as being nei-
ther provably true nor provably false, sometimes relying upon the theory that
there is no such thing as a false opinion.
If a court purports to assess the truth or falsity of a communication before
determining whether the communication is of fact or opinion, the fact/opinion
dichotomy will become circular. That is, however, exactly what the court in Murray
did. According to the court, one of the factors used to determine whether a com-
munication is fact or opinion is "its truth or falsity." 574 A.2d at 1341. And since
the court was willing to take judicial notice of the "fact" that wedding photos
capture the beauty of a woman at her "zenith," the statement that a woman in a
particular wedding photo was "ugly" was necessarily a statement of fact rather
than opinion.
258. The court assumed that "wedding photographs capture [a bride's] beauty."
Id. at 1341. Yet not all photographs capture a person's beauty, and the photo-
graph that triggered this lawsuit may well have been such a photograph. The au-
thor has been reliably informed that the plaintiff is actually an attractive young
woman (and was attractive at the time of the picture) and that the picture which
the plaintiff submitted to the newspaper for publication was not very flattering.
Entirely apart from whether the superior court's determination was correct
as a matter of constitutional law (see, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46
(1988)), the case is a classic example of the trivialization of law. A woman sends
her photograph to a newspaper to have it published. Someone sees the photo-
graph and says that the plaintiff looks "ugly" in it. Is it truly the business of the
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And what of the false light privacy claim in the case? It
went entirely unmentioned in the court's opinion. Quite
clearly, if there was to be recovery, it would be on both the
defamation and the false light claims. If in fact (assuming, as
the court did, that this type of statement can be a fact) the
plaintiff was not ugly, then the defendants portrayed the plain-
tiff in a false light before the public. There is no doubt that
the false light in which the plaintiff was portrayed would be
highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and the plaintiff
suffered severe emotional distress. The elements for false light
would be met, but the false light claim would add nothing to
the plaintiffs case or potential recovery.
The other state cases permitting false light claims to go
forward in conjunction with defamation claims present similar
considerations. Each case involves a libel in which there would
be a significant risk of harm to reputation, if false. In Yancey v.
Hamilton,' the defendant branded the plaintiff a "con artist"
in a newspaper article, a communication that, if false, would
clearly harm the plaintiff's reputation."W In Jones v. Palmer
Communications,"' the news-telecast concerned the plaintiffs
employability as a firefighter. 2 Larsen v. Philadelphia Newspa-
pers' arose out of newspaper articles accusing a judge of per-
jury and improper conduct.' Berkos v. National Broadcasting
Co.' arose out of a television news program accusing a judge
of accepting a bribe from a police officer to influence his deci-
sion in a criminal case.' In Zartman v. Lehigh County Humane
Society,' the plaintiff, who operated a livestock auction, was
accused of cruelty to animals and of maintaining unhealthy
conditions at his auction site.' The bank in Lester v. Trust
Company of Georgia' falsely told a credit bureau that the
courts to give her relief? No doubt the talk-show program was insensitive and
perhaps even cruel. But is this really the stuff of legal liability?
259. 786 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1989).
260. Id. at 855-56.
261. 440 N.W.2d 884 (Iowa 1989).
262. Id. at 888.
263. 543 A.2d 1181 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
264. Id. at 1188-89.
265. 515 N.E.2d 668 (III. App. Ct. 1987).
266. Id. at 669.
267. 482 A.2d 266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
268. Id. at 269-70.
269. 241 S.E.2d 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978).
1992]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32
plaintiff was delinquent in making payment on a charge card
account.' The defendant in Hodson v. Whitworth ' adver-
tised a foreclosure sale of real property without having proper
authority under the deed to conduct such a sale.'" In McCall
v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co.,' a criminal defense
lawyer was accused of offering to "fix" a drug case or bribe a
judge.' The defendant in National Bonding Agency v.
Demeson' defamed the plaintiff by putting her picture on a
"wanted" poster, describing her as a bond jumper, and refer-
ring to her sexual practices 7  The plaintiff in Crump v.
Beckley Newspapers' was a woman coal miner whose picture
was published in conjunction with an article about sexual ha-
rassment of women coal miners even though she had never
suffered harassment.7 There are a number of federal deci-
sions, but each of them, like the state decisions, are obvious
defamation actions.'"
270. Id. at 634.
271. 266 S.E.2d 561 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980).
272. Id. at 563.
273. 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981).
274. Id. at 883-84, 887.
275. 648 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
276. Id. at 749 & n.1.
277. 320 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 1984).
278. Id. at 75. The article included descriptions of specific incidents of sexual
harassment, and the plaintiff was questioned by friends and others whether she
had been victim to this type of conduct. For example, the complaint alleged that
one reader asked her "whether she had ever been 'stripped, greased and sent out
of the mine.'" Id.
279. Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 691 F.2d 666, 670 (4th Cir. 1982) (de-
fendant accused the plaintiff of having engaged in espionage); Ceisler v. Petrocelli,
616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff falsely portrayed in a novel as a transsexual
who engaged in criminal conduct); Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 742 F. Supp.
1359 (N.D. Ill. 1900) (circumstances of termination implied that employee had
been terminated for committing a criminal or unethical act); Sisemore v. U.S.
News & World Report, 662 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Alaska 1987) (plaintiff portrayed as
having mental disease which made him dangerous to himself or others); Jensen v.
Times Mirror Co., 634 F. Supp. 304 (D. Conn. 1986), reconsidered, 647 F. Supp.
1525 (D. Conn. 1986) (newspaper reported that one of its reporters "withheld
information and that her 'ability to function' as a reporter 'was irreparably
damaged'"); Krochalis v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 629 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D.
Pa. 1985) (plaintiff allegedly accused by former employer of having engaged in
criminal conduct); Bolduc v. Bailey, 586 F. Supp. 896 (D. Colo. 1984) (priest ac-
cused of criminal and immoral conduct); Parnell v. Booth Newspapers, 572 F.
Supp. 909 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (photograph of plaintiff in newspaper identified her
as a prostitute); Cantrell v. American Broadcasting Cos., 529 F. Supp. 746 (N.D.
III. 1981) (plaintiff accused of being co-conspirator in arson scheme); Dresbach v.
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Each of these cases could be cited as proof that false light
exists, because in each case, the court permitted the case to
proceed to trial with false light as one possible theory. Yet it is
plain in each case that if the offending statement was false, a
prerequisite for liability under false light, then there would
also be liability for defamation. The false light cause of action
thus added nothing to the case that was not already there. As a
practical reality, these cases do not support the independent
existence of false light. They support only the limited prop-
osition that if there can be liability for defamation, there can
also be liability for false light.'
3. The Misappropriation Cases
The case which Prosser confidently claimed was the seed
for false light privacy, Byron v. Johnston,8' was actually a "pass-
ing off" case, which can be viewed as one species of commer-
cial appropriation of name or picture. The defendant in Byron
was about to (or already had) published a book purporting to
Doubleday & Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285 (D. D.C. 1981) (passages in book accused
plaintiff of being "a co-conspirator and accessory before and after the fact in the
murder of his parents"); Martin v. Municipal Publications, 510 F. Supp. 255 (E.D.
Pa. 1981) (caption under picture of plaintiff in newspaper describes him as a
"closet transvestite[] from South Philly" who is "stinking drunk"); Lorentz v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 946 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (plaintiff accused of
being 'a Communist, a criminal, and a traitor"); Holmes v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
303 F. Supp. 522 (D.S.C. 1969) (plaintiff accused of being high stakes gambler
with possible mafia connections).
The Geisler case, arose under New York law, and the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, relying on Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978),
held that a cause of action for invasion of privacy existed in New York apart
from N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50-51. Geisler, 616 F.2d at 638-39 & n.5. Bimbauma
itself cited no New York authority for the proposition that New York recognized
invasion of privacy apart from the Civil Rights Law. The decision in Birnbaum was
based entirely upon the panel's prediction that the New York Court of Appeals
would bring itself up to date by modifying or distinguishing Roberson v. Roches-
ter Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). Birnbaum, 588 F.2d at 323-26. That
prediction was contrary to a long line of New York authority, and subsequent
decisions indicate that the Second Circuit's prediction was incorrect. Stephano v.
News Group Publications, 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446
N.Y.S.2d 801 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
280. One of the proferred justifications for false light was that it was needed
to fill the gap in cases where the plaintiff could not prove harm to reputation in
defamation. See Prosser, Privacy, supra note 1, at 400-01. The cases make it plain,
however, that plaintiffs have little difficulty in establishing harm to reputation. The
.gap" which false light was supposed to fill simply does not exist in practice.
281. 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (Ch. 1816).
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contain the poetry of Lord Byron, who at the time was one of
the most famous living poets in England. By attributing the
poems to Byron, the defendant hoped to capitalize upon the
market's demand for Byron's poetry. The court enjoined the
attempt.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the appropria-
tion tort as follows in Section 652C: "One who appropriates to
his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is sub-
ject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.""'2 Al-
though many of the cases involve appropriation for a commer-
cial purpose, the Restatement indicates that the tort goes be-
yond commercial appropriation and includes a "use of the
plaintiff's name or likeness for [the defendant's] own purposes
and benefit, even though the use is not a commercial one, and
even though the benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecu-
niary one."28
There are two ways in which appropriation of name or
likeness can overlap with false light. First, using someone's
name or likeness may suggest to the reasonable audience that
the owner has consented to the use. This false impression may
by itself satisfy the loose standards for false light contained in
Section 652E. Conceivably, then, since appropriation requires
proof that the plaintiff did not consent to the publication,
every case of appropriation may also involve false light. Sec-
ond, the use of the name or likeness may suggest that the per-
son identified agrees with other material published in conjunc-
tion with the name or likeness or has the characteristics de-
scribed in that related material.
Because the misappropriation tort is so well established
and understood, there are relatively few cases in which a plain-
tiff has added a false light claim to a misappropriation
claim." Litigants apparently have not felt a need to burden a
282. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 652C (1977).
283. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (1977). This broad view
of appropriation is consistent with the interpretation by New York courts of the
New York Civil Rights Law. See the discussion in Zimmetynan, supra note 4, at
376-80.
284. State cases: Merz v. Professional Health Control of Augusta, 332 S.E.2d
333 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Jonap v. Silver, 474 A.2d 800 (Conn. Ct. App. 1984);
Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983); Martinez by Mar-
tinez v. Democrat- Herald Pub. Co., 669 P.2d 818 (Or. Ct. App. 1983); Bisbee v.
John C. Conover Agency, 452 A.2d 689 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1982); Guglielmi v.
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complaint which contains a good misappropriation claim with
a weak false light claim. Decisions rejecting false light claims in
this context have most often done so by finding that the publi-
cized matter is substantially true.' In one extraordinary case,
the court held that Navajo sensibilities concerning publication
of a person's picture in conjunction with a news story were not
"ordinary sensibilities" and that, therefore, no actionable inva-
sion of privacy had occurred."' Two California cases rejected
false light claims on technical, procedural grounds.2 ' This
Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 140 Cal. Rptr. 775 (Ct. App. 1977), affid, 603 P.2d 454
(Cal. 1979); Rinsley v. Frydman, 559 P.2d 334 (Kan. 1977); Brown v. Capricorn
Records, 222 S.E.2d 618 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975); Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace,
Jovanovich, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Ct. App. 1974); Bitsie v. Walston, 515 P.2d
659 (N.M. 1973).
Federal cases: Faloona by Fredrickson v. Hustler Magazine, 799 F.2d 1000
(5th Cir. 1986); Wagner v. Campbell County, 695 F. Supp. 512 (D. Wyo. 1988);
Tellado v. Time-Life Books, 643 F. Supp. 904 (D.N.J. 1986); International Union v.
Garner, 601 F. Supp. 187 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); Hooker v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
551 F. Supp. 1060 (D.C. III. 1982); Cordell v. Detective Publications, 307 F. Supp.
1212 (D.C. Tenn. 1968); Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580
(D.C. Cir. 1985). The federal cases cited here contained claims for false light pri-
vacy and misappropriation but no claim for defamation. The federal false
light/defamation cases are cited above in note 279.
285. State cases: Merz v. Professional Health Control of Augusta, 332 S.E.2d
333 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (picture of plaintiffs property used in television advertise-
ment was substantially accurate); Martinez by Martinez v. Democrat-Herald Publish-
ing Co., 669 P.2d 818 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (true story in high school newspaper
about drug use in the school with a picture of an alleged drug transaction in
which the plaintiff was identifiable); Bisbee v. John C. Conover Agency, 452 A.2d
689 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1982) (real estate advertisement which announced sale of
house, disclosed general terms of sale, and disclosed name and occupation of pur-
chaser); Brown v. Capricorn Records, 222 S.E.2d 618 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975)
(plaintiff's picture published on rock and roll album cover-nothing false about the
picture).
Federal cases: International Union v. Garner, 601 F. Supp. 187 (M.D. Tenn.
1985) (plaintiffs did not contend that information publicized was in any way mis-
leading); Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(before and after plastic surgery picture of plaintiff was substantially accurate).
286. Bitsie v. Walston, 515 P.2d 659 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973). As part of a
fund-raiser for cerebral palsy, the plaintiffs portrait had been put upon a card.
The card was subsequently published in conjunction with a newspaper story about
the fund- raising effort. The plaintiff was completely healthy, however, and the
Navajos allegedly believed that publication of the picture in conjunction with a
story about cerebral palsy would bring bad luck upon the plaintiff. The court held
that publication would not offend the sensibilities of an ordinary person.
287. Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Ct. App.
1974) (false light claim dismissed for plaintiff's failure to comply with retraction
statute); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 140 Cal. Rptr. 775 (Ct. App. 1977),
aflid, 603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979) (false light claim is a personal cause of action that
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leaves us with only three cases to discuss in which false light
and appropriation were permitted to go to trial together or
resulted in a jury verdict for the plaintiff." The first case is
Eastwood v. Superior Court."' The National Enquirer published
what Clint Eastwood alleged was a fabricated story about
Eastwood's love life.' Eastwood alleged both false light and
misappropriation. The defendant did not even challenge the
allegations of false light, and filed a demurrer only against the
misappropriation claim.' The court of appeals permitted the
misappropriation claim to go forward even though the article
was cast in the form of news. According to the court, if the
article was knowingly false, then its publication must have been
for commercial advantage.' Since the misappropriation
claim was, according to the court's analysis, valid only if the
article was false, the false light claim added nothing to the
case. By proving the article to be false, Eastwood could recover
under misappropriation all of the damages he could recover
for false light, and he probably could recover more for the
misappropriation than for the false light.
The second case is Jonap v. Silver."' The plaintiff was the
marketing director for the defendant, a manufacturer of ani-
mal health care products. Despite the plaintiffs objections, the
defendant sent a letter over the plaintiff's signature to the
does not survive death of person portrayed in a false light).
288. A third case which may involve both appropriation and false light, Rinsley
v. Frydman, 559 P.2d 334 (Kan. 1977), is discussed below at text accompanying
notes 419-30. It is unclear whether the court found both appropriation and false
light or only false light. In light of the possibility that the court approved only a
false light claim, it is more appropriate to treat the case below in the section
dealing with pure false light cases.
289. 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983).
290. In particular, the story alleged that Eastwood was having serious problems
in his personal relationship with film star Sondra Locke and that he had recently
spent time with Tanya Tucker. The story was titled, "Clint Eastwood in Love Tri-
angle with Tanya Tucker." Id. at 345.
291. Id. at 344, 346. The false light claim tracked RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652E (1977), and the defendant apparently thought it was pointless to
challenge the existence of false light in California.
292. The Enquirer had used the Eastwood story as a teaser on the front cover
and in its television advertisements. As the court explained, "the use of
Eastwood's personality in the context of a news account, allegedly false but pre-
sented as true, provided the Enquirer with a ready-made 'scoop'--a commercial ad-
vantage over its competitors which it would otherwise not have." Eastwood, 198
Cal. Rptr. at 349.
293. 474 A.2d 800 (Conn. Ct. App. 1984).
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editor of the "Animal Nutrition and Health" magazine. The
plaintiff testified that certain portions of the letter did not
reflect his beliefs and that other portions were outright false-
hoods.' He brought suit, alleging injurious falsehood, misap-
propriation, and false light. The jury awarded damages of
$24,000 for injurious falsehood, $24,000 for misappropriation
and $32,000 for false light.' The trial court set aside the ver-
dict on the injurious falsehood claim but entered judgment for
the plaintiff on the two privacy claims.'
The defendant did not contest the sufficiency of the ,evi-
dence on the misappropriation claim, challenging only the
merits of the false light claim.' In affirming judgment on
the false light claim, the court emphasized that the only falsity
required to support liability was the false attribution of beliefs
to the plaintiff which, according to the testimony, clearly had
happened.2 Since the false attribution was in the context of
a letter to the editor in which the commercial interests of the
defendant were defended, the false attribution just as clearly
constituted a misappropriation of name for commercial pur-
poses.'
Of interest in Jonap is the breakdown of damages. Why
did the jury award only $24,000 for injurious falsehood and
misappropriation, but award $32,000 for false light? We are
left entirely in the dark about this matter. The court held that
the damages for misappropriation and false light were
duplicative because the damages arose out of the same single
294. Id. at 806.
295. Id. at 803.
296. Id. The opinion does not indicate why the injurious falsehood verdicts
were set aside.
297. Id.
298. The court stated:
In testifying that in his opinion certain parts of the letter were not
even true, it is clear that the jury could infer that they were, there-
fore, not the plaintiff's beliefs or judgments. There is sufficient evi-
dence for the jury to have found that the letter attributed to the
plaintiff views which were not, in truth, his own. The jury could rea-
sonably have found this to be highly offensive to a reasonable person
because there is sufficient evidence to establish that there was a "ma-
jor misrepresentation of his character, history, activities or beliefs."
474 A.2d at 806 (footnote omitted).
299. See, e.g., Staruski v. Continental Tel. Co. of Vt., 581 A.2d 266 (Vt. 1990),
where the defendant used an employee's picture and fabricated testimonial in ad-
vertising for the company.
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transaction, and the court struck the $24,000 award for misap-
propriation leaving the $32,000 judgment intact.' Conceiv-
ably, the jury awarded $8,000 extra for false light to compen-
sate the plaintiff for injury to reputation which the jury might
have believed was not compensable under the misappropria-
tion cause of action. But even if true, that extra $8,000 should
have been reflected in the injurious falsehood claim. Moreover,
the court held that the misappropriation claim included dam-
ages for reputation."' We are thus left wondering where the
extra $8,000 came from.
On the federal side, we have Judge Posner's opinion in
Douglass v. Hustler Magazine,- one of many cases involving
Larry Flynt."3 The plaintiff, Robyn Douglass, was a model
and actress. She had originally agreed to pose nude in Playboy
and had executed a release authorizing Playboy to publish the
photographs or "otherwise use the photographs 'for any lawful
purpose whatsoever, without restrictions.""" The photogra-
pher subsequently was hired by Hustler as its photography
editor, and he brought with him a number of the nude photos
of Douglass, some of which had been published by Playboy
and others which had not. Hustler published the photos with-
out securing the consent of either Douglass or Playboy.' 5
Douglass claimed both emotional distress and lost earnings,
and an expert testified that the present value of her lost earn-
300. Jonap, 474 A.2d at 807.
301. The court stated:
The elements of damage establishing liability for invasion of privacy
for appropriation of the plaintiff's name and those establishing liabili-
ty for invasion of privacy by placing the plaintiff in a false light were
duplicative. One event, the request to publish the letter and its subse-
quent publication, resulted in the harm alleged. Put another way,
plaintiff cannot twice suffer damage to his reputation, mental distress
or other harm from this one transaction. Thus, he should not twice
recover damages.
Id. at 807.
302. Douglass, 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985).
303. See also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Wood v. Hustler
Magazine, 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984); Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir.
1984).
304. 769 F.2d at 1131.
305. The photographer claimed that Douglass had executed a general release
in his favor authorizing him to do whatever he wanted with the pictures. The
release was never produced at trial, however, and the jury credited Douglass' tes-
timony that she had signed a more limited release in favor only of Playboy. Id.
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ings was $716,565. The jury awarded compensatory damages
of $1,000,000 for both misappropriation of name or picture
and false light privacy and $1,500,000 in punitive damages
(which was reduced by the trial judge to $100,000).'
The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for a new
trial, but indicated in its opinion that if there had not been
procedural error in the trial, it would have affirmed the ver-
dict.' The misappropriation claim was open and shut once
the jury determined that Hustler had published the photos
without securing the necessary consent. The plaintiff was a
model and actress who made significant sums of money from
appearing in print and television commercials. Hustler, like the
National Equirer in the Eastwood case discussed above, used
the Douglass pictorial as a teaser to boost its sales. Judge
Posner correctly noted that "Douglass or her agents must have
control over the dissemination of her nude photographs if
their value is to be maximized."'
In support of her false light claim, Douglass claimed that
the publication falsely portrayed her (1) as being a lesbian
(because a few of the shots were of Douglass with another
model in simulated sex positions and captions for these photos
were suggestive) and (2) as having consented to publication of
the photographs in Hustler, a vile and degrading publica-
tion.' The first basis for false light-being portrayed as a
lesbian- would clearly form the basis for a defamation action,
particularly since there was evidence of special damages to
Douglass' business."'
306. Id. at 1132.
307. The errors related to introduction of prejudicial evidence and improper
jury instructions. Id. at 1140-46.
308. Id. at 1138.
309. Id. at 1135.
310. BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 4.12.2, at 123-25 (2nd ed.
1991). Judge Posner's analysis of this aspect of the case confirms that, as Posner
himself admitted, the court was having to "enter imaginatively into a world that is
not the natural habitat of judges-the world of nude modeling and (as they are
called in the trade) 'provocative' magazines." Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1134. According
to Posner, the panel did not "think that Hustler was seriously insinuating-or that
its readership would think-that Robyn Douglass is a lesbian. Hustler is a magazine
for men. Few men are interested in lesbians. The purpose of showing two women
in apparent sexual embrace is to display the charms of two women." Id. at 1135.
Posner's reasoning is apparently as follows: Hustler is for men; Men are not in-
terested in lesbians or scenes depicting lesbians making love; Therefore, the pic-
tures could not reasonably have been intended to suggest that the women being
8491992]
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The second basis for false light was the "degrading associa-
tion with Hustler.""' Posner believed that "[i]t would have
been difficult for Douglass to state this claim as one for li-
bel."" One wonders why Posner held this belief. The remain-
der of his analysis is not very helpful:
For what exactly is the imputation of saying (or here, im-
plying) of a person that she agreed to have pictures of
herself appear in a vulgar and offensive magazine? That
she is immoral? This would be too strong a characteriza-,
tion in today's moral climate. That she lacks good taste?
This would not be defamatory."' The point is, rather,
that to be shown nude in such a setting before millions of
people-the readers of the magazine-is degrading in much
the same way that to be shown beaten up by criminals is
degrading (although not libelous, despite the analogy to
being reported to have been raped), though of course if
Douglass consented to appear nude in this setting she is
responsible for her own debasement and can get no judi-
cial redress'
There are quite a few things wrong with this analysis. In
the first place, does Posner really believe as a matter of law that
a jury could not find the imputation to be that Douglass was
immoral? Can the Seventh Circuit in these circumstances take
judicial notice of "today's moral climate"? Wouldn't that be a
classic jury question?" Second, couldn't a jury reasonably
draw the conclusion that a person who consents to appear
nude in a "vulgar and offensive magazine" is similarly "vulgar
and offensive"? Such an imputation would itself be defamatory.
Moreover, it is well accepted that falsely accusing a person of
associating with vile persons is a basis for an action in defama-
tion. 16
photographed were lesbians. The minor premise in this syllogism may be doubtful.
311. Id. at 1135.
312. Id.
313. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 111, at 773-78 (5th ed. 1984).
314. Deug/ass, 769 F.2d at 1135.
315. Posner's explanation here is especially suspect because he subsequently is
able to distinguish Hustler from Playboy, primarily on grounds of decency. Id. at
1135-38.
316. BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 4.12.3, at 125-26 (2nd ed.
1991).
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Third, how can the impression that Douglass had consented
to be shown in Hustler possibly be similar to being shown
beaten up by criminals or raped? Hustler did not portray
Douglass as a victim. It portrayed Douglass as a willing model.
Posner's analogy to being a victim of crime is singularly in-
apt.3 17
In any event, the false imputation that Douglass had con-
sented to the publication was the basis for Douglass' misappro-
priation claim. This aspect of the false light claim thus arose
out of the same factual allegations which supported the misap-
propriation claim, and the false light claim thus added nothing
to Douglass' recovery."1
4. Emotional Distress Cases
As noted above, a supposedly key difference between false
light privacy and defamation is that false light privacy may be
established with emotional distress as the only injury while
defamation supposedly requires injury to reputation."9 In-
deed, emotional distress appears as a compensable element of
damages in each of the four privacy torts identified by Prosser,
and the Restatement identifies mental distress as one of the
typical bases for measuring damages in a privacy action.'2 It
317. It is, however, an analogy that may expose what really is going on in the
decision. Despite the court's recognition that the edition of Hustler in which
Douglass' picture appeared was lawful and not obscene, Douglass, 769 F.2d at
1137-38, the judges on the court (like the jury) may have been emotionally affect-
ed by the disgusting nature of the magazine and have been convinced that anyone
who appears in Hustler is a "victim." But see Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46 (1988) (striking down jury verdict against Hustler on First Amendment grounds
despite the disgusting nature of the publication).
318. Damages for false light would include, among other things, emotional dis-
tress and harm to reputation. Emotional distress would also be recoverable for
misappropriation, however, and if her reputation was actually harmed, as the evi-
dence established, an action for defamation would be the more appropriate
course.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 230-35. I say defamation "supposedly"
requires damage to reputation because the common law presumes damages to
reputation for libels and slanders per se. Although these common law rules have
been limited somewhat by the Supreme Court's First Amendment cases, the consti-
tutional limits on defamation apply at least as strongly to false light, and perhaps
are even stricter. Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 383-93. Compare Cantrell v. Forest
City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974).
320. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H(b) (1977). The primary element
of damages is supposed to be "the harm to [the plaintiff's] interest in privacy re-
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is of course to be expected then that in almost any action for
invasion of privacy, the plaintiff could also allege intentional or
negligent infliction of emotional distress ("IIED" or "NIED"),
and the cases bear this out.
3 2
'
Negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED") is itself
a relatively weak cause of action,' and there have been only
two reported decisions in which a plaintiff has even attempted
to recover for both false light privacy and NIED. In Flowers v.
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n, 25 the defen-
dant restaurant, at the insistence of the defendant bank (which
had negligently computed plaintiffs credit), refused to honor
the plaintiffs credit card, leading to a public confrontation at
suiting from the invasion." Id. To date, there has been no adequate explanation
of how a jury is supposed to measure loss of privacy in monetary terms.
321. State cases: Murray v. Schlosser, 574 A.2d 1339 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1990);
S & W Seafoods Co. v. Jacor Broadcasting of Atlanta, 390 S.E.2d 228 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1989); Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 262 Cal. Rptr. 890 (Ct.
App. 1989); Hoppe v. Hearst Corp., 770 P.2d 203 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Van
Duyn v. Smith, 527 N.E.2d 1005 (III. App. Ct. 1988); Walko v. Kean College, 561
A.2d 680 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1988); Celebrezze v. Dayton Newspapers, 535 N.E.2d
755 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 757 P.2d 105
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Berkos v. National Broadcasting Co., 515 N.E.2d 668 (III.
App. Ct. 1987); Burton v. NCNB National Bank of N. Carolina, 355 S.E.2d 800
(N.C. Ct. App. 1987); Deitz v. Wometco West Michigan TV, 407 N.W.2d 649
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Young v. Barker, 405 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987);
Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Early Detection Ctr., P.C.
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 403 N.W.2d 830 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Hirsch v. Coo-
per, 737 P.2d 1092 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Trought v. Richardson, 338 S.E.2d 617
(N.C. CL App. 1986); Madsen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985); Sawabini v.
Desenberg, 372 N.W.2d 559 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Pearce v. Courier-Journal, 683
S.W.2d 633 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); Buller v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 684 S.W.2d 473
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 610 (Cal.
1984); Flowers v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 679 P.2d 1385 (Or.
Ct. App. 1984); Ledl v. Quik Pik Food Stores, 349 N.W.2d 529 (Mich. Ct. App.
1984); Yeager v. Local Union 20, 453 N.E.2d 666 (Ohio 1983); National Bonding
Agency v. Demeson, 648 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); Jones v. Calder, 187
Cal. Rptr. 825 (Ct. App. 1982); Duhammel v. Star, 653 P.2d 15 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1982); Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott, 345 N.E.2d 37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
There is only one federal decision which involved both false light and emotional
distress claims but which did not include a defamation claim. Metz v. United
States, 788 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1986). The federal false light/defamation cases
are cited above in note 279.
322. See discussion of authorities in Julie A. Davies, Direct Actions for Emotional
Harm: Is Compromise Possible?, 67 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 5-14 (1991).
323. 679 P.2d 1385 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
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the restaurant."4 The court affirmed dismissal of the com-
plaint for failure to state a cause of action."S'
In Deitz v. Wometco West Michigan TV,3' the plaintiff, a
wealthy real estate developer, was the subject of a series of
news stories which alleged, among other things, that the plain-
tiff had "a grip on the criminal justice system in Newaygo
County," as a result of "gifts, favors, and deals with local offi-
cials."' 7 The complaint alleged, among other things, defama-
tion, NIED and false light privacy. The court held that a cause
of action for defamation and false light privacy was adequately
pled and that there existed disputed questions of fact con-
cerning the television station's possible negligence in investigat-
ing the report."' Holding that NIED in Michigan was limited
to situations involving bystanders who witness negligent per-
sonal injury to a third person, the court held that the com-
plaint did not state a cause of action for NIED.5
Intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") is
more firmly established than its cousin, NIED. First given a
clear statement by Dean Prosser in a 1939 article,' s inten-
324. The complaint alleged that the defendants deliberately "confiscated the
card in the presence of plaintiff's guests and other patrons of the restaurant, re-
fusing his reasonable request to make further inquiry as to the card's validity,
refused to discuss the matter with him, demanded and received cash payment for
the meal, called the police and caused them to remove plaintiff from the restau-
rant." Id. at 1387.
325. In Oregon, NIED is apparently available only when the defendant's con-
duct has "'infringed some legally protected interest apart from causing the claimed
distress.'" Id. at 1387 (quoting Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 652
P.2d 318 (Or. 1982)). The court held that the only other interest invaded was
"plaintiff's contractual right to have the credit card honored," and the court re-
fused to permit the breach of this contractual obligation to form the basis for an
action in tort. Id. at 1387. lIED was not adequately pled, according to the court,
because the defendants' conduct "did not exceed the outer limits of what a rea-
sonable person should be expected to tolerate." Id. Public disclosure was not pled
because the complaint did not allege that any private facts actually were disclosed.
Id. at 1389. The court might also have noted that there was insufficient publicity
since the disclosure, if any, was only to a few people in the restaurant. False light
failed, according to the court, because there was no allegation that the defendants
either had knowledge of the falsity or acted recklessly with respect to falsity,
which are elements of a false light claim in Oregon. Id.
326. 407 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
327. Id. at 651.
328. Id. at 655-56. The court found that the plaintiff was a private person and
that the subject matter of the report was public, triggering the fault standard of
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
329. 407 N.W.2d at 656.
330. William L. Prosser, Infliction of Mental Suffering-A New TorM, 37 MICH. L
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tional infliction of emotional distress has taken root nation-
wide. Although there are minor variations from state to state,
the rough outlines of IIED are fairly well settled. The general
interest protected by IED is "peace of mind-i.e., the right to
be free from socially unacceptable conduct that seriously af-
fects another's peace of mind.""3 ' The elements generally in-
clude the following:' First, the defendant must have intend-
ed to cause emotional distress. The intent element can be satis-
fied by proof that the defendant either had the purpose or
desire to cause emotional distress or that the defendant knew
that emotional distress was substantially certain to result from
the defendant's conduct. Second, most jurisdictions reijuire
that the defendant's conduct be extreme and outrageous, out-
side the bounds which could be tolerated by reasonable per-
sons in society. And third, that the defendant's conduct have
actually caused (and proximately caused) the plaintiff to suffer
emotional distress.
Almost all of the IED and false light cases involve, in
addition, an allegation of libel."' These cases are thus proper-
REv. 874 (1939).
331. Thing v. La Chusa, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 867 (Cal. 1989).
332. See generaUy, W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §
12, at 54-66 (5th ed. 1984). Although lIED is an intentional tort, the Restatement
provides that liability may be imposed when the defendant's conduct is only reck-
less with respect to the possibility of causing severe emotional distress. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46. The Supreme Court of California recently held
that where the theory of liability is recklessness, the plaintiff must have been pres-
ent at the scene, and the defendant must have been aware that the plaintiff was
present. Christensen v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 181, 203-04 (Cal. 1991). The
presence requirements helps to insure that there remains a bright line between
liability for an intentional tort and liability for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Id., 820 P.2d at 204. For purposes of this article, the difference between
recklessly causing severe emotional distress and intentionally causing severe emo-
tional distress is an irrelevancy.
333. State cases: Murray v. Schlosser, 574 A.2d 1339 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1990);
S & W Seafoods Co. v. Jacor Broadcasting of Atlanta, 390 S.E.2d 228 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1989); Hoppe v. Hearst Corp., 770 P.2d 203 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Van
Duyn v. Smith, 527 N.E.2d 1005 (I1. App. Ct. 1988); Walko v. Kean College, 561
A.2d 680 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1988); Celebrezze v. Dayton Newspapers, 535 N.E.2d
755 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 757 P.2d 105
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Berkos v. National Broadcasting Co., 515 N.E.2d 668 (11.
App. Ct. 1987); Burton v. NCNB Nat'l Bank of N. C., 355 S.E.2d 800 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1987); Deitz v. Wometco W. Mich. TV, 407 N.W.2d 649 (Mich Ct. App.
1987); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Early Detection
Ctr., P.C. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 403 N.W.2d 830 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986);
Hirsch v. Cooper, 737 P.2d 1092 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Madsen v. Erwin, 481
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ly categorized as libel cases, and no further discussion is re-
quired here. In the remaining few cases in which IIED and
false light appear in the, absence of a libel claim, the plaintiff
has uniformly lost the false light cause of action."3 ' False light
adds nothing to these cases.
5. Statute of Limitations Cases
The natural response of a lawyer faced with the seemingly
impenetrable barrier of a valid statute of limitations defense to
one cause of action is to recast the case under a different
cause of action with a longer limitations period. Judges who
are sensitive (and perhaps overly sensitive) to the arbitrary line
drawn by a statutory limitations period may sometimes re-
spond favorably to such artful pleading. The possible existence
of false light privacy has sparked its share of artfully pled com-
plaints, and the courts are about evenly split on whether such
artful pleading will be permitted.
At the outset, it is important to emphasize the obvious
fact that limitations defenses are entirely statutory153 The
starting point for any statute of limitations analysis is, of
course, to "READ THE STATUTE. " "Ss In some states, a stat-
ute of limitations issue can be readily resolved simply by con-
sulting the applicable statute."'
N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985); Sawabini v. Desenberg, 372 N.W.2d 559 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1985); Pearce v. Courier-Journal, 683 S.W.2d 633 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); Buller
v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 684 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Reader's Digest
Ass'n v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 610 (Cal. 1984); Ledl v. Quik Pik Food Stores,
349 N.W.2d 529 (Mich. CL App. 1984); Yeager v. Local Union 20, 453 N.E.2d
666 (Ohio 1983); National Bonding Agency v. Demeson, 648 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1983); Jones v. Calder, 187 Cal. Rptr. 825 (Ct. App. 1982).
334. Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 262 Cal. Rptr. 890 (Ct. App.
1989); Young v. Barker, 405 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Trought v. Rich-
ardson, 338 S.E.2d 617 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986); Duhammel v. Star, 653 P.2d 15
(Ariz. CL App. 1982); Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott, 345 N.E.2d 37 (Il. App.
Ct. 1976).
335. There are no false light cases involving the equitable doctrine of laches.
336. See, e.g., John M. Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of Method,
3 DALHOUSiE LJ. 333 (1976).
337. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-201 (1984) ("Actions for slan-
der, libel or for publication of matter violating the right of privacy, shall be com-
menced within one year next after the cause of action accrued"); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 20-211 (1990) ("An action for invasion of privacy must be brought within one
year of the date the cause of action arose"); N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L & R. 215(3)
(McKinney 1983) (one year for "an action to recover damages for assault, battery,
1992]
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Most states, however, have not amended their limitations
statutes to provide specifically for false light privacy or, more
generally, for invasion of privacy. By contrast, most jurisdic-
tions have a specific limitations period for defamation, typically
one or two years.' The issue is whether the defamation limi-
tations period should apply, in which case the plaintiff loses, or
whether the catch-all limitations period, which is longer,
should apply.
In deciding which statute to apply, some states employ
rules of statutory construction that have as their purpose or
effect to preserve a plaintiff's access to the courts unless access
is clearly foreclosed by an applicable limitations period. These
courts may "strictly construe" limitations periods, for example,
and reason that since false light is not specifically mentioned
in any statutory provision, the catch-all limitations period ap-
plies.' Similarly, some courts have adopted a rule that if
there is ambiguity about which limitations period applies, the
court should select the statute with the longer period in order
to preserve the plaintiff's access to the courts."
false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, libel, slander, false words causing spe-
cial damages, or a violation of the right of privacy under section fifty-one of the
civil rights law"); Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 2, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
42, § 5523 (1981) (amended 1982) (one year for "[a]n action for libel, slander or
invasion of privacy"); Wis. STAT. § 893.57 (1979) ("An action to recover damages
for libel, slander, assault, battery, invasion of privacy, false imprisonment or other
intentional tort to the person shall be commenced within two years after the
cause of action accrues or be barred").
The Uniform Single Publication Act has been adopted in at least seven
states and applies to a "cause of action for damages for libel or slander or inva-
sion of privacy or any other tort founded upon any single publication or exhibi-
tion or utterance." ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-651 (1952); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3425.3 -
.5 (West 1955); IDAHO CODE § 6-702 to 705 (1953); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 126, § 11
(1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-7-1 (Michie 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-10
(1985); 42 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 8341 (1978).
338. A list of limitation periods for libel and slander is printed in BRUCE W.
SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY, Appendix C at 83741 (2nd ed. 1991).
339. State cases: Covington v. Houston Post, 743 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988) ("Texas construes statutes of limitations strictly"); Allen v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 547 A.2d 1105, 1108 (Md. Ct. App. 1988) ("Limitation statutes are
generally strictly construed").
Federal cases: Wood v. Hustler Magazine, 736 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 1984)
(Texas law); Jensen v. Times Mirror Co., 634 F. Supp. 304, 315 (D. Conn. 1986)
(Connecticut law).
340. Williams v. Lee Way Motor Freight, 688 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Okla. 1984) (an
emotional distress case subsequently relied upon in Colbert v. World Publishing
Co., 747 P.2d 286 (Okla. 1987), a false light case).
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Apart from this sort of mechanical jurisprudence, the
issue in these cases generally comes down to whether false
light privacy exists and, if so, whether it protects an interest
distinct from any other cause of action. All of the limitation
cases to date have involved false light claims brought in order
to avoid the short statute of limitations applicable to a libel
action, and the issue in the cases is whether false light privacy
should be treated differently from libel for statute of limita-
tions purposes.
Courts rejecting the libel limitation period naturally em-
phasize the differences in theory between a false light claim
and a defamation claim. For example, in Clarke v. Denton Pub-
lishing Co., " the court explained that there must be publicity
in a false light case (whereas defamation requires only publica-
tion to one third person), that the publicity in a false light case
does not have to be defamatory in order to be actionable, and
that a plaintiff may recover nominal damages in false light
(whereas in Texas, according to this court, special damages
must be proven in a defamation action)." In Covington v.
Houston Post," the court noted that defamation protects
one's interest in reputation, whereas false light protects not
only reputation, but "the plaintiff's sensibilities."3"
Courts accepting the libel limitation period emphasize the
obvious similarities and overlap between false light privacy and
defamation. The court in Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broadcasting
Co.,3" for example, pointed out that although false light in
theory is supposed to protect an interest distinct from that
protected by defamation, that theoretic difference usually dis-
appears in practice since the plaintiff can recover the same
damages for libel as for false light privacy (that is, damages for
341. 793 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
342. Id. at 331.
343. 793 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
344. Id. at 347. Accord Colbert v. World Publishing Co., 747 P.2d 286, 289
(Okla. 1987) ("In an action for libel, recovery is sought primarily for the injury to
one's reputation. The focus of the action is on the effect of the publication on
what others may think of the person. Under the theory of false light invasion of
privacy, the interest to be vindicated is the injury to the person's own feelings.")
(footnotes omitted); Wood v. Hustler Magazine, 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984);
Uhl v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 476 F. Supp. 1134 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
345. 709 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1986).
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harm to reputation, emotional distress and humiliation). 6
Indeed, even in theory, the only cases in which there would
not be a complete overlap between false light and defamation
are false light cases where there is no injury to reputation."'
As the Washington Supreme Court put it in Eastwood v. Cas-
cade Broadcasting Co.," "[w]hile all false light cases need not
be defamation cases, all defamation cases are potentially false
light cases. "M Relying upon the substantial similarity between
false light and defamation, the majority of the courts consider-
ing the issue have held that the defamation limitations period
applies.m Those courts coming to a contrary conclusion
should reconsider.
6. The Federal Cases
We have a short list of federal decisions in which false
light privacy was the sole basis for recovery. These cases are
being treated in this separate section because of their limited
precedential value. In each of these cases, the federal courts
are trying to predict what a state court would do when faced
with the same case. A federal court's statement of state
law-even a statement by the Supreme Court of the United
States-may be ignored by the lowest state court.
The Supreme Court has decided only two cases purport-
edly involving false light privacy, Time, Inc. v. Hill5 and
346. Id. at 479.
347. Recognizing the overlap but also recognizing that false light may in theo.
ry exist even without a defamation action, the court in Magenis v. Fisher
Bradcasting, 798 P.2d 1106 (Or. Ct. App. 1990), held that "when a claim charac-
terized as false light alleges facts that also constitute a claim for defamation, the
claim must be filed within the period for bringing a defamation claim." Magenis,
798 P.2d at 1111. This limited holding suggests that a different limitations period
may apply to a false light claim that does not also state a claim for defamation.
348. 722 P.2d 1295 (Wash. 1986).
349. Id. at 1297.
350. State cases: Magenis v. Fisher Broadcasting, 798 P.2d 1106 (Or. Ct. App.
1990); Eastwood v. Cascade Broadcasting Co., 722 P.2d 1295 (Wash. 1986);
Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broadcasting Co., 709 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1986); Wiener v. Supe-
rior Court, 130 Cal. Rptr. 61 (Ct. App. 1976); Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace,
Jovanovich, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Ct. App. 1975).
Federal cases: Gashgai v. Leibowitz, 703 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1983); White v. Fawcett
Publications, 324 F. Supp. 403 (W.D. Mo. 1971); Smith v. Esquire, Inc., 494 F.
Supp. 967 (D. Md. 1980); Robinson v. Vitro Corp., 620 F. Supp. 1066 (D.C. Md.
1985).
351. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co."5' As will be seen, neither
case actually involves what Prosser and the Restatement call
false light. That the Court has mischaracterized the tort before
it in these cases has been of little consequence, however, since
the Court's only interest has been whether liability could be
imposed consistent with the First Amendment. The details of
the tort have not been terribly important.
Time arose under the New York Civil Rights Law and
actually involved misappropriation of name or picture rather
than false light.' 3 The Court subsequently incorrectly charac-
terized its decision in Time as arising under the false light ru-
bric, however, apparently confused because the article in Time
contained falsehoods." This category error was unimportant
since the only issue before the Court in Time, an appeal from a
state court judgment against the defendant, was whether the
judgment was consistent with constitutional standards. The
Court reversed and remanded for the lower court's failure to
instruct the jury that liability could be predicated only upon a
showing of knowing or reckless falsehood, the New York Times
v. Sullivan standard.55 Whether the cause of action was de-
nominated false light or misappropriation under the New York
Civil Rights law was quite irrelevant to consideration of this
constitutional question.
In its second case, Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.,'
the Court affirmed what was again characterized as a plaintiffs
false light judgment rendered by a federal district court sitting
in diversity. Because Time was an appeal from a state court, the
Supreme Court could render a decision only on constitutional
grounds. In Cantrell, by contrast, the entire case was before the
federal courts, and we might have seen an opinion dealing
with the tort aspects of the case. Unfortunately (at least for our
purposes), defense counsel appears to have limited his appeal
to constitutional grounds, and we are left largely to speculate
about what might have happened had an appeal been taken on
tort grounds as well.
352. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
353. Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 384 ("their action technically was one for
commercial appropriation rather than for false light").
354. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 249 (1974).
355. 385 U.S. at 390.
356. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
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Some five months after the collapse of a bridge, in which
forty-four people perished, Eszterhas, a reporter for the Plain
Dealer, and Conway, a photographer, visited Margaret Mae
Cantrell's home. Mr. Cantrell had perished in the bridge disas-
ter, and Eszterhas wanted to write a story showing how the
disaster had affected the community. Mrs. Cantrell was not at
home when Eszterhas arrived, but that did not stop him from
entering the home and talking with her children for a little
over one hour. The Plain Dealer subsequently published the
story with accompanying photographs which accurately showed
the poverty in which the Cantrells lived. The story contained a
number of inaccuracies, apparently the most significant of
which was that the article implied that Mrs. Cantrell was home
at the time of the interview.
The complaint pled causes of action for libel and invasion
of privacy. 57 The libel claim apparently was not vigorously
pursued, and the jury was instructed only on the privacy claim.
The invasion of privacy instruction, to which defense counsel
failed to object, did not follow the Restatement definitions and
attempted to state invasion of privacy as though it were one
tort:
[I]n this case the burden of proof is upon the plaintiffs to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence their assertions
of an invasion of privacy, the elements of which are: (1)
An unwarranted and/or wrongful intrusion by the defen-
dants into their private or personal affairs with which the
public has no legitimate concern. (2) Publishing a report
or article about plaintiff with knowledge of its falsity or in
reckless disregard of the truth. (3) Defendants' acts of
publishing a report or article about plaintiffs with knowl-
edge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth
caused plaintiffs injury as individuals of ordinary sensibili-
ties and damage in the form of outrage or mental suffer-
357. Libel appeared most frequently in the substantive paragraphs of the com-
plaint. Privacy may well have been added to the complaint in a misguided attempt
to support federal jurisdiction. The first paragraph of the complaint alleges that
"Uj]urisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship of the parties . . . and the rights
of privacy of plaintiffs under the Constitution of the United States." Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, Appendix at p. 3, Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., cerf.
granted, 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (No. 73-5520). The attempt was misguided because
none of the defendants were state actors subject to the restraints of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State law was therefore the
only source of substantive law available to the plaintiffs.
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ing, shame or humiliation.'
Under this instruction, a jury could find against the defen-
dant if it believed that (1) there was no legitimate public inter-
est in Eszterhas, many months after a tragic accident in which
Mr. Cantrell perished, entering the Cantrell's house uninvited,
and interviewing Mrs. Cantrell's children and having pictures
taken, all when Mrs. Cantrell was not around; (2) the story
contained one or more false statements of which defendants
were aware; and (3) publication of the story caused emotional
distress. Under this instruction, the jury did not have to find
that the plaintiffs had been "place[d] before the public in a
false light,"' that "the false light in which the other was
placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person " '
or that the emotional distress suffered was caused by the false
light (rather than by the public disclosure). False light was
most definitely not before the jury.
In spite of the obvious differences between what the jury
was charged and the Restatement definition of false light, both
the Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court concluded that the case
fundamentally involved false light, although neither court seri-
ously studied this state law question."' At the very least, the
358. Cantrel/, 419 U.S. at 250 n.3. The court also instructed the jury as fol-
lows: "An actionable invasion of privacy as alleged in the complaint derives from
a wrongful intrusion into an individual's private activity . . . .The right of privacy
is the right of an individual to be let alone, to be free from unwarranted publici-
ty, and to live without unwarranted interference by the public into matters with
which the public is not necessarily concerned. It is the unwarranted appropriation
of an individual's personality, the publicizing of an individual's private affairs with
which the public has no legitimate concern in such a manner as to outrage or
cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities."
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Appendix at pp. 97-98, Cantrell v. Forest City Pub-
lishing Co., cert. granted, 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (No. 73- 5520). The trial court thus
thought the case was about either intrusion, public disclosure or misappropriation.
Falsity worked its way into the instructions only because of the First Amendment:
"Calculated falsehoods do not, therefore, come within the immunity of the First
Amendment rights of freedom of press and speech." Id. at 98.
359. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
360. Id. § 652E(a).
361. The Supreme Court noted that "there is remarkably little discussion of
the relevant Ohio or West Virginia law by the District Court, the Court of Ap-
peals, and counsel for the parties." 419 U.S. at 248 n.2. There is a reason no
Ohio or West Virginia authorities were discussed-none existed. False light made
its first appearance in West Virginia in conjunction with a libel claim in Crump v.
Beckley Newspapers, 320 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 1983). Ohio courts had also never
faced a false light claim at that time, and subsequently held that false light did
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false light charged to the jury was a type of false light that bore
little relationship to what was described by the Restatement. In
any event, as a result of defense counsel's failure to preserve
any of these purely tort arguments, the only issue before the
appellate courts was whether there was any evidence from
which a reasonable jury could conclude that the story was pub-
lished with knowledge of its falsity (which was one of the ele-
ments charged to the jury). Eszterhas of course knew that Mrs.
Cantrell was not present, and the Supreme Court held there
was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Eszterhas
was the publishers' agent."'
Although the Court's decision was probably correct from a
purely technical standpoint in view of the extremely narrow
issue before the Court,6" the decision is ultimately
unsatisfying from a torts perspective. The most significant
falsehood was apparently the implication which could be
drawn from the article that Mrs. Cantrell was present at the
interview, although the article did not even purport to quote
Mrs. Cantrell. It is not clear whether this minor inaccuracy
would constitute placing Mrs. Cantrell in a "false light" before
the public, and it seems very likely that the "false light" in
which she was placed, if any, would not have been highly of-
fensive to a reasonable person.' Cantrell is perhaps nothing
more than a good example of how sloppy lawyering at the trial
level can tie the hands of even the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States.
There is only one decision from a federal court of appeals
affirming a false light recovery, Braun v. Flynt,"' and the case
involved one of Larry Flynt's publications, Chic. The unsuspect-
not exist in Ohio.
362. 419 U.S. at 253-54.
363. Defense counsel's failure to object to the instructions made it impossible
for the Court even to consider the one interesting constitutional issue for which
the Court probably had granted certiorari. That issue was whether the Gertz stan-
dard should apply in a false light case involving a private person/public subject
matter. Because counsel failed to object to the New York Times v. Sullivan instruc-
tion, the Court was prevented from considering the issue, and leaving the "sole
question" before the Court as "whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting
aside the jury's verdict" in light of the law of the case. Id. at 251.
364. Professor Zimmerman has come to a similar conclusion about the merits
of the tort in Cantrell. Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 389-91.
365. 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1984).
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ing victim this time was Jeannie Braun, who as an employee of
the Aquarena Springs amusement park worked with "Ralph,
the Diving Pig." Mrs. Braun would position herself in a pool
with a bottle of milk with a nipple on it, and Ralph would dive
into the pool to the delight of the crowd. Mrs. Braun had
signed a release authorizing Aquarena Springs to use publicity
photographs showing Ralph jumping towards Mrs. Braun. The
release provided that "[i]t is to be understood that all photo-
graphs are to be in good taste and without embarrassment to
me and my family."'
A representative of Chic, a magazine in which, according
to the court, "[t]he dominant theme ... is 'female nudity,' ""
contacted Aquarena Springs to ask consent to publish the pub-
licity photo in Chic. The representative described Chic as a
men's fashion magazine and did not disclose its true nature.
Aquarena Springs consented to the publication, and the pic-
ture appeared in the "Chic Thrills" section of the magazine
next to an essentially accurate caption.' Other pictures or
cartoons in this section were, in the words of the court, "overt-
ly sexual." 9
Mrs. Braun sued Larry Flynt, alleging defamation, false
light and misappropriation. The jury found in her favor on all
three causes of action. The case would be a simple one classifi-
able above as defamation/false light if it had not been for the
fact that the overlap in damages between defamation and false
light caused the trial court to commit reversible error. Follow-
ing Texas' special interrogatory practice, the trial court asked
the jury twelve questions. 7 Question number four asked the
jury what sum of money would compensate Mrs. Braun for the
injury to her reputation, and the jury answered "5,000.00."
Question number ten asked what sum of money would com-
pensate Mrs. Braun for the invasion of her privacy, and the
jury answered "$15,000.00." Correctly noting that damages for
366. Id. at 247.
367. Id. at 247.
368. The caption read as follows: "SWINE DIVE-A pig that swims? Why not?
This plucky porker performs every day at Aquarena Springs Amusement Park in
bustling San Marcos, Texas. Aquarena staff members say the pig was incredibly
easy to train. They told him to learn quick, or grow up to be a juicy ham sand-
wich." Id. at 248 n.2.
369. Id. at 247.
370. Id. at 258.
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false light invasion of privacy completely overlapped with dam-
ages for defamation and that the jury's verdict constituted a
duplicative recovery, the Fifth Circuit ordered a new trial on
damages only."' But, in order to spare the litigants the ex-
pense of a new trial, the court ordered that if Mrs. Braun
would accept only the $15,000 for invasion of privacy and
would waive the $5,000 for defamation, then the trial court
could enter judgment solely for invasion of privacy."' The
result is a decision which, in effect, affirms a false light inva-
sion of privacy verdict.
The court identified several ways in which publication of
the picture in Chic might have portrayed the plaintiff in a false
light. First, "the ordinary reader automatically will form an
unfavorable opinion about the character of a woman whose
picture appears in Chic magazine.""' Second, "the jury might
have found that the publication implied Mrs. Braun's approval
of the opinions expressed in Chic.""74
The Fifth Circuit appears to be far out on a limb at this
point in its analysis. Assuming that the picture did not suggest
that Mrs. Braun had consented to its publication in Chic, an
ordinary reader would form an unfavorable opinion only of
Chic, not of Mrs. Braun. And if the photograph did not sug-
gest her consent, no ordinary reader would believe that Mrs.
Braun approved of the opinions expressed in Chic. Moreover,
serious First Amendment concerns would be created by a rule
that anyone whose name or picture appears in Chic or Hustler
without their permission has a cause of action. 75
Apparently recognizing that its first two explanations were
doubtful, the court offered a third: "[T]he jury might have
found ... that it [i.e., the photograph] implied Mrs. Braun had
consented to having her picture in Chic."76 If indeed the pho-
tograph in context suggested that Mrs. Braun had consented
to its publication, then Mrs. Braun's reputation might well
have been sullied, as the jury found.77 Alternatively, if she
371. Id. at 252.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 254.
374. Id. at 254 n.11.
375. Cf. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (Falwell could not
recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of paro-
dy in Hustler).
376. 726 F.2d at 254 n. 1.
377. The analysis would be similar to that discussed in another Larry Flynt
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had not consented to have her publicity photo published in
Chic, she would have a cause of action for misappropriation of
name or picture, and the jury may well have found a misappro-
priation, although the record is confused as to this possibili-
ty.'" In either event, the false light claim added nothing to
the overall likelihood of recovery. Rather, the existence of the
false light cause of action simply created confusion, causing the
district court to ask the jury separate damage questions for
defamation and invasion of privacy which ultimately created a
duplicative recovery.
There exist a handful of federal district court decisions
concerning only false light. Summary judgment for the defen-
dant was granted in one case.'" There are a number of deci-
sions in which the district court denied pre- trial motions to
dismiss or for summary judgment but which ultimately result-
ed in pro-defendant results.' These cases of course do not
case involving Hustler. See supra text accompanying notes 302-18.
378. At this point, analysis of the decision becomes mired in technicalities.
The special interrogatory given to the jury asked the following question, combin-
ing false light and appropriation of likeness: "Do you find that Chic's publication
of Mrs. Braun's picture created a false impression of her or was an unauthorized
appropriation of her picture, reputation or accomplishments?" 726 F.2d at 258.
The jury answered "yes." It thus is impossible to know whether the jury found
only false light, only appropriation of likeness, or both. In a motion for reconsid-
eration, the defendant argued that there was no evidence to support a misappro-
priation and that a reversal was therefore required because the jury's verdict
might have been based upon the misappropriation claim. The Fifth Circuit reject-
ed this argument on the grounds that the trial focused much more on the false
light claim and that there was little evidence presented on the misappropriation
claim. Braun v. Flynt, 731 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1984). This is the worst form of
sophistry, of course. It was precisely the defendant's argument that there was no
evidence of misappropriation and that misappropriation should therefore have
never been given to the jury. But according to the court, the submission of mis-
appropriation was harmless because there was no evidence of misappropriation
presented In fairness to the Fifth Circuit, it also noted correctly that the jury had
found publication of the picture to have been defamatory and that the jury was
therefore very likely to have also found the photograph to have placed the plain-
tiff in a false light. Id. at 1206.
379. Goldman v. Time, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
380. Kassel v. United States Veterans Admin., 682 F. Supp. 646 (D. N.H.
1988) (denying summary judgment on false light claim against government employ-
ees), on reconsideration, 709 F. Supp. 1194 (D. N.H. 1989) (granting summary judg-
ment for defendants on immunity grounds in light of Federal Employees Liability
Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988); Tomson v. Stephan, 705 F. Supp.
530 (D. Kan. 1989) (jury verdict for defendant on false light claim); Ritzmann v.
Weekly World News, 614 F. Supp. 1336, 1341 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (plaintiff failed to
prosecute action following dismissal by court of libel claims and caution to plain-
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establish the existence of false light privacy; they establish only
that federal district courts have been willing at an interlocutory
stage of the proceedings to let false light privacy claims go to
trial.
There remains only one district court opinion to consider.
In Dempsey v. National Enquirer,"' the National Enquirer and
Star had each reported the incredible story of Henry Dempsey,
who fell out of a plane but survived by clinging to the
boarding ladder of the plane until his co- pilot landed. Both
the Enquirer and the Star had, as is apparently their practice,
exaggerated certain facts and fictionalized quotes from Demp-
sey. The Star had additionally printed a purported first-person
narrative under the by-line "by Henry Dempsey.""'2 Dempsey,
however, claimed that he had not written the narrative, and
the Star had not even interviewed him.s
The district court granted the Enquirer's motion to dismiss
the false light claim against it, holding as a matter of law that
any misrepresentations in the Enquirer's story were not highly
objectionable to a reasonable person.' The Star did not
make out so well, however. The court denied the Star's motion
to dismiss, holding that by unequivocally attributing authorship
to the plaintiff, the Star had crossed the line from non-tortious
exaggeration to possibly tortious false light privacy."' The
court's primary support for its holding was none other than
Lord Byron v. Johnston,' which, as was shown above, is more
properly thought of as a misappropriation case. The district
court thus properly permitted the claim against the Star to go
tiff that in order to succeed on remaining false light claim, plaintiff must show a
.major misrepresentation" rather than "mere inaccuracy"); Pierson v. News Group
Publications, 549 F. Supp. 635 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (denying summary judg-
ment-defense counsel indicated in telephone interview that court granted defense
motion for directed verdict after trial).
381. 702 F. Supp. 934 (D. Me. 1989).
382. Id. at 935.
383. Id.
384. Dempsey v. National Enquirer, 687 F. Supp. 692 (D. Me. 1988), motion for
reconsideration denied, 702 F. Supp. 927 (D. Me. 1988).
385. Dempsey v. National Enquirer, 702 F. Supp. 934, 937 (D. Me. 1989).
386. 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (Ch. 1816).
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forward, but on the wrong basis. 7 The case ultimately settled
before trial for an undetermined sum.
7. And the Cheese Stands Alone
It has been a long journey to reach this point, and the
reader is to be commended for his or her dedication to the
topic. Over 500 cases have now been properly categorized. The
statute of limitations cases stand in a class by themselves and
must be viewed as decisions motivated not by tort consider-
ations but by hostility to limitations defenses. As for the other
cases, false light was mere surplusage and the presence of the
false light claim did not add anything to the plaintiffs arsenal.
The cases discussed in this section are different. In each of
these cases, false light ended up being the only
non-overlapping basis for the recovery (or the only basis for
permitting the trial to proceed). That is, these cases did not
involve allegations of defamation, intentional or negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress or misappropriation. If false light
really exists, it is in these few cases that we can see its essence.
The plaintiff lost in most of the cases, and there is no point in
reviewing the details of these decisions in the text.'
387. The court rather plainly misunderstood the misappropriation doctrine and
actually granted the Star's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's misappropriation claim
on the ground that the Star had not attempted to use Dempsey's name to adver-
tise the Star. 702 F. Supp. at 938. The court's view of misappropriation was too
narrow. The Star's use of Dempsey's name on the by-line indicates that the Star
perceived that significant commercial value could be gained by publishing what
purported to be an exclusive first.person narrative.
388. State cases: Schoneweis v. Dando, 435 N.W.2d 666 (Neb. 1989)
(defendant's demurrer sustained and false light claim dismissed on first amend-
ment considerations); Floyd v. Park Cities People, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1985) (summary judgement for newspaper based on truth and
newsworthiness of public information); Penwell v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 469
N.E.2d 1025 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (plaintiff, ultimately determined by police to be
an innocent bystander, was arrested and defendant broadcast film of ar-
rest--summary judgment for defendant based on truth and newsworthiness); Gill v.
Snow, 644 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (publication about land dispute be-
tween neighbors true and newsworthy and of public record); Strutner v. Dispatch
Printing Co., 442 N.E.2d 129 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (plaintiff identified as father
of murder suspect-summary judgment for defendant because true and newswor-
thy); McCormack v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 613 P.2d 737 (Okla. 1980) (pub-
lication in newspaper of information contained in publicly available rap sheet on
plaintiff-summary judgment for defendant on truth and newsworthiness); Moore v.
Charles B. Pierce Film Enters., 589 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (murder
victim portrayed in movie-surviving brother has no cause of action for invasion of
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a. Demurrers or Motions to Dismiss Denied
We begin with the short decision in Dean v. Guard Publish-
ing Co., an Oregon Court of Appeals opinion.' The suit
arose out of a newspaper report announcing the opening of an
alcohol rehabilitation center in Eugene, Oregon. Accompany-
ing the article was a picture of the center's aversion treatment
room.'® There were three people in the picture, two nurses
and the plaintiff. The complaint alleged that the picture as
taken created the false impression that the plaintiff was a pa-
tient at the facility, when in fact, the plaintiff was simply visit-
ing an open house at the facility."9 '
The complaint apparently alleged only a single cause of
action: false light privacy."s The trial court dismissed the
complaint, and the court of appeals reversed, permitting the
action to go to trial.'" The court's opinion was carefully
drafted and reasoned. The court first recognized that false
light had not previously been declared to exist in Oregon and
privacy since surviving brother not mentioned in movie); LaFontaine v. Family
Drug Stores, 360 A.2d 899 (Conn. 1976) (false report of criminal activity privately
communicated to police was insufficient publicity as a matter of law to support
false light claim); Kent County Bd. of Educ. v. Bilbrough, 525 A.2d 252 (Md.
1987), (plaintiff's prior civil rights suit did not bar presentation of false light claim
in state court-court did not reach merits of false light claim).
Federal cases: McLean v. International Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir.
1987) (summary judgment for defendant because all statements were made in
course of judicial proceeding and were, therefore, absolutely privileged); Polin v.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 768 F.2d 1204 (10th Cir. 1985) (summary judgment for
defendant because distribution of credit report to only a few of defendant's sub-
scribers did not constitute sufficient "publicity"); Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304
(10th Cir. 1983) (summary judgment for defendant because statements were true);
Berry v. National Broadcasting Co., 480 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1973) (judgment for
defendant as a matter of law because no evidence of malice); Matlock v. Town of
Harrah, 719 F. Supp. 1523 (W.D. Okla. 1989) ev'd, in pail, 930 F.2d 34 (10th
Cir. 1991) (tort claims against town barred by governmental tort claims act).
389. 699 P.2d 1158 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
390. In aversion treatment, the alcoholic is given both a drink of liquor and a
drug which produces a nauseous reaction. The theory is that the patient ultimately
associates liquor with having a nauseous reaction, and the patient then can more
easily resist the temptation to drink. DAVID J. ARMOR, ALCOHOLISM AND TREAT-
MENT 33 (1978).
391. 699 P.2d at 1159.
392. It may become apparent below why no cause of action for libel was al-
leged.
393. The court held that 'false light' is a tort in Oregon and that the plaintiff
is entitled to replead in order to state a claim under that theory. Id.
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that in previous cases mentioning false light, the Oregon
courts had simply assumed that false light existed for purposes
of decision.' In holding that false light exists in Oregon, the
court focused both on the injury suffered by the plaintiff and
the wrongful conduct by the defendant. As for the injury, the
court noted that:
If the false light is detrimental, it is foreseeable that the
person will suffer an injury to reputation and possibly
mental distress and other harms. A person is entitled to
damages as redress for those injuries just as much as he or
she would be for the more traditional torts such as slander
and libel."
As for the defendant's conduct, the court noted that two
different provisions of the Oregon Constitution "show a gener-
al public policy to provide redress for wrongs of this kind,"
specifically, for wrongs arising out of false statements of
fact.' Finding that the type of injuries to be redressed by
false light are similar to the type of injuries protected by other
torts and that the type of harm to be deterred is similar to the
type of harm deterred by other torts, the court concluded that
"[riecognizing false light as a tort is a natural extension of
previous law."'
394. In each of the cases, the assumption that false light was actionable did
not change the result because each case affirmed a judgment for the defendant.
McNabb v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 685 P.2d 458 (Or. Ct. App. 1984), reh. de-
nied, 687 P.2d 797 (Or. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1216 (1985); Flowers v. Bank
of Am., 679 P.2d 1385 (Or. Ct. App. 1984); Martinez v. Democrat-Herald Publish-
ing Co., 669 P.2d 818 (Or. Ct. App. 1983), petition denied, 672 P.2d 1193 (Or.
1983); Lee v. Nash, 671 P.2d 703 (Or. Ct. App. 1983), re. denied, 675 P.2d 491
(Or. 1984) (defendant's motion to dismiss was reversed and remanded, since de-
fendant did not allege absolute privilege as an affirmative defense, although if he
had, he would have been protected).
395. 699 P.2d at 1160. This is of course a debatable proposition. Not all inju-
ries are created equal for purposes of tort law. It is fair to say that physical inju-
ries are more important than either reputational or emotional injuries, and it
probably is fair to say that reputational harm has, at least historically, been of
greater concern to courts than emotional harm. The limitations placed upon emo-
tional distress claims suggest that emotional distress is placed something on a par
with pure economic loss.
396. Id. at 1160. The court stated that "[tihe [Oregon] constitution does not
require that we recognize the false light theory of invasion of privacy, but [article
I, sections 8, 10] show a general public policy to provide redress for wrongs of
this kind." Id.
397. Id.
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The facts as stated in the court's opinion suggest that the
false light consisted of a false representation that the plaintiff
was an alcoholic. If this had been the actionable representa-
tion, then it would appear that a cause of action for libel could
also have been pled, and this would simply be one of the hun-
dred or so cases where false light is pled along with libel. Per-
haps, however, the libel action would have been barred by the
statute of limitations, although it seems likely that if this had
been true, the defendant would have raised the issue. Why file
only an action for false light privacy on these facts when a
good libel action may exist?
The facts as stated in the court's opinion are not com-
plete, and the "true" facts clear up the mystery somewhat. As
subsequently told in a newspaper report (and essentially con-
firmed by defense counsel in a telephone conversation), the
plaintiff actually was an alcoholic and was proven to be an
alcoholic at the subsequent trial."' Thus, the only false light
in which the plaintiff was portrayed was that he had entered
the aversion treatment program to cure his alcoholism when in
fact he had not. It would be difficult to prove that this false
statement was defamatory; if anything, a statement that an
alcoholic had entered a treatment program would appear to be
complimentary.
If he in fact was an alcoholic, then it would appear he
could have pled a cause of action for public disclosure of pri-
vate facts. Disclosing in a newspaper that a private person is an
alcoholic would seem to be exactly the sort of embarrassing
398. The news report stated:
In a third ruling, the court said a jury should be allowed to decide if
a photograph published by The Register-Guard newspaper in Eugene
portrayed a man in a 'false light.'
The case involves a suit filed against the newspaper by Orlin
Dean, who was photographed at the opening of an alcohol rehabilita-
tion center in Eugene.
Dean, who later admitted to being an alcoholic, said he was
present at the facility for the opening and that the photo presented
him in a false light by implying that he was a patient at the center.
Dean's suit was thrown out by Lane County Circuit Judge
Maurice Merten.
The appeals court said a jury should be allowed to decide if
being portrayed as an alcoholic undergoing treatment is more offen-
sive than actually being one.
Appeals Court Rules on Jobless Benefits for Illegal Aliens, Byline-Tom Towslee, UPI,
Nov. 12, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Ubrary, UPI File.
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story that the public disclosure tort was designed to prevent.
Why didn't he plead public disclosure? Efforts to find the
plaintiffs counsel met with no success, but the most natural
explanation would be that the tort of public disclosure is based
upon disclosure of true facts, and the plaintiff may well have
wished to avoid admitting that he was alcoholic.
Putting aside this strategy, the issue in the case comes
down to the following: Should a newspaper be held liable for
publishing the picture of an alcoholic while that alcoholic is
visiting a treatment center during opening ceremonies, a news-
worthy event to which the press had been invited, when the
only falsity lies in an implication which could be drawn from
the picture that the alcoholic is a patient at the facility? We
have no final judicial answer to this question because the case
ultimately settled for nuisance value (around $1,000).
We next consider Lovgren v. Citizens First National Bank of
Princeton,' another pleadings case. The plaintiff, a farmer,
experienced difficulties in making payments to the bank on
the mortgage on his farm. Agents for the defendant-bank pres-
sured the plaintiff to sell his farm, but the plaintiff refused.
Without instituting foreclosure proceedings and without secur-
ing the owner's consent, the bank's agents then placed in a
local newspaper an advertisement under the plaintiffs name
announcing the sale of the plaintiff's farm at a public auction.
The advertisement did not mention the bank's name at all and
did not mention that the purpose of the sale was to satisfy the
plaintiff's debt obligations. The complaint alleged that the
advertisement "had made it practically impossible for the plain-
tiff to obtain refinancing of his mortgage loan."4" The com-
plaint also alleged that the plaintiff suffered emotional distress
and embarrassment on the day of the announced sale because
the plaintiff was forced to explain to people who showed up at
the farm that there would be no sale. The plaintiff alleged the
tort of intrusion into seclusion, and the trial court dismissed
the complaint for failure to state a claim.
The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed. It agreed that
there was no intrusion,"' but it held that the complaint prop-
399. 534 N.E.2d 987 (I1. 1989).
400. Id. at 988.
401. Id. at 988-89. In the court's view, the "core" of the tort of intrusion is
"the offensive prying into the private domain of another." Id. at 989. The grava-
19921
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erly pled a cause of action for false light. The first task under
the Restatement definition of this tort is to identify the false
light in which the plaintiff has allegedly been placed. The court
identified the false light in only one ambiguous sentence, a
brevity which makes analysis of the case somewhat difficult.
According to the court, "because the advertisement stated that
the farm was for sale by public auction, and named the plain-
tiff as seller-which was clearly untrue-the defendants' actions
placed the plaintiff in a false light before the public."4"
To begin with, the court's sentence is syntactically ambigu-
ous. Does the clause "which was clearly untrue" modify only
the second clause in the sentence ("named the plaintiff as sell-
er") or does it modify both the first and the second clause? In
other words, was the false light merely that the plaintiff was
named as seller when in fact someone else was the seller, or
was the false light both that the property was being sold at
public auction and that the plaintiff was the seller?
If the defendant bank had instituted foreclosure proceed-
ings under Illinois law, it would be possible for the first clause
to be true (that is, that the farm would be sold by public auc-
tion) but the second clause to be false (that is, the plaintiff was
the seller).' In fact, however, the complaint alleged that the
bank had not instituted foreclosure proceedings. Thus, the
more likely construction of the court's sentence is that the
court intended "which was clearly untrue" to modify the entire
first portion of the sentence. It was "clearly untrue" that the
property would be sold at public auction on the date indicated.
Obviously, if the property would not be sold at public auction,
it'would also be untrue that the plaintiff would be selling the
property.
To meet the Restatement's requirements, the court next
had to find that the false light in which the plaintiff was placed
men of the plaintiff's claim was not prying, however, but the publication of the
advertisement.
402. Id. at 990.
405. It appears that under Illinois law, there is no "seller" at a foreclosure
sale, at least no "seller" in the common sense definition of that term. The judg-
ment in a foreclosure proceeding may direct that the property be sold at a public
auction to be held by a judge or sheriff. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15- 1507
(Smith-Hurd 1984 & Supp. 1991). The purchaser ultimately receives a deed of sale
which simply identifies the judgment authorizing the foreclosure sale. ILL ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, para. 151509 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1091).
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"would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."' The
comments to Section 652E put some meat upon the
barebones, black-letter test. According to comment c, a reason-
able person would be highly offended when the plaintiff, "as a
reasonable man, would be justified in the eyes of the commu-
nity in feeling seriously offended and aggrieved by the pub-
licity."' "[U]nimportant false statements" are not actionable,
but "a major misrepresentation of his character, history, activi-
ties or beliefs" will be sufficient."
Would a reasonable person be "seriously offended and
aggrieved" by an advertisement falsely announcing a public
auction of that person's real property? Is such an advertise-
ment an "unimportant false statement" or a "major misrepre-
sentation"? In one critical sense, the false advertisement of sale
was quite clearly "unimportant." The advertisement by itself
was of no legal force or effect. The owner was not required to
sell the property simply because someone falsely advertised a
public auction of it. On the other hand, the entire adver-
tisement was false, and in that sense, it was a "major misrepre-
sentation."
If the advertisement in Lovgren was highly offensive, it was
probably not simply because it falsely advertised a sale, but
because it falsely advertised a public auction, a type of sale
associated with foreclosure which, in turn, is associated with
the property owner's inability to make payments on a mort-
gage.' More simply, by announcing a public auction of farm-
land, the defendant was branding the plaintiff as essentially
bankrupt and unable to pay his debts. Moreover, since the
defendant had not instituted foreclosure proceedings, the false
404. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E(a) (1977).
405. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. c (1977).
406. Id.
407. At this point, it may be helpful to vary the advertisement slightly. Sup.
pose as a practical joke, a friend placed an advertisement falsely reporting that
the property owner was moving to another state and was, as a result, selling his
residence. In fact, the property owner was not moving and was not interested in
selling. Would a reasonable person feel seriously offended or aggrieved by such
an advertisement? If a reasonable person would find this sort of advertisement
highly offensive, then it is difficult to conceive of any unauthorized use of a
person's name in the mass media that would not be actionable, except of course
for the use of names that are legitimately newsworthy. Have we become so sensi-
tive that the mere appearance of our names in the mass media reasonably causes
emotional distress?
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advertisement could reasonably be viewed as an unfair debt
collection practice."0
The Supreme Court of Illinois did not clearly indicate in
its opinion why a reasonable person could find the false adver-
tisement to be highly offensive. The court's entire analysis is
contained in two sentences. The first sentence simply restates
the complaint's allegations: "The facts alleged in the complaint
indicate that the plaintiff had no intention of selling his farm,
and that the placement of the advertisements and the circula-
tion of handbills were accomplished without his knowledge or
consent."' As noted above, it is difficult to believe that a
reasonable person would be highly offended simply by a false
announcement of a sale of property.
The second sentence indicates more clearly the court's
focus: "Of considerable significance is the allegation that the
unauthorized advertisement made it practically impossible for
plaintiff to obtain refinancing of his mortgage loan.""' If in
fact the announcement of a sale of the property made it "prac-
tically impossible" to obtain refinancing, it was most likely
because the advertisement announced a public auction rather
than merely a sale, and, as noted above, a public auction im-
plies financial distress. Thus, it seems most probable that the
Supreme Court of Illinois believed a reasonable person who
owned a farm and was having trouble making payments on the
mortgage could be highly offended by the false announcement
by the mortgagee of a public auction.
If this analysis of the court's opinion is correct, then the
court was simply creating a cause of action against a mortgag-
ee who, as part of a campaign of pressure directed at a default-
ing mortgagor, falsely advertises a public auction of the prop-
erty. Such a cause of action might be labelled tortious credit
collection practices.
In addition to this cause of action, the complaint in
Lovgren might easily have included causes of action for libel or
408. A consensual sale or foreclosure proceeding are the only permissible
methods for a mortgagee in Illinois to liquidate the security for the mortgage. See
ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15- 101 (Smith-Hurd 1984) (repealed 1987) ("No
real estate within this State may be sold by virtue of any power of sale contained
in any mortgage, trust deed or other conveyance in the nature of a mort-
gage .... ").
409. Lowgn, 534 N.E.2d at 990.
410. Id.
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intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.
Because the advertisement in effect announced the plaintiffs
financial distress, the advertisement could easily have been
defamatory, and the plaintiff, after the Supreme Court of
Illinois' decision remanding the case, added a cause of action
in libel to its complaint."' One serious problem with an ac-
tion for defamation in Lovgren is that the plaintiff apparently
was in financial distress and was not making his payments; the
implication of financial distress created by the advertisement
may have been substantially true, in which case the plaintiff
should not be able to recover either for defamation or false
light.
The plaintiff also amended his complaint after remand to
add a cause of action for interference with prospective eco-
nomic advantage. Recall that the complaint originally alleged
that the advertisement made it practically impossible to secure
refinancing, and the court emphasized this allegation in its
analysis. The refinancing would have been an advantageous
relationship, and, according to the allegations, the advertise-
ment interfered with the creation of that relationship. As a
matter of pleading, then, intentional interference with prospec-
tive relations could be alleged. It is of course difficult to credit
the allegation that it was the advertisement alone that prevent-
ed the plaintiff from securing refinancing (rather than the
plaintiffs lack of economic resources), but that is a matter to
be dealt with in a motion for summary judgment or at trial.
Tollefson v. Price is another credit collection case.4" The
defendant posted a notice in his store and published a similar
notice as an advertisement in the local paper announcing the
sale of certain "Judgment, Claims, Notes and Accounts," which
were "guaranteed by the owner to be just, correct and undis-
puted."" The plaintiffs name appeared in the list, and the
plaintiff sued, alleging embarrassment and humiliation."4 The
plaintiff also alleged that the notice was false in that the debt
411. Telephone interview with Gregg N. Grimsley (August 15, 1991).
412. 430 P.2d 990 (Or. 1967).
413. Id. at 991.
414. The suit was actually filed by a husband and wife and only the wife's
name appeared on the list. The husband alleged that he suffered humiliation and
embarrassment because his wife's name appeared on the list. Without explanation,
the court held that "[flor purpose of the demurrer, if either plaintiff states a
cause of action it must be overruled." Id.
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was disputed rather than undisputed."' In holding that a
cause of action for invasion of privacy was stated, the court
emphasized that the purpose of the advertisement was alleg-
edly not to collect the debt, but to harass, vex or annoy, and
that invasion of privacy was, as Dean Wade had observed,'
merely one aspect of the broader tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress."7 False light added nothing to the
plaintiffs chances for recovery. Whether the advertisement was
true was not the critical issue for the court; instead, the critical
issue was whether the defendant acted with an improper mo-
tive to cause the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress.4"'
We now consider the strange case of Rinsley v.
Fiydman."1 Dr. Donald B. Rinsley was a controversial Direc-
tor of the Children's Section of the Topeka State Hospital in
the early 1970's.4" His administration of the facility and his
theories of treatment generated a storm of criticism from oth-
er health professionals. The defendant, Dr. Louis Frydman,
apparently made it his business to expose the mistreatment
taking place in the Children's Section, to drive patients away
from the Children's Section, and to block reaccreditation of
the facility by the state board.' Rinsley's amended complaint
alleged interference with confidential relationships, defamation
and invasion of privacy."
The trial court granted a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. It found the
defamation allegations inadequate on a variety of grounds,
including, most significantly, that the defendant was a public
figure as a matter of law and that the complaint failed to allege
malice."" The court dismissed the privacy and interference
415. Id.
416. Wade, supra note 9, at 1124-25.
417. 430 P.2d at 991.
418. Id.
419. 559 P.2d 334 (Kan. 1977).
420. Dr. Rinsley was also a member of the Executive and Training Faculty in
Child Psychiatry of the Menninger Foundation and an Associate Clinical Professor
of Psychiatry at the University of Kansas Medical Center. Id. at 335. He was a
self. described "'nationally recognized . . . expert in the diagnosis and treatment
of adolescent children.'" Id. at 336.
421. Id. at 337.
422. Id. at 336.
423. Id. at 337. The trial court also held that the statements did not constitute
libel per se (the court probably meant slander per se), the plaintiff failed to allege
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claims as well, although the grounds for the dismissal are not
clearly set forth in the supreme court's opinion.4
At oral argument before the supreme court, plaintiffs
confused counsel disowned the defamation cause of action and
stated that the defendant's conduct "'can be conceptualized as
ranging on a continuum from tortious interference with con-
fidential contractual relations, through the intrusion, appropri-
ation, and false light forms of invasion of privacy.'"4 The
court did not appear to address itself directly to the tortious
interference claim. The court indicated that there is no such
claim as "tortious intermeddling," but it was unclear whether
the court believed the complaint alleged more than that."6
The court's discussion of privacy was equally
unilluminating. The court first cited its prior decision in
Froelich v. Adair as recognizing the Restatement's four versions
of privacy.'" The court next quoted an outdated tentative
draft of Section 652E dealing with false light. 28 With this
short legal introduction, the court then analyzed the record in
the following sentence: "On the posture of the amended peti-
tion as set forth in the record, subject only to the rules of no-
tice pleading at this point, it is sufficient to withstand attack,
under the appellee's motion to dismiss, based on the theory of
an invasion of privacy."'" We are left wondering, among oth-
er things, whether the complaint properly alleged only false
special damages, and statements allegedly made to legislative committees and com-
missions were absolutely privileged. Id.
424. 559 P.2d at 337-38.
425. Id. at 339.
426. Id.
427. Id. (citing Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993 (1973)).
428. Id. The court relied upon the 1967 tentative draft for its definition of
false light. This tentative draft differed significantly from the final draft. The final
draft included a requirement that "the actor had knowledge of or acted in reck-
less disregard as to the falsity of the public matter and the false light in which
the other would be placed." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977). The
tentative draft contained no such limitation, providing only that "[olne who gives
to another publicity which places him before the public in a false light of a kind
highly offensive to a reasonable man, is subject to liability to the other for inva-
sion of his privacy." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (Tentative Draft
No. 13, 1967). The court rendered its decision on January 22, 1977. If either
defense counsel or court had bothered to check the 1975 tentative draft, they
would have discovered that actual malice had been added to 652E. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (Tentative Draft No. 21, 1975) (liability for false light
if "the actor had knowledge of the falsity or acted in reckless disregard of it").
429. 559 P.2d at 339.
87719921
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
light privacy, or whether it also alleged intrusion and appropri-
ation, which were on the same "continuum" identified by
plaintiff's counsel at oral argument.
One thing is clear out of all of this: the plaintiffs claim
was no good. The trial court was undoubtedly correct that the
plaintiff was a public figure,s and since the complaint no-
where alleged malice, the defamation claim was properly dis-
missed. Under either the proper constitutional standard or
under the proper tentative draft of what ultimately became
Section 652E, the absence of an allegation of malice should
have likewise doomed the false light claim. The outdated ten-
tative draft of 652E, which the court relied upon, did not re-
quire malice, however, and the Supreme Court of Kansas up-
held the complaint despite the absence of that allegation.
If there was a valid cause of action in Rinsley, it was for
defamation. Plaintiff's counsel abandoned the defamation
claim, no doubt anticipating a problem in establishing actual
malice under the applicable constitutional standard. Plaintiff's
counsel then turned to an old version of 652E which did not
on its face require a finding of actual malice, and the Supreme
Court of Kansas (as well as defense counsel, apparently)
bought it.
Finally, we review Rafferty v. Hartford Courant Co., where
the court denied. defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment."' The plaintiffs in the case had recently been divorced.
In celebration of their new status, they held a party at a private
location at which was held an "unwedding" ceremony. The
plaintiffs were dressed in "peculiar garb," and the guests were
dressed "a bit oddly."' A reporter and photographer were
also present at the party, and the defendant-newspaper pub-
430. This is more than mere speculation. Dr. Rinsley was the subject of criti-
cism and attack in a book by Anthony Brandt. ANTHONY BRANDT, REALITY PO-
LICE: THE EXPERIENCE OF INSANITY IN AMERICA (1975). Dr. Rinsley sued the au-
thor and publisher in federal court, alleging defamation, invasion of privacy and
violation of civil rights protected by 42 U.S.C. sections 1985 and 1986. Rinsley v.
Brandt, 446 F. Supp. 850 (D. Kan. 1977). On a motion for summary judgment,
the district court held, among other things, that the plaintiff was both a public
figure and a public official. Id. at 857. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ulti-
mately affirmed a subsequent summary judgment entered against the plaintiff on
the grounds that the allegedly harmful statements were either substantially true or
were non-actionable opinions. Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304 (10th Cir. 1983).
431. 416 A.2d 1215 (Conn. 1980).
432. Id. at 1216.
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lished a story about the ceremony, complete with pictures.
One of the plaintiffs claimed that the adverse publicity cost
him his job. Their lawsuit pled claims for intrusion, public
disclosure of private facts and false light."s
The defendant moved for summary judgment on all
claims, and the court denied the motion, finding that disputed
questions of material fact remained to be decided.'" In par-
ticular, it was disputed whether the defendant's reporter had
been invited and whether, if invited, consent had been given to
the reporter to write a story about the party. If the reporter
had not been invited, then his uninvited attendance would
arguably have been a physical intrusion. The court also held
that there was little or no public interest in the story and that
if the reporter had obtained the story illegitimately, an action
for public disclosure might lie."35
Insofar as the false light claim was concerned, although
the court was of the view that the article "would appear in
general to be an accurate reflection of the happening," and the
plaintiff failed to come forward with any evidence showing that
the article was false, the court nevertheless denied summary
judgment, finding that the defendant, who had the initial bur-
den of establishing truth for purposes of the summary judg-
ment motion, had produced no evidence to support a finding
that the article was accurate. " It is most likely of course that
the article was right on the money. There was no dispute that
the unwedding ceremony took place. Either defense counsel
failed properly to support its motion for summary judgment,
or the court made a mistake. In any event, the court's opinion
is singularly unhelpful here. The opinion does not identify
anything about the article that was even allegedly false, and the
433. Id.
434. Id. at 1221.
435. Id. at 1216. The court's reasoning here is a little faulty. If the content of
the story is newsworthy, it should not matter for purposes of public disclosure of
private facts whether the content was obtained through legitimate or illegitimate
means. The tort of public disclosure is intended to protect only the interest in
keeping private information private, and if the information is newsworthy, then it
may not be deemed private. Other torts, such as intrusion, trespass or conversion,
are designed to handle cases where the press uses illegitimate means to access
information that is being kept secret. Improper invasions of secrecy should not be
confused with public disclosure of private facts. That which is secret is not neces-
sarily private.
436. 416 A.2d at 1217.
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court does not explain how the plaintiffs were portrayed in a
false light. If the story was false-if there had been no
unwedding ceremony or if the participants had not worn fan-
tastic costumes and behaved oddly-a cause of action for libel
would surely have existed.
b. Affirming Jury Verdict for False Light Privacy
When all is said and done, research has uncovered only
two state appellate decisions affirming an award of damages
for false light privacy when no other overlapping cause of ac-
tion arising out of the same communication had been pled or
proved. The first decision, by the Supreme Court of Iowa, is
Anderson v. Low Rent Housing Commission of Muscatine.37 The
plaintiff, Phyllis Anderson, was employed as a secretary in the
Community Development Department of the City of
Muscatine, Iowa. The plaintiff was either a whistle- blower or a
busy-body and trouble maker. The plaintiff's supervisor called
her a trouble maker and terminated her summarily. The jury
determined that she was a whistle- blower, and it found in her
favor on causes of action for libel and false light invasion of
privacy.
Anderson is a perfect example of how a smart lawyer may
be able to confuse opposing counsel and the court by carefully
exploiting the multiplicity of overlapping causes of action (such
as false light and defamation). There were two communica-
tions which the plaintiff alleged injured her. The first commu-
nication occurred some four months prior to the plaintiffs
discharge. The offending statement was contained in a letter to
the Community Development Department from the Low Rent
Housing Commission (known as either the LRHC or the
LHA), which served the Department. The letter, drafted by
one of the defendants, said that "'She [Anderson] also has
become a serious source of difficulty for the LHA.'"4
Plaintiffs counsel used this statement as the basis for a defa-
mation claim (but not a false light claim). The jury found this
statement to be defamatory and awarded damages against the
437. 304.N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1981), en. denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981).
438. Id. at 245.
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LHA in the amount of $15,000 and against the drafter of the
letter in the amount of $20,000.
43.
The second communication occurred on the day of the
plaintiffs discharge. The plaintiffs supervisor confirmed to
several reporters that the plaintiff had been terminated and
summarized the reasons for the dismissal, which amounted to
a repetition of the charge that Anderson had created difficul-
ties within the department. " ' Interestingly, plaintiffs counsel
did not allege that these statements were defamatory. Instead,
counsel alleged only that these statements put the plaintiff in a
false light. The jury also found in plaintiffs favor on these
claims, awarding $10,000 in actual damages and $10,000 in
punitive damages.4 '
The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed and remanded the
defamation award. The trial court had determined as a matter
of law that the plaintiff was a public figure. Notwithstanding
this finding and over the objection of the defendants, the
court instructed the jury that the plaintiff had to prove actual
malice only by a preponderance of evidence."' In support of
this instruction, the trial court reasoned that the clear and
convincing standard of proof was reserved for suits involving
media defendants, and that in suits involving non-media defen-
dants, the First Amendment was satisfied by a preponderance
instruction."' The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed, holding
that the distinction between media and non-media defendants
was irrelevant for purposes of First Amendment restrictions
upon defamation actions."
Apparently confused by the multiplicity of causes of action
and in spite of his careful objection to the preponderance
instruction in the context of the defamation claim, defense
439. Id. at 245.
440. Id. at 247-48. Anderson had been supplying information about potentially
illegal allocation of federal funds to the FBI and to the press. According to the
court, Anderson's supervisor, one Schott, 'was quoted to the effect that he had
been plagued with two problems: one involved various investigations, and the oth-
er concerned friction between employees in the community development depart-
ment. Schott was also quoted as saying that the dismissal of Anderson was the
action he felt could best remedy that difficulty." Id. at 247.
441. Id. at 248.
442. Id. at 245.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 247.
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counsel failed to object when the trial court instructed the jury
that the plaintiff could succeed on her false light claim by
proving the elements of the tort by only a preponderance of
the evidence."" Having failed to preserve the point by a time-
ly objection, counsel apparently decided not to raise the issue
on appeal, and the Supreme Court of Iowa limited its review
"to those issues presented and argued by the parties."46 The
only issues raised on the appeal from the false light judgment
related to the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on two
weak affirmative defenses, consent and waiver. The court held
that the record contained no evidence which supported those
defenses, and the court affirmed the judgment. 47
As it turned out, plaintiff's counsel made an extremely
wise decision in pleading the first communication as defama-
tion only and pleading the second communication as false light
only. Whether counsel foresaw that the choice might produce
such a favorable result is open to speculation, although there is
some evidence that counsel knew exactly what he was doing.
By the time of the second communication, the plaintiffs name
had become newsworthy, and the plaintiff was pretty clearly a
public figure, definitely triggering the actual malice standard
from New York Times and probably triggering the clear and
convincing standard as well.44 Counsel may have hoped that
by pleading the second communication as a false light claim,
defense counsel and the court would give the preponderance
instruction, failing to realize that the First Amendment con-
cerns which trigger the clear and convincing standard in defa-
mation should operate just as strongly in the false light con-
text.4 Counsel guessed right. The trial court gave a prepon-
derance instruction, and defense counsel failed to object.
There was also a good reason for pleading the first com-
munication only in defamation and not including a false light
445. Id. at 248.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 248-51.
448. PlaintifFs counsel of course argued that the clear and convincing standard
was reserved for media defendants, but counsel probably realized that this argu-
ment was relatively weak and that he stood a good chance of having to prove the
defamation claim by clear and convincing evidence.
449. Indeed, Professor Zimmerman makes a strong argument that the false
light tort should be limited by constitutional rules even stricter than those which
operate in the context of defamation. Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 435-51.
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claim here. In the first place, pleading both false light and
defamation together for the same communication might have
alerted defense counsel and the court to the absurdity of using
a clear and convincing standard for defamation and a prepon-
derance standard for false light. Second, and probably more
important for plaintiffs counsel, at the time of the first com-
munication, the plaintiffs name had not appeared in the me-
dia, and the plaintiff had a decent chance of proving that the
plaintiff was not a public figure. If the plaintiff was not a pub-
lic figure, then the actual malice standard would not apply,
and the plaintiff could win on either a showing of fault or
less."W This would be easier than proving false light which,
according to Section 652E,4 ' always requires a showing of ac-
tual malice.
By exploiting the minor differences between defamation
and false light, plaintiffs counsel was able to secure and hold
on appeal its false light verdict. If the minor differences being
exploited reflected real differences between defamation and
false light, then exploiting them would be fair game. It does
not make sense, however, to have a clear and convincing stan-
dard for defamation of public figures but to have a preponder-
ance standard for portraying a public figure in a false light.
These sort of irrational differences are the inevitable re-
sult of any attempt to provide two causes of action to remedy
essentially the same type of harm caused by the same type
conduct. We have seen a similar problem in the area of prod-
ucts liability where different causes of action and theories of
recovery have multiplied like rabbits. The main result of creat-
ing multiple causes of action has been years of confusion as
the courts try to figure out what the differences are, if any,
between, for example, design defect cases under Restatement
(second) of Torts, section 402A (1977), and ordinary negli-
gence.4" In Anderson, we witness a similar type of confusion
leading to an equally unsatisfactory and confusing result. Be-
'cause there are two causes of action, courts feel almost com-
450. See, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
451. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
452. J. Clark Kelso, Brown v. Abbott Laboratoties and Strict P oducts Liability, 20
Pac. LJ. 1 (1988); William C. Powers, Jr., The Persistence of Fault in Products Lia-
bility, 61 TEX. L REv. 777 (1983).
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pelled to create some differences between them, even if those
differences do not reflect real differences in the interests being
protected or the conduct being regulated.
The second decision is from the California Court of Ap-
peal in Kinsey v. Macur, a "fatal attraction" case.' The defen-
dant, Mary Macur, had a short relationship with one of the
co-plaintiffs, Bill Kinsey. Kinsey broke off the relationship and
shortly thereafter married co-plaintiff Sally Allen Kinsey. Macur
reacted poorly to Kinsey's marriage. She sent some thirty let-
ters to the co-plaintiffs, their parents, some of their friends,
their parents' neighbors, members of Bill Kinsey's dissertation
committee at Stanford and the President of Stanford Universi-
ty (overall, about twenty persons received letters)." The let-
ters somewhat hysterically accused Kinsey of being a bad per-
son."' In addition, a number of the letters accused Kinsey of
having murdered his first wife, of having spent six months in
jail for that crime and of having committed rape." The truth
of the matter was that Kinsey had been accused of murdering
his first wife while on a picnic in Tanzania, had spent six
months in jail awaiting trial (having refused to post bail), and
had been acquitted of the crime,45 and the trial court found
that he had not attempted to rape Macur 4
The Kinsey's sought an injunction and damages for "men-
tal anguish, suffering and expenses incurred in trying to pro-
tect the Kinseys from appellant Macur's reach." 9 The com-
plaint apparently pled only a single cause of action for invasion
of privacy. An injunction was agreed to by the parties, and the
trial court awarded the Mr. Kinsey damages of $5,000 for inva-
sion of privacy."'
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs
had proven both public disclosure of private facts and false
light.' " Both public disclosure and false light require that
453. 165 Cal. Rptr. 608 (Ct. App. 1980).
454. Id. at 611-12.
455. For example, the first letter to Kinsey was addressed to "'the most deceit-
fil, fucking, selfish bastard I know.'" Id. at 610.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 613.
458. Id. at 610.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 614.
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there be "publicity" which, according to Restatement (Second) of
Torts, "means that the matter is made public, by communicat-
ing it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the
matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become
one of public knowledge."462 It would appear initially that a
communication by private letter to only 20 persons would not
constitute "publicity." The court held otherwise, however, em-
phasizing that the defendant's purpose, as she herself ex-
pressed it in one of her letters, was to "'tell the whole world
what a bastard he is, ' " '4 s and that the twenty or so people
who received letters "had nothing in common except the possi-
ble acquaintance of Bill Kinsey,"" a circumstance which, for
the court, "adequately reflect[ed] 'mass exposure."' 65
The court discussed only one additional false light issue.
The defendant asserted that by failing to comply with
California's retraction statute,4" the plaintiffs could recover
for false light only if they proved special damages, which they
had failed even to allege. 67 This was a rather silly argument
because section 48a applies by its express terms only to broad-
cast defamation and newspaper libels,4" and does not apply
to private letters. The court rejected this argument on the
suspect ground that section 48a does not apply to false light
suits which also involve public disclosures of private facts, since
retracting the public disclosure of private facts would only
exacerbate the initial disclosure. 69
462. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977).
463. 165 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a (West 1982 & Supp. 1992).
467. Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 14 Cal. Rptr. 208 (Ct. App. 1961), had held
that section 48a applied in a suit against a newspaper alleging both libel and false
light.
468. Section 48a provides in relevant part that "[i]n any action for damages
for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, or of a slander by radio broadcast,
plaintiff shall recover no more than special damages unless a correction be de-
manded and be not published or broadcast, as hereinafter provided." CAL. CIV.
CODE § 48a (West 1982 & Supp. 1992). "Radio broadcast" is defined in CAL. Civ.
CODE § 48.5(4) (West 1982 & Supp. 1992) "to include both visual and sound ra-
dio broadcasting."
469. The court was correct that insofar as the tort is public disclosure, the re-
traction statute would not apply because, as the court said, the retraction would
only repeat the initial disclosure. 107 Cal. Rptr. at 614 (quoting Kapellas v.
Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, (Cal. 1969)). But insofar as the tort is false light, the re-
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The mystery about Kinsey is not why there was a recovery,
but why the plaintiffs did not plead libel. Among other false
accusations, the defendant accused Kinsey in writing of having
committed both murder and rape. Why not plead libel and
recover, in addition to emotional distress damages, presumed
damages for injury to reputation? The answer may be that
Kinsey pre-dated Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,7
and plaintiffs' counsel may have been concerned about over-
coming the actual malice standard for presumed damages from
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.7' and New York Times v.
Sullivan."" The plaintiffs sought only $10,000 in their com-
plaint, and their prime goal in bringing the suit may have been
only to get the injunction in any event. It seems clear, howev-
er, that recovery could have been had in Kinsey for defamation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The continued viability of false light privacy should be
decided by examining the two cases just reviewed. These are
the only cases where false light privacy shows its true colors. In
the other cases, false light privacy is concealed by other, more
stable, causes of action. It is much easier to permit a cause of
action for false light privacy to proceed when that cause of
action goes hand in hand with defamation, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, misappropriation, or some other
well established tort.
For my money, the few "true" false light decisions do not
establish the independent vitality of a cause of action that de-
serves judicial recognition. Each of these cases is more proper-
ly treated as either defamation or intentional infliction of emo-
traction statute must be held to apply. Otherwise, the plaintiff can avoid the re-
traction statute entirely in a case to which it otherwise would apply (i.e.,
newspaper libel or broadcast defamation) by the simple expedient of pleading
false light and public disclosure and not pleading libel. The court in Kapellas ex-
plicitly approved the holding in Werner v. Times- Mirror Co., 14 Cal. Rptr. 208
(CL App. 1961), that section 48a was applicable to false light claims. 459 P.2d at
921 n.17. The Supreme Court of California subsequently confirmed Werner in
Fellows v. National Enquirer, 721 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1986). The Kinsey court should
have held that the retraction statute did not apply because the letters were neither
published in a newspaper nor broadcast over television or radio.
470. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
471. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
472. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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tional distress or both. And in one of the cases, false light is
manipulated by an astute plaintiffs counsel in such a way as to
mislead and confuse both opposing counsel and court. Justice
is not served by permitting this type of subterfuge. Courts
around the country should follow the lead set by North Caroli-
na, Missouri and Ohio, and declare that false light privacy is
no part of the law of torts. False light privacy, may it rest in
peace.

